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
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# HERMES

OR

## A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

CONCERNING

## UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BY JAMES HARRIS ESQ.

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ΕΙΣΙΝΑΙ ΘΑΠΡΟΥΝΤΑΞ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΤΑΘΑ ΘΕΟΥΣ.

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TO  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
**PHILIP LORD HARDWICKE,**  
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN.\*

*My Lord,*

*AS no one has exercised the Powers of Speech with juster and more universal applause, than yourself; I have presumed to inscribe the following Treatise to your Lordship, its End being to investigate the Principles of those Powers. It has a farther Claim to your Lordship's Patronage, by being connected in some degree with that politer Literature, which, in the most important scenes of Business, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to*

---

\* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should be considered as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.

*myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government ; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation ? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that, with the greatest gratitude and respect, I am, My Lord,*

*Your Lordship's most obliged,*

*and most obedient humble Servant,*

**JAMES HARRIS.**

*Close of Salisbury,*

*Oct. 1, 1751.*

## PREFACE.

**T**HE chief End proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation), but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind; like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue of the



tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

*Hoc juvat et melli est.* ~~—————~~

For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say (according to the vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that "it was the hasty fruits of a few idle hours; written merely for private amusement; never revised; published against consent, at the importunity of friends, copies (God knows how) having by stealth gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falsehood and inanity. May we not ask such Prefacers, *If what they allege be true, what*

*has the world to do with them and their crudities.*

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral ; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little studied ; and some, perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name, just suffices to give them a

kind of *nominal* existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

*Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Noemonaque,  
Prytanimque.*

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, *among people* (in the fashionable phrase) *that nobody knows*, what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has), what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

He hopes there will be found a pleasure

in the contemplation of antient sentiments, as the view of antient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, *Extremes may be said to meet*. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of *Grecian* and *Roman* Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous and depraved; it may afford, perhaps, no unpleasing speculation, to see how the **SAME REASON** has at all times prevailed; how there is **ONE TRUTH**, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men,

and human Knowledge ; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature,

It is perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we BRITONS by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen ; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think perfection with ourselves, and that it is superfluous to search farther.

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow ; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. It is hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of LOGIC or UNIVERSAL REASONING. It is thro' *them* we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely, the Predicament of *Quantity*. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied *here*, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves *elsewhere*. Nay, farther still—by viewing the MIND, *during its process in these syllogistic employments*, we may come to know in part, *what kind of Being it is*; since MIND, like other Powers, can be only known from its *Operations*. Whoever therefore will study *Mathematics* in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert *Logician*, and by



Logic a more rational *Mathematician*, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when *Mathematics*, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify *Logic*, but to supply its place; no wonder if *Logic* pass into contempt, and if *Mathematics*, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is *universal*, come to attach themselves for years to a single *Species*, a species wholly involved in *Lines and Numbers only*; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor *Indians* thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay, the

necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even *Knowledge itself* should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such, then, is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity ; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science ; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature ; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern ; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem ; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confest already, it would be no unpleasing event. Should

the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in his fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern Wit are every day passing,

—*in vicum vendentem thus et odores.*

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## ADVERTISEMENT.

*The Reader is desired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. &c. he refers to Three Treatises published first in one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1745.*

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**HERMES**  
OR  
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY  
CONCERNING  
*UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.*

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**BOOK I.**

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**CHAP. I.**

**INTRODUCTION.**

*Design of the Whole.*

**I**F Men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper subjects of Discourse. Since **SPEECH**, then, is the joint Energy of our best and noblest Faculties,<sup>(a)</sup> (that is to say, of our *Reason* and our *social Affection*) being

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<sup>(a)</sup> See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume



withal our *peculiar* Ornament and Distinction, as *Men*; those Inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how *SPEECH* may be naturally *resolved*; or how, when resolved, it may be again *combined*.

HERE, a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold *SPEECH*, as divided into *its constituent Parts*, as a Statue may be divided into its several limbs; or else, as resolved into its *Matter* and *Form*, as the same Statue may be resolved into its Marble and Figure.

THESE different *Analysings* or *Resolutions* constitute what we call <sup>(b)</sup> PHILOSOPHICAL, or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

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<sup>(b)</sup> Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit *literarij*, alia philosophica, &c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. And soon after he adds—*Verumtamen hâc ipsâ re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulo inquirat.*

WHEN we have viewed **SPEECH** thus analysed, we may then consider it as *compounded*. And here, in the first place, we may contemplate that <sup>(c)</sup> *Synthesis* which by combining simple Terms produces a Truth ; then by combining two Truths produces a third ; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of **SCIENCE**.

Now this is that *superior* and most excellent *Synthesis*, which alone applies itself to our *Intellect* or *Reason*, and which to

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<sup>(c)</sup> *Aristotle* says—τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενων ἔδεν ἢτε ἀληθὲς ἢτε ψευδὲς εἶπαι ὅλον ἀνθρώπος λεῖκος, τρέχει, νικᾷ—Of those words which are spoken without connexion, there is no one either true or false ; as for instance, *Man, white, runneth, conquereth*. Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise *De Interpretatione*, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν ἢ διαρᾶσιν ἔστι τὸ ψευδὸς τε ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. *True and False are seen in Composition and Division*. Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring terms together, and so far therefore may be called *synthetical*.

conduct according to Rule, constitutes the Art of Logic.

AFTER this we may turn to those  
*inferior* Compositions, which are productive of the *Pathetic*, and the *Pleasant*,

---

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ammonius* in his Comment on the Treatise *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, p. 53, gives the following extract from *Theophrastus*, which is here inserted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διττῆς γὰρ ἔσης τῆ λόγῃ σχέσεως (καθ' ἣ διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος), τῆς τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἷς ἡ σημαίνει τι, ἡ τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πείσαι προτιθῆται τὰς ἀκρωμένους· περὶ μὲν ἔν τῇ σχέσει αὐτῇ τὴν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΩΑΤΑΣ καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ· διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ ἢ δεδημευμένα, ἢ ταῦτα ἑναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥτε διὰ τέτων ἢ τῶν τέτοις ἐπομένων, οἷον σαφηνείας, γλυκύτητος, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ιδεῶν, ἔτι τε μακρολογίας, ἢ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαμβάνομένων, οἷσα τε τὸν ἀκρόατην, ἢ ἐκπλῆξαι, ἢ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν τῆς δέ γε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῆς λόγῃ σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγαμένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς. *The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the HEARERS to whom*

in all their kinds. These latter Compositions aspire not to the Intellect, but being, addressed to the *Imagination*, the *Affections*, and the *Sense*, become, from their differ-

*it explains something, and one to the THINGS, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the HEARERS are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use; and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as through these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.*

*Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem.—Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quæ ab oratione solæcismos et barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quæ in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica quæ ornatum Sermonis tantum æquirit. M. in l. 1. c. 2.*

ent heightenings, either RHETORIC or POETRY.

NOR need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though LOGIC may indeed subsist without RHETORIC or POETRY, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deemed Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

At present we shall postpone the whole synthetical Part (that is to say *Logic* and

*Rhetoric*), and confine ourselves to the analytical, that is to say, **UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR**. In this we shall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, first dividing **SPEECH**, as a **WHOLE**, into its **CONSTITUENT PARTS**; then resolving it, as a **COMPOSITE**, into its **MATTER** and **FORM**; two Methods of Analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations.

SHOULD any one object, that in the course of our Inquiry we sometimes descend to things which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which those things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Consequences, let him honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not improperly be here inserted. “When the Fame of *Heraclitus* was celebrated throughout *Greece*, there were certain Persons, that

“ had a curiosity to see so great a man.  
 “ They came, and, as it happened, found  
 “ him warming himself in a Kitchen. The  
 “ meanness of the place occasioned them to  
 “ stop ; upon which the Philosopher thus  
 “ accosted them—ENTER (says he), BOLD-  
 “ LY, FOR HERE TOO THERE ARE GODS.”<sup>(\*)</sup>

We shall only add, that as there is no  
 part of Nature too mean for the Divine  
 Presence ; so there is no kind of Subject,  
 having its foundation in Nature, that is  
 below the Dignity of a philosophical  
 Inquiry.

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<sup>(\*)</sup> See *Aristot. de Part. Animal.* l. 1. c. 5.

## CHAP. II.

*Concerning the Analysing of Speech into its smallest Parts.*

THOSE things which are *first to Nature* are not *first to Man*. *Nature* begins from *Causes*, and thence descends to *Effects*. *Human Perceptions* first open upon *Effects* and thence by slow degrees ascend to *Causes*. Often had mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition ; much oftener had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion.<sup>(a)</sup> Even

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<sup>(a)</sup>This Distinction of *first to Man*, and *first to Nature*, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy.—See *Arist. Phys. Auscult.* l. 1. c. 1. *Themistius's* Comment on the same, *Poster. Analyt.* l. 1. c. 2. *De Anima*,



in Matters of Art and *human* Creation, if we except a few Artists and critical Ob-

l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. God may be said to view the First as first; and the Last as last; that is, he views *Effects* through *Causes* in their *natural Order*. MAN views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views *Causes* through *Effects*, in an *inverse Order*, and hence the Meaning of that passage in *Aristotle*; ὡςπερ γὰρ τὰ ὄν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, ὅτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῆς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all things.*

Metaph. l. 2. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 4. and *Ethic. Nicom.*

l. 1. c. 4. *Ammonius*, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the subject of this Treatise—'Αγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλότερα καὶ τελειότερα προῖναι τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα· Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶραι μὲν λόγον, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, οἶδε· τῆτον δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβὰς, κακῆνα εἰς στοιχεῖα, ἔκτε· *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus, therefore, it is, that even a Child knows how to put a sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a*

servers, the rest look no higher than to the *Practice* and mere *Work*, knowing nothing of those *Principles* on which the whole depends.

Thus in *SPEECH* for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own language? How few, then, must be those, who know *GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL*; *that Grammar* which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages, *only respects those Principles that are essential to them all?*

'Tis our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we

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*Noun and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.*

shall follow the Order consonant to *human* Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

WE shall begin therefore first from a *Period or Sentence*, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all; and thence pass, if possible, to those its *primary Parts*, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH respect, therefore, to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as if we address him in his Mother Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *assert*, and when we *question*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wish*?

FOR example, when we read in *Shakespeare*\*

*The Man that hath no music in himself,  
And is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,  
Is fit for Treasons——*

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\* Merchant of Venice.

Or in *Milton*,\*

*O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet  
Hasting this way——*

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions,

*When shall we three meet again,  
In thunder, lightning, and in rain?*

this, 'tis evident, is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* says, to the Ghost of Banquo,

*———Hence, horrible Shadow,  
Unreal Mock'ry, hence!———*

he speaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the passion of hatred.

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\* P. L. IV. 866.

WHEN *Milton* says in the character of his *Allegro*,

*Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee  
Jest and youthful Jollity.*

he too speaks an *imperative Sentence*, though founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.

WHEN in the beginning of the *Paradise Lost* we read the following address,

*And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer  
Before all temples th' upright heart, and pure,  
Instruct me, for thou know'st—*

this is not to be called an *imperative Sentence*, though perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence *precative* or *optative*.

WHAT then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in their stamp and character? Are they no way reducible to certain definite Classes?

If not, they can be no objects of *rational* comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that *he speaks his MIND*; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is *a publishing of some Energy or Motion of his Soul*. So it indeed is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the Dissembler or Hypocrite; and he, too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over and above the mere \* nutritive) may be included all of them in those of PERCEPTION, and those of VOLITION. By the Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the *Senses* and the *Intellect*; by the Powers of VOLITION, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the *Will* but the several *Passions* and

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\* Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

*Appetites ; in short, all that moves to action whether rational or irrational.*

IF, then, the leading Powers of the Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech, or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, must, of course, respect one or other of these.

IF we *assert*, then it is a Sentence which respects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to *publish some Perception either of the Senses or the Intellect ?*

AGAIN, if we *interrogate*, if we *command*, if we *pray*, or if we *wish* (which in terms of Art is to speak Sentences *interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative*) what do we but publish so many different VOLITIONS ?—For who is it that *questions ?* He that has a *Desire* to be informed.—Who is

it that *commands*? He that has a *Will*, which he would have obeyed.—What are those Beings, who either *wish* or *pray*? Those, who feel certain wants either for themselves, or others.

IF then the *Soul's leading Powers* be the *two* above mentioned, and if it be true that *all Speech is a publication of these Powers*, it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And thus by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude.

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(B) Πρῶτον εἶν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διττὰς ἐχέσης δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς ἐν ὀρεκτικὰς λεγομένας· (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκουμεν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νῦν, διάνοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν ἐν αἰσθησιν· ὀρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ὀρεγόμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δοκούντων, οἷον βάλῃσιν λέγω, προαίρεσιν, θυμὸν, ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ ΜΕΝ τέτταρα εἶδη τῷ λόγῳ (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ὀρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτήν



THE Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare

ἐνεργείας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποτετιομένης (τὸν συμβάλλεσθαι δοκούντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) καὶ ἦτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτῆς ζητήσεως, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῇ ΠΥΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καὶ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καλεσμένης λόγῳ, ἢ πρᾶγμα, καὶ εἰ πρᾶγμα, ἦτοι αὐτῇ ἐκείνῳ τυχεῖν ἐφεμένης, πρὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος, ὡς περ ἐπὶ τῇ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ἢ τινὸς παρ' αὐτῆς πράξεως· καὶ ταύτης, ἢ ὡς παρὰ κρείττονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ΕΥΧΗΣ, καὶ ὡς παρὰ χείρονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῇ κυρίως καλεσμένης ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ· μόνον ΔΕ τὸ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωστικῶν, καὶ ἔστι τῷ ἐξαγγελτικῷ τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ φαινομένως, διὸ καὶ μόνον τῷ δεκτικῷ ἔστιν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἰδέν. The Meaning of the above passage being implied in the Text, we take its translation from the *Latin Interpreter*.

*Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplicem potestatem habeat, cognitionis, et vitæ, quæ etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellatur, quæ vero cognitionis est, vis est, quâ res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantasiâ, sensus : appetitus vero facultas est, quâ bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas : quatuor orationis species, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi proficiscuntur, quæ concupiscunt ; non cum animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum id, quod cupit, conducere posse videatur ; atque etiam vel rationem ab eo exquirat, ut in oratione, quam Percunctantem aut Interrogantem vocant ; vel rem : sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum*

the *Æneid* to an Epigram of *Martial*. But the *longest Extension*, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here considered, that is to say, a SENTENCE. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but sentences repeated.

NOW a SENTENCE <sup>(c)</sup> may be sketched in the following description—a *compound Quantity of Sound significant, of*

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*loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem; atque in hâc, vel ut a præstantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enunciatio a cognoscendi facultate profisciscitur: hæque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis est aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Hæc sola verum falsumque capit: præterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.*

(c) Λόγος δὲ φωνῇ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, ἥς ἕντα μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.

*which certain Parts are themselves also significant.*

THUS when I say [*the Sun shineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of sound has a meaning, but *certain parts* also, such as [*Sun*] and [*shineth*].

BUT what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as a *Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant*. And this is what we call the proper character of a <sup>(d)</sup>WORD.

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<sup>(d)</sup> Φωνή σημαντική,—ἥς μέρος ἄδέν ἐστι καθ' αὐτὸ σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows—

For thus, though the Words [*Sun*] and [*shineth*] have each a Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts; neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other.

IF therefore ALL SPEECH, whether in prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain *Meaning, divisible into other Meanings*, but WORDS imply a *Meaning, which is not so divisible* : it follows that WORDS *will be the smallest parts of Speech*, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all.

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*Dictio est pars minima orationis constructæ, id est, in ordine compositæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum est, ne quis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi et res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divisio.* To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza.—*Ἀέξιος δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγος.* Introd. Gram. l. 4. Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word—See *Cratylus* p. 385. Edit. Serr.

*To know therefore the species of Words must needs contribute to the knowledge of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its minutest Parts.*

THIS therefore must become our next Inquiry.

## CHAP. III.

*Concerning the Species of Words, the  
smallest Parts of Speech.*

**LET** us first search for the *Species* of Words among those Parts of Speech, commonly received by Grammarians. For Example in one of the passages above cited—

*The Man that hath no music in himself,  
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,  
Is fit for treasons—*

Here the Word [*The*] is an ARTICLE;—  
[*Man*] [*No*] [*Music*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*]  
[*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treasons*] are all NOUNS,  
some *Substantive*, and some *Adjective*—  
[*That*] and [*Himself*] are PRONOUNS—  
[*Hath*] and [*Is*] are VERBS—[*Mov'd*] a  
PARTICIPLE—[*Not*] an ADVERB—[*And*]  
a CONJUNCTION—[*In*] [*With*] and [*For*]

are PREPOSITIONS. In one sentence we have all those parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latins* only differ in having no Article, and in separating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itself, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

WHAT then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example the same Sentence above,

*The Man that hath no music, &c.*

ONE Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Hast*,

*Had, &c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweetest; Fit into Fitter and Fittest.* On the contrary, the Words *The, In, And,* and some others, remain as they are, and *cannot be altered.*

AND yet it may be questioned, how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual* Variation, which is unknown both to the Moderns, and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case, and Number; whereas the *English* never vary them in any of those ways, but through all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by *Auxiliars* as when for *Bruti* or



*Bruto* we say, of *Brutus*, to *Brutus* ; some, by mere *Position*, as when for *Brutum amavit Cassius*, we say, *Cassius loved Brutus*. For here the *Accusative*, which in *Latin* is known *any where* from its *Variation*, is in *English* only known from its *Position* or place.

IF then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

SUPPOSE then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several *Parts* as they stand *separate* and detached. Some, 'tis plain, still preserve a *Meaning* (such as *Man, Music, Sweet, &c.*) others on the contrary *immediately lose it* (such as, *And, The, With, &c.*). Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it but when *in company*, or *associated*.

Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For all Words are significant or else they would not be Words; and if every thing not *absolute*, is of course *relative*, then will all Words be significant either *absolutely* or *relatively*.

WITH respect therefore to this Distinction, the first sort of Words may be call'd *significant by themselves*; the latter may be call'd *significant by relation*; or if we like it better, the first sort may be called *Principals*, the latter *Accessories*. The first are like those stones in the basis of an Arch, which are able to support themselves, even when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are like those stones in its Summit or Curve, which can no longer stand, than while the whole subsists. <sup>(1)</sup>

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<sup>(1)</sup> *Apollonius of Alexandria* (one of the acutest Authors that ever wrote on the Subject of Grammar) illustrates the different power of Words, by the different power of Letters. "Ετι, δὲ τρόπον τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν

§ This Distinction being admitted, we thus pursue our Speculations. All *things* whatever either exist as the *Energies*,

ἔστι φωνήεντα, ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ· τὰ δὲ σί φωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν φωνηέντων ἑκ ἑχέει ῥητὴν τὴν ἐκφώνσιν. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι κατὰ τῶν λέξεων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, τρόπον τινὰ τῶν φωνηέντων ῥηταὶ εἰσι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ὀνομάτων, ἀντωνυμιῶν, ἐπιρρήμάτων. αἱ δὲ, ὥσπερ εἰ σύμφωνα, ἀναμένεσι τὰ φωνήεντα, ὃ δυνάμει κατ' ἰδίαν ῥητὰ εἶναι—καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τὰ ἄρθρων, τῶν συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα αἰετῶν μορίων συνσημαίνει. *In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters some are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no express vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowels being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for these parts of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when associated to something else.* Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. 1. c. 3. *Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit NOMEN ET VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; cætera vero ADMINICULA vel JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabulæ et trabes, cætera autem (id est, cera, stuppa, et clavi, et similia) vincula et conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est, labu-*

*Affections, of some other thing, or without being the Energies or Affections of some other thing. If they exist as the Energies or Affections of something else, then are they called ATTRIBUTES.—Thus to think is the attribute of a Man; to be white, of a Swan; to fly, of an Eagle; to be four-footed, of a Horse.—If they exist not after this manner, then are they called SUBSTANCES.\* Thus Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse, are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else, do they exist as Energies or Affections.*

AND thus all things whatsoever, being

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*larum et trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Prisc. L. XI. 913.*

\* SUBSTANCES.] Thus Aristotle. Νῦν μὲν ἐν τύπῳ εἰρηγὰι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ὁσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένους, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἅλλα. *Metaph. Z γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb.*

either <sup>o</sup> *Substances* or *Attributes*, it follows of course that all Words, *which are significant as Principals*, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are *significant of Substances*, they are called *Substantives*; if of *Attributes*, they are called *Attributives*. So that ALL WORDS *whatever, significant as Principals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or ATTRIBUTIVES.*

AGAIN, as to Words, which are only significant as *Accessories*, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner *define* or *determine*, they may justly for that reason be called DEFINI-

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<sup>o</sup> This division of things into *Substance* and *Attribute* seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and ages. See *Catagor. c. 2, Metaphys. L. VII. c. 1. De Caelo, L. III. c. 1.*

TIVES. If *to many Words at once*, then as they serve to no other purpose than *to connect*, they are called for that reason by the name of **CONNECTIVES**.

AND thus it is that all **WORDS** whatever are either *Principals* or *Accessories*; or under other Names, either *significant from themselves*, or *significant by relation*.—If *significant from themselves*, they are either *Substantives* or *Attributives*; if *significant by relation*, they are either *Definitives* or *Connectives*. So that under one of these four Species, **SUBSTANTIVES**, **ATTRIBUTIVES**, **DEFINITIVES**, and **CONNECTIVES** are **ALL WORDS**, *however different, in a manner included*.

IF any of these Names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the *Substantives*, **NOUNS**; the *Attributives*, **VERBS**; the *Definitives*,

ARTICLES; and the *Connectives*, *CONJUNCTIONS*.

SHOULD it be asked, what then become of *Pronouns*, *Adverbs*, *Prepositions*, and *Interjections*; the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient Days, as to the *number* of these Parts or Elements of Speech.

*Plato* in his \**Sophist* mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb*. *Aristotle* mentions no more, where he treats of †*Prepositions*. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to *Logic* or *Dialec-*

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\* Tom. 1, p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† De Interpr. c. 2 and 3.

tic <sup>(a)</sup> considering the Essence of Speech as contained in these two, because *these alone* combined make a perfect *assertive* Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore *Aristotle* in his *\*treatise of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements of a more

<sup>(a)</sup> *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duæ, NOMEN et VERBUM; quia hæ solæ etiam per se conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes συγκατανηγορήματα, hoc est, consignantia appellabant.* Priscian l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putschii. *Existit hic quædam quæstio, cur duo tantum, NOMEN et VERBUM, se (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis et Nominibus componatur.—Quare superfluum est quærere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa partiri.* Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. *Apollonius* from the above principles elegantly calls the NOUN and VERB τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τῆς λόγου, the most animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi, l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also *Plutarch. Quæst. Platon.* p. 1009.

\* *Poet. Cap. 20.*



variegated speech) adds the *Article* and *Conjunction* to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To *Aristotle's* authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder *Stoics*.<sup>(N)</sup>

THE latter *Stoics* instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative* and *Proper*. Others increased the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Preposition* from the Conjunction. The *Latin Grammarians* went farther, and detached the *Interjection* from the Adverb, within which by the *Greeks* it was always included, as a Species.

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<sup>(N)</sup> For this we have the authority of *Dionysius*, of *Halicarnassus*, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom *Quintilian* follows, *Inst. l. 1. c. 4.* *Diogenes Laertius* and *Priscian* make them always to have admitted five parts. See *Priscian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*

WE are told indeed by <sup>(1)</sup> *Dionysius of Halicarnassus* and *Quintilian*, that *Aristotle* with *Theodectes*, and the more early writers, held but *three* parts of speech, the *Noun* the *Verb*, and the *Conjunction*. This, it must be owned, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are <sup>(2)</sup> told) admit no other. But as to *Aristotle*, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the *four* Species which we have adopted, but

<sup>(1)</sup> See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Estque hæc Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem eam demum scribere cæperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent.—Dubium, utrum eâ in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Græcorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnovisse, non solum auctor est Dionysius, &c. Voss. de Analog. l. 1. c. 1. See also Sanctii Minerv. l. 1. c. 2.*

ascertains them each by a proper Definition.\*

To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the **NOUN**, the **VERB**, the **ARTICLE**, and the **CONJUNCTION**; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call **SUBSTANTIVES**, **ATTRIBUTIVES**, **DEFINITIVES**, and **CONNECTIVES**.

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\* Sup. p 34.

## CHAP. IV.

*Concerning Substantives properly so called.*

**SUBSTANTIVES** are *all those principal Words, which are significant of Substances considered as Substances.*

THE first sort of *Substances* are the **NATURAL**, such as *Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.*

THERE are other *Substances of our own making.* Thus by giving a *Figure not natural to natural Materials*, we create such *Substances*, as *House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.*

AGAIN, by a *more refined operation of our Mind alone* we *abstract any Attribute* from its necessary subject, and consider it *apart*, devoid of its dependence. For

example, from Body we abstract to *Fly* from Surface, *the being White*; from Soul *the being Temperate*.

AND thus it is we convert even *Attributes* into *Substances*, denoting them on the occasion by proper *Substantives*, such as *Flight, Whiteness, Temperance*; or else by others more general, such as *Motion, Colour, Virtue*. These we call **ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES**; the second sort we call **ARTIFICIAL**.

Now all those several *Substances* have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in *natural Substances*, *Animal* is a Genus; *Man*, a Species: *Alexander*, an Individual. In *artificial Substances*, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican* an Individual. In *abstract Substances*, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight* or *that Flight* are Individuals.

As therefore every <sup>(a)</sup> GENUS may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal); and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals* (for thus Socrates, Plato and Xenophon, are each of them completely and distinctly a Man); hence it is, that every Genus, though ONE is multiplied into MANY; and every Species, though ONE, is also multiplied into MANY, by reference to those beings which are their proper subordinates. Since, then, *no individual has any such subordinates*, it can never in strictness be considered as MANY, and so is truly an INDIVIDUAL as well in Nature as in Name.

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(a) This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of *μία ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἐκάς κείμεν χωρὶς, πάντα διατεταμένην—ἢ πολλὰς, ἐτέρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένης*. —*Sophist. p. 253 Edit. Serrani*. For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the *Isagoge* or Introduction of *Porphyry* to *Aristotle's Logic*.

FROM these Principles it is, that *Words* following the nature and genius of *Things* such *Substantives* admit of NUMBER as denote *Genera* or *Species*, while those which denote <sup>(b)</sup> *Individuals*, in strictness, admit it not.

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<sup>(b)</sup> Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or *Number*, from the causes following. In the first place the *Individuals* of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new Name for every new-born *Individual*.—Hence, then, instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*; it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and *many* called *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the Romans had their *Plurals*, *Marci* and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthones*. Now the *Plurals* of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because it is merely by chance that the names coincide.

There seems more reason for such *Plurals*, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catos*, or (to instance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelhams*, and *Montagues*; because a *Race* or *Family* is like a *smaller sort of Species*; so that the *family Name* extends to the *Kindred*, as the *specific Name* extends to the *Individuals*.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become *Plural*, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one *Individual*, whose *Name* became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all those who had pretensions

BESIDES *Number*, another characteristic visible in Substances, is that of *SEX*. Every Substance is either *Male* or *Female*; or *both Male and Female*; or *neither one nor the other*. So that with respect to *Sexes* and their *Negation*, *all Substances conceivable* are comprehended under this *fourfold* consideration.

Now the existence of *Hermaphrodites* being rare, if not doubtful; hence Lan-

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to merit in the same way. Thus every great *Critic* was called an *Aristarchus*; every great *Warrior*, an *Alexander*; every great *Beauty*, a *Helen*, &c.

A DANIEL come to judgment! yea, a DANIEL, cries *Shylock* in the Play, when he would express the wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So *Martial* in that well-known verse,

*Sint MÆCENATES, non deerunt, Flacce, MARONES.*

So *Lucilius*,

ΑΙΓΙΛΙΠΟΙ montes, ÆΤΝÆ om̃es, asperi ATHONES.

πόσοι ΦΑΕΘΟΝΤΕΣ, ἢ ΔΕΥΚΑΛΙΩΝΕΣ. Lucian in *Timon*. T. I. p. 108.



guage, only regarding those distinctions which are more obvious, considers *Words denoting Substances* to be either **MASCULINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER.**\*

As to our own Species, and all those animal Species, *which have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are *eminently distinguished*, most Languages have different substantives, to denote the Male and the Female.—But as to those animal Species, which either *less frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *less apparently distinguished* from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

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\* After this manner they are distinguished by *Aristotle*. Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ θήλεα, τὰ δὲ μετὰξυ. Poet. cap. 21. *Protagoras* before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενά, θήλεα, καὶ σκεύη.—*Aristot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5.* Where mark, what were afterwards called ὀδύερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μετὰξυ καὶ σκεύη.

\* IN the *English* Tongue it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is *Masculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Substance*; none *Feminine* but what denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and that where the Substance *has no Sex*, the Substantive is always *Neuter*.

BUT 'tis not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many of the *modern* Tongues. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. MIND is surely neither male, nor female; yet is ΝΟΥΣ, in *Greek* masculine, and MENS, in *Latin*, feminine.

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\* *Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id Ars, &c.* Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole passage from *Genera Hominum; quæ naturalia sunt, &c.* is worth perusing.

IN some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the mere casual structure of the Word itself: It is of such a Gender from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns, even *in things without Sex*, a distant analogy to that great NATURAL DISTINCTION, *which* (according to *Milton*) *animates the World*.\*

IN this view we may conceive such SUBSTANTIVES to have been considered as MASCULINE, which were “conspicuous  
“for the Attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were by nature  
“active, strong, and efficacious, and that  
“indiscriminately whether to good or to

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\* Mr. *Linnaeus*, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the *Distinction of Sexes* throughout the whole *Vegetable World*, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method.

“ ill ; or which had claim to Eminence,  
 “ either laudable or otherwise.”

THE FEMININE, on the contrary, were  
 “ such as were conspicuous for the Attri-  
 “ butes either of receiving, or of contain-  
 “ ing, or of producing and bringing forth ;  
 “ or which had more of the passive in  
 “ their nature, than of the active ; or  
 “ which were peculiarly beautiful and  
 “ amiable ; or which had respect to such  
 “ excesses, as were rather Feminine, than  
 “ Masculine.”

UPON these Principles the two greater  
 Luminaries were considered, one as Mas-  
 culine, the other as Feminine ; the SUN  
 (Ἡλιος *Sol*) as *Masculine*, from commu-  
 nicating Light, which was native and ori-  
 ginal, as well as from the vigorous warmth  
 and efficacy of his Rays ; the MOON Σελήνη  
 (*Luna*) as *Feminine*, from being the Recep-

tacle only of another's Light, and from shining with rays more delicate and soft.

THUS Milton,

*First in HIS East the glorious Lamp was seen,  
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round  
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run  
HIS longitude thro' Heav'n's high road: the gray  
Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM danc'd  
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the Moon  
But opposite, in levell'd West was set,  
HIS mirrour, with full face borrowing HER Light  
From HIM; for other light she needed none.*

P. L. VII. 370.

By *Virgil* they were considered as *Brother* and *Sister*, which still preserves the same distinction.

*Nec FRATRIS radiis obnoxia surgere LUNA.*

G. I. 396.

THE SKY or ETHER is in *Greek* and *Latin Masculine*, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth.

\*The EARTH on the contrary is universally *Feminine*, from being the grand *Receiver*, the grand *Container*, but above all from being the *Mother* (either mediately or immediately) of every sublunary Substance, whether animal or vegetable.

Thus *Virgil*,

*Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS fœcundis imbribus*  
ÆTHER

*CONJUGIS in gremium LÆTÆ descendit, et omnes*  
*Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fœtus.*

G. II. 325.

Thus *Shakespear*,

—† COMMON MOTHER, *Thou*  
*Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite-breast*  
*Teems and feeds all*—Tim. of Athens.

So *Milton*,

*Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER, yields.*  
P. L. V.

\* Seneca Nat. Quest. III. 14.

† Παμμήτορ γῆ χαίρε—Græc. Anth. p. 281.

So Virgil,

*Non jam MATER alit TELLUS, viresque ministrat.*<sup>(c)</sup>

Æn. XI. 71.

AMONG artificial Substances the SHIP (Ναῦς, *Navis*) is *feminine*, as being so eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their vessel, say always, “SHE *rides at anchor*,” “SHE *is under sail*.”

A CITY (Πόλις, *Civitas*) and a COUNTRY, (Πάτρις, *Patria*) are *feminine* also, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurses* of their respective Inhabitants.

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(c)—διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ δαφ τὴν ΓΗΣ φύσιν, ὡς ΘΗΛΥ καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζουσιν. ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ΗΑΙΟΝ, καὶ εἰ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύσει. Arist. de Gener. Anim. 1. c. 2.

THUS *Virgil*,

*Salve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, Saturnia Tellus.*

MAGNA VIRUM——

Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those brave *Greeks*, who fell at *Chæronea*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρὶς ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλεῖστα καμόντων  
Σώματα——

*Their PARENT COUNTRY in HER bosom holds  
Their wearied bodies.—\**

So *Milton*,

*The City, which Thou seest, no other deem  
Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN of the  
Earth.* Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being the *Receiver* of all Rivers, as well as the *Container* and *Productress* of so many

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\* Demost. in Orat. de Coroná.



Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) *Feminine*; yet its *deep Voice* and *boisterous Nature* have, in spite of these reasons, prevailed to make it *Male*. Indeed the very sound of *Homer's*

——μέγα σθένος Ὀκεανοῖο,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female* delicacy and softness.

TIME (Χρόνος) from his mighty efficacy upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as *Masculine*. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

\* Ὅ γὰρ Χρόνος μ' ἔκαμψε, τέκτων εἰ σοφός,  
Ἄπαντα δ' ἐργαζόμενος ἀσθενέστερα.†

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\* Ω Χρόνε, παντοίων θνητῶν πανεπίσκοπε Δαίμον.  
Grec. Anth. p. 290.

† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

*Me TIME hath bent, that sorry Artist, HE  
That surely makes, whate'er he handles, worse.*

So too *Shakespear*, speaking likewise of  
TIME,

Orl. *Whom doth he gallop withal?*

Res. *With a thief to the gallows.—*

As you like it.

THE Greek Θάνατος or Αἴδης, and the  
English DEATH, seem from the same irre-  
sistible power to have been considered as  
Masculine. Even the vulgar with us are  
so accustomed to this notion, that a  
FEMALE DEATH they would treat as  
ridiculous.<sup>(a)</sup>

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<sup>(a)</sup> Well therefore did *Milton* in his *Paradise Lost* not only adopt DEATH as a *Person*, but consider him as *Masculine*: in which he was so far from introducing a *Phantom* of his own, or from giving it a *Gender not supported by Custom*, that perhaps he had as much the *Sanction of national Opinion* for his *Masculine Death*, as the ancient *Poets* had for many of their *Deities*.

TAKE a few examples of the masculine Death.

*Callimachus* upon the Elegies of his Friend *Heraclitus*—

Ἄϊ δὲ τεαὶ ζώουσιν ἀήδονες, ἧσιν ὁ πάντων  
Ἀρπάκτηρ Ἀΐδης ἐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains  
Still live immortal, nor on them shall DEATH  
His hand e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all,

In the *Alcestis* of *Euripides*, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo* and towards its end there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and rescues *Alcestis* from his hands.

It is well known too, that SLEEP and

DEATH are made *Brothers* by *Homer*. It was to this old *Georgias* elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, "*How he did?*" "SLEEP (replied the old Man) *is just upon delivering me over to the care of his BROTHER.*"<sup>(c)</sup>

THUS *Shakespear*, speaking of Life,

—merely *Thou art Death's Fool;*  
*For HIM Thou labour'st by thy flight to shun,*  
*And yet run'st towards HIM still.*

Meas. for Meas.

So *Milton*,

*Dire was the tossing, deep the groans ; Despair*  
*Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch :*  
*And over them triumphant DEATH HIS dart*  
*Shook ; but delay'd to strike——*

P. L. XI. 489.<sup>(d)</sup>

<sup>(c)</sup> "Ὡδὴ μὲ Ὁ ΥΨΙΝΟΣ ἀρχεται παρακατατίθεσθαι Τ-  
 ΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

<sup>(d)</sup> Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce a  
*female Death* ; suppose we read,

THE supreme Being (God, Θεός, *Dieu*, &c.) is in all languages *Masculine*, as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον *Nume DEITY* (which last we *English* join to neuter, saying *Deity itself*) sometimes, say, we meet with these *Neuters*. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as God is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and expressed by a *Negatio* than by any of those Distinctions which are *co-ordinate with some Opposite*, as Mal

*And over them triumphant Death HER dart  
Shook, &c.*

What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength  
the whole sentiment weakened!

for example is co-ordinate with Female, Right with Left, &c. &c.<sup>(a)</sup>

VIRTUE (Ἀρετή, *Virtus*) as well as most of its Species, are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

<sup>(a)</sup> Thus *Ammonius*, speaking on the same Subject—  
 ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ μυθολογίας  
 παραδόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ τις ἢ ἄρρενωπὸν,  
 ἢ θύληπρεπὴν (lege θηλυπρεπὴν) διαμόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ  
 τῷτο εἰκότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄρρενι τὸ θῆλυ σύτοιχον· τὸ  
 (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΘΙ ΑΠΑΛΩΣ ΑΙΤΙΩΙ σύτοιχον ἔδεν.  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ ὀνομάζομεν, [πρὸς]  
 τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τῷ ὑφεμένῳ προτιμῶντες, ὥτως  
 αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν. PRIMUM dicimus, quod nemo  
 etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis  
 obsoletam tradiderunt, vel maris vel feminae specie fingere  
 ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum enim mari femininum  
 est. CAUSAE autem omnino ABSOLUTÆ AC SIMPLICI nihil  
 est conjugatum. Immo vero cum DEVM masculino genere  
 appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius sub-  
 misso atque humili præferentes.—*Ammon.* in Lib. de  
 Interpr. p. 30. b.—ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Πρώτῳ ἔδεν.  
*Aristot.* *Metaph.* A. p. 210. Sylb.

———*abash'd the Devil stood,  
And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw  
VIRTUE in her shape how lovely; saw and pin  
His loss——*

P. L. IV. 84

THIS being allowed, VICE (*Kaxía*) becomes *Feminine* of course, as being, i the *συνοικία*, or Co-ordination of things: Virtue's natural Opposite <sup>(A)</sup>

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male: but taken together they make

<sup>(A)</sup> They are both represented as *Females* by *Xenopho* in the celebrated Story of *Hercules*, taken from *Prodicus* see *Memorab.* L. II. c. 1. As to the *συνοικία* here mentioned, thus *Varro*——*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem.* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also *Arist. Metaph.* L. 1. c. 5. and *Ecclesiasticus*, Chap. lxii. ver. 24.

very natural *Female*, which has no small resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,  
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*, is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions; and that the *Furies* were to be represented, as things superlatively outrageous.

*Talibus Alecto dictis exarsit in iras.  
At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus :  
Diriguere oculi: tot Erinnyes sibilat Hydris,  
Tantaque se facies aperit: tum flammea torquens  
Lumina cunctantem et quærentem dicere plura  
Repulit, et geminos erexit crinibus angues,*



*Verberaque insomuit, rabidoque hæc addidit ore  
En! Ego victa situ, &c.*

Æn. VII. 455.

HE, that would see more on this Subject may consult *Ammonius* the Peripatetic, in his Commentary on the Treatise *de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated a

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<sup>(i)</sup> The Words above mentioned, *Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c.* in *Greek, Latin, French*, and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say ἡ ἀρετὴ or ὁ ἀρετὴ *hæc Virtus* or *hic Virtus, la Virtu* or *le Virtu* and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in *English*. We in our own language say, *Virtue is its own reward*, or *Virtue is her own reward*; *Time maintains its wonted Pace*, or *Time maintains his wonted Pace*.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or *Logical Style*, and the ornamental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we speak of the above

large with respect to the *Greek* Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such

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Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, as *Neuters*, we speak of them *as they are*, and as becomes a *logical* Inquiry. When we give them *Sex*, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth *personified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus *Milton*,

———*The Thunder,*  
*Wing'd with red lightning and impetuous rage,*  
*Perhaps hath spent his shafts*——— P. *Lost* I. 174,

The Poet having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Ministers of Vengeance*, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its* Shafts for *his* Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to *Prose*.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

*Should intermitted Vengeance arm again*  
*His red right hand*———

P. L. II. 174.

In this Place *His* Hand is clearly preferable either to *Hers* or *Its*, by immediately referring us to *God himself*, the *Avenger*.

Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be received with candour rather than scrutinized with rigour. *Varro's* words on a Subject near akin, are, for their aptness and elegance, well worth attending. *Non mediocres enim tenebræ in*

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

*At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd  
Each to HIS place : they heard his voice and went  
Obsequious : Heav'n HIS wonted face renew'd,  
And with fresh flowrets Hill and Valley smil'd.*

P. L. VI.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified ; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *smile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed.— Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—*Each hill retir'd to ITS Place—Heaven renew'd ITS wonted face*—how prosaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared ; how detrimental to the *Prosopopeia*, which he was aiming to establish ! In this therefore he was happy, that the Language in which he wrote imposed no such necessity ; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. It were to be wished, his correctors had been as wise on their parts.

*silvâ, ubi hæc captanda ; neque eò, quò pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ ; neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt.\**

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to WORDS, because in the first place they appertain to THINGS ; that is to say, *because Substances are Many, and have either Sex or no Sex ; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter.* There is however this difference between the two Attributes : NUMBER, in strictness, descends no lower, than to *the last Rank of Species* :<sup>(\*)</sup> GENDER on the-

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\* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

<sup>(\*)</sup> The reason why *Number* goes no lower is, that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals* : the cause of which see before, p. 39.

contrary stops not here, but descends to *every Individual*, however diversified. And so much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

## CHAP. V.

*Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.*

WE are now to proceed to a SECONDARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

EVERY Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the *first time*, or else is recognized as having been perceived *before*. In the former case it is called an Object *τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως*, of the *first knowledge* or *acquaintance*; <sup>(a)</sup> in the latter it is called

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<sup>(a)</sup> See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priscian*—*Interest autem inter demonstrationem et relationem hoc ; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit ; Quis fecit ? Ego ; relatio*

an Object τῆς δεύτερας γνώσεως, of the second knowledge or acquaintance.

Now as all Conversation passes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to say, *till that instant unacquainted with each other*. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been Δειξις, that is *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action which naturally attends our

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*vero* Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. *Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. Putschii.*

But the Authors of Language were not content with this. They invented a race of *Words to supply this Pointing*; which Words, as they always stood for *Substantives or Nouns*, were characterized by the Name of *Ἀντωνυμίαι*, or PRONOUNS.<sup>(a)</sup> These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them *Pronouns* of the *First*, the *Second*, and the *Third Person*, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor

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<sup>(a)</sup> Ἐκεῖνο δὲν Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἈΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of *Individuals*, that he does not say they supply the place of *any* Noun, but that of the *proper* Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.



Countenance on either side known, and the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Speaker himself*. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of *equal* Power, they furnished the Speaker with the *Pronoun*, I. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason *the Pronoun of the First Person*.

AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Party addrest*. Here for similar reasons they invented the *Pronoun*, THOU. *Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c.* and as the Party addressed is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Person*.

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party

address, but *some Third Object, different from both*. Here they provided another *Pronoun*, HE SHE, OR IT, which in distinction to the two former was called *the Pronoun of the Third Person*.

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective *PERSONS*.<sup>(c)</sup>

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(c) The description of the different *PERSONS* here given is taken from *Priscian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Personæ Pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de eâ pronuntiat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de eâ, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit sermonem*. L. XII. p. 940. *Theodore Gaza* gives the same Distinctions. Πρῶτον (πρόσωπον αὐ) ὃ περὶ αὐτῆς φράζει ὁ λέγων· δεύτερον, ὃ περὶ τῆς, πρὸς ἣν ὁ λόγος· τρίτον, ὃ περὶ ἑτέρας. *Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.*

This account of *Persons* is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the *Speaker*; the Second, the *Party address*; and the Third, the *Subject*. For though the First and Second be, as commonly described, one the

As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each Person has it : (I) has the plural (WE), because there may be many Speakers at once of the same Sentiment ; as well as one,

Speaker, the other the Party address, yet, till they become *subjects of the discourse*, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the *subject*, this is a character which it *shares in common* with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Aeneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, the *second Person* immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he *addresses*, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

*Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.*

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (though she be all that time the party address) we hear nothing farther of this *Second Person*, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the *First Person* may be seen every where, because the *Speaker* every where is himself the *Subject*. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—*quæque ipse miserrima vidi,*  
*Et quorum pars magna fui*—

Not that the *Second Person* does not often occur in the

who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the plural (YOU), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (HE) has the plural (THEY), because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

BUT tho' all these pronouns have *Number*, it does not appear either in *Greek* or *Latin* or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of *SEX*. The reason seems to be,

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course of this Narrative ; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Second Persons by being introduced as *present*. The *real* Second Person (*Dido*) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgîl*. But when we read *Euclid*, we find neither *First* Person, nor *Second*, in any Part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party address (in which light we may always view the Writer and his reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else

that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous, to have marked a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly<sup>(a)</sup> apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is, that in most Languages *the third person* has its *Genders*, and that even *English* (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple<sup>(a)</sup> distinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

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except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.

<sup>(a)</sup> *Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit.* Priscian. L. XII, p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax.* L. II. c. 7. p. 109.

<sup>(a)</sup> The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose, for example, we should read in history these words—*He caused him to destroy him*—and

HENCE too we see the reason why a single Pronoun to each Person, an *I* to the *First*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of

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that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a man for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Persepolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when, instead of the ambiguous sentence, *He* caused *him* to destroy *him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that *SHE* caused *HIM* to destroy *IT*. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not, that the Promoter was the woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

<sup>(1)</sup> *Queritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona et secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem et secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentibus inter se sunt, et demonstrativæ; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Iste; modo relativa, ut, Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.*

Speech. But it is not so with respect to the *Third* Person. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but *many* Pronouns, such as *He, This, That, Other, Any, Some, &c.*

It must be confest, indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun (as when we say, *THIS is Virtue*, or δεικτικῶς, *Give me THAT*), then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say *THIS Habit is Virtue* ; or δεικτικῶς, *THAT Man* defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed a near re-

lation between *Pronouns* and *Articles*, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged; and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine *PRONOUN* *always stands by itself*, assuming the *Power* of a Noun, and supplying its place—The genuine *ARTICLE* *never stands by itself*, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as *Attributes* <sup>(a)</sup> or *Adjectives*.

<sup>(a)</sup> Τὸ Ἄρθρον μετὰ ὀνόματος, ἐξ ἣ Ἀντωνυμία ἀντ' ὀνόματος. THE ARTICLE *stands WITH a Noun*; but THE PRONOUN *stands FOR a Noun*. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἄντ' ἐν τὰ ἄρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα συναρτήσεως ἀποσάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποτεταγμένην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. Now *Articles themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun as is proper upon the occasion*. Ibid. Again—"Ὅταν τὸ Ἄρθρον μὴ μετ' ὀνόματος παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσεται δὲ σύνταξι ὀνόματος ἢν προεκτεθείμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε ἐκ ἐγγινόμενον μετ' ὀνόματος δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παρελήφθη. When the Article is



As to the *Coalescence* of these Pronouns it is as follows. The First or Second will either of them, by themselves coalesce

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*assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before the same Syntax which the Noun has, it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in Power assumed for on* Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96.—*Inter Pronomina et Articulos hoc Interest, quod Pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent ut QUIS, ILLE, ISTE: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, ac Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur.* Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

*Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: ARTICULIS autem PRONOMINA connumerantes, FINITOS et ARTICULOS appellabant; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus, INFINITOS ARTICULOS dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, et ARTICULARIA eos PRONOMINA vocabant, &c.* Pris. L. I. p. 57. *Varro, speaking of Quisque and Hic, calls them both ARTICLES, the first indefinite the second definite. De Ling. Lat. L. VII.* See also L. IX. p. 132. *Vossius, indeed in his Analogia (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because Hic has not the same power with the Greek Article. But he did not enough attend to the ancient Writers on the*

with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—*I AM HE—THOU ART HE*—but we cannot say—*I AM THOU—nor THOU ART I*. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the *Speaker* to be the *Subject* also of the Discourse, as when we say, *I am He*; or for the *Person addrest*; as when we say, *Thou art He*. But for the same Person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the Speaker, and the Party addrest, this is impossible; and so therefore is the Coalescence of the First and Second Person.

AND now perhaps we have seen enough of *Pronouns* to perceive how they differ

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Subject, who considered all Words, as ARTICLES, which being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their signification.

from other Substantives. The others are *Primary*, these are their *Substitutes*; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reasons already <sup>(A)</sup> mentioned the others could not be used. It is moreover by means of these, and of *Articles*, which are nearly allied to them, that

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<sup>(A)</sup> See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. It is therefore "to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in "aid; and, hence it is, it becomes equivalent to δειξίς, "that is, to *Pointing or Indication by the Finger*." It is worth remarking in that Verse of *Persius*,

*Sed pulchrum est DIGITO MONSTRARI, et dici, HIC EST.*

how the δειξίς and the Pronoun are introduced together, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of δειξίς the Pronoun of the *third* Person stands for the *first*.

*Quod si militibus parces, erit HIC quoque Miles.*

That is, *I also will be a Soldier.*

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See *Vulpius*.

“ LANGUAGE, though in itself only significant of *general Ideas*, is brought down “ to denote *that infinitude of Particulars*, “ which are for ever arising, and ceasing “ to be.” But more of this hereafter in a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called *Prepositive*, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is ANOTHER PRONOUN (in

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It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a sort of *implied Presence*, which they are supposed to indicate though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in *Apollonius* τὰς μὲν τῇν ὀφθαλμοῖν εἶναι δεῖξαις, τὰς δὲ τῷ νῷ, *that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental.* De Syntaxi, L. II.c. 3. p. 104.

Greek ὅς, ὅςτις; <sup>(1)</sup> in Latin, Qui,; in English, Who, Which, That), a Pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE I was to say—LIGHT is a Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity. These would apparently be two distinct

<sup>(1)</sup> The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this Pronoun ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον, the *subjunctive Article*. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the προτακτικὸν or true *prepositive Article*, not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, it is wholly different. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὅθεν δὲ καὶ ἡ κυρίως αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄρθρῳ ταύτῃ—for these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article. And just before he says, κυρίως γέ μιν ἄρθρον τὸ προτακτικόν—however, properly speaking, it is the Prepositive is the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second **LIGHT**, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, **IT**, and say—**LIGHT is a Body ; IT moves with great celerity**—the Sentence would still be distinct and two. But if I add a *Connective* (as for Example an **AND**) saying—**LIGHT is a Body, AND it moves with great celerity**—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many stones I make one Wall.

Now it is *in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun*, that we may see the force and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of **AND IT**, we substitute **THAT, OR WHICH**, saying **LIGHT is a Body WHICH moves with great celerity**—the Sentence still retains its *Unity and Perfection*, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the **SUBJUNCTIVE**, because it cannot (like

the Prepositive) introduce an original Sentence, but only *serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous.*<sup>(1)</sup>

### The Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE

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<sup>(1)</sup> Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the Part of some *complex* Sentence, which Sentence contains, either exprest, or understood, *two Verbs*, and *two Nominatives*.

Thus in that Verse of *Horace*.

*QUI metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.*

*Ille non erit liber*—is one Sentence; *qui metuens vivit*—is another. *Ille* and *Qui* are the *two Nominatives*; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the *two Verbs*; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from *Apollonius* (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew whence the above speculations are taken. Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι· ἢ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπλῆν λόγον ἐπαριστάνει κατὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, ἢ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρελάβανε τὸ ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δὲ

like the other Pronouns, is universal. It may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract ; as well as general, special or particular. We

ἕτερον λόγον πάντως ἢ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάβανε, ἢ ἔτω τὸ, ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, ΟΣ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τῷ (fors. τῇ) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. *The subjunctive Article (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative assumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it is that the Words—the Grammarian came who discoursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came AND discoursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire générale et raisonnée, Chap. IX.*

The *Latins*, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part Pronoun, and part Connective, in forming their QUI ET



may say, the *Animal*, *Which*, &c. the *Man*, *Whom*, &c. the *Ship*, *Which*, &c. *Alexander*, *Who*, &c. *Bucephalus*, *That*, &c. *Virtue*, *Which*, &c. &c.

NAY, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, *I WHO now read, have near finished this Chapter; THOU, WHO now readest: HE, WHO now readeth, &c. &c.*

AND thus is this SUBJUNCTIVE truly a *Pronoun* from its *Substitution*, there being no Substantive existing, in whose place it

QUIS from QUE and IS, or (if we go with *Scaliger* to the Greek) from KAI and 'OΣ, KAI and 'O. *Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.*

HOMER also expresses the Force of this *Subjunctive Pronoun* or *Article*, by help of the *Prepositive* and a *Connective*, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See *Iliad* A. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

may not stand. At the same time, it is *essentially distinguished* from the other Pronouns, by this peculiar, that it is not only a *Substitute*, but withal a *Connective*.<sup>(1)</sup>

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<sup>(1)</sup>Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues, the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu*, are *implied* in the very Form of the Verb itself (*γράφω γράφεις, scribo, scribis*) and are for that reason never *expressed*, unless it be to mark a *Contradistinction*; such as in *Virgil*,

*Nos patriam fugimus ; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbrâ  
Formosam resonare doces, &c.*

This, however, is true with respect only to the *Casus rectus*, or *Nominative* of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their *oblique Cases*, which must always be added, because though we see the *Ego* in *Amo*, and the *Tu* in *Amas*, we see not the *Te* or *Me* in *Amat* or *Amant*.

Yet even these *oblique Cases*, appear in a different manner, according as they mark *Contradistinction*, or not. If they *contradistinguish*, then are they *commonly* placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.

And now to conclude what we have said concerning Substantives. All SUBSTANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Secondary*.

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Thus *Virgil*,

——— *Quid Thesea, magnum*

*Quid memorem Alciden ? Et MI genus ab Jove summo.*

Thus *Homer*,

‘ΥΜΙΝ μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν———

Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην——— Ιλ. Α.

where the ‘Υμῖν and the Μοὶ stand, as contradistinguished and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the ‘Υμῖν even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The Greek Language went farther still. When the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contradistinguish they assumed a peculiar accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονούμεναι, or *Pronouns uprightly accented*. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave their accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of Εγκλιτικά, that is *Leaning or Inclining Pronouns*. The Greeks too had in the first person ‘Εμῶ, ‘Εμοί, ‘Εμέ, for *Contradistinctives* and Μῶ, Μοί, Μὲ, for *Enclitics*. And hence it was that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read παῖδα δ’ ‘ΕΜΟ

that is to say, according to a Language more familiar and known, are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS denote *Substances*, and those either *Natural*, *Artificial*, or *Abstract*.\* They moreover denote Things either *General* or *Special* or *Particular*. The PRONOUNS, their Substitutes, are either *Prepositive*, or *Subjunctive*. THE PREPOSITIVE is distinguished into *three* Orders called the *First*, the *Second*, and the *Third* Person. THE SUBJUNCTIVE

for *παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ*, on account of the Contradistinction which there occurs between the *Grecians* and *Chryses*. See *Apoll. de Syntari. L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.*

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pronouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the *English* Tongue. When we say, *Give me Content*, the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, *Give Mé Content*, *Give Hím his thousands*, the (*Me*) and (*Hím*) are no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an Accent of their own, and so become the true *ὀρθορονσμέναι*.

\* See before p. 37, 38.

includes the powers of all those three, having *superadded*, as of its own, the peculiar force of a *Connective*.

HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES,  
we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES.

## CHAP. VI.

*Concerning Attributives.*

**ATTRIBUTIVES** are all those principal Words, that denote *Attributes*, considered as *Attributes*. Such for example are the Words, *Black, White, Great, Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c.*<sup>(a)</sup>

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<sup>(a)</sup> In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles*, in as much as all of them equally denote the *Attributes of Substance*. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the *Predicates* in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, *Snow is white, Cicero writeth &c.*) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or VERB is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus *Ammonius* explaining the reason, why *Aristotle* in his Tract de Interpretatione calls λευκός a Verb, tells us πᾶσαν φωνήν, κακηγορέμενον ὄρον ἐν προτάσει ποιῶσαν, 'PHMA καλεῖσθαι, that every Sound articulate, that forms

HOWEVER, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must *first* of necessity EXIST before it can possibly be any thing else. For EXISTENCE may be considered as *an universal Genus*, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either *express*, or by *implication*; express, as when we say, *The Sun is bright*; by implication

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the *Predicate in a Proposition is called a VERB*. p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. *Non Declinatio sed proprietates excutienda est significationis*. L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—*non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis*. L. XIII. p. 970.

as when we say, *The Sun rises*, which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising*.<sup>(a)</sup>

THE Verbs, *Is, Groweth, Becometh, Est Fit*, ὑπάρχει, ἐστίν, ὥσκει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this *general Genus*. The *Latins* have called them *Verba Substantiva, Verbs Substantive*, but the *Greeks* ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικά, *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well *Attribute*, as *Substance*. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall here particularly consider, is the Verb, ἔστι, *Est, Is*.

Now all existence is either absolute or qualified—*absolute*, as when we say, *B is*; *qualified*, as when we say, *B is an Animal*; *B is black, is round, &c.*

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<sup>(a)</sup> See *Metaphys. Aristot. L. V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall.*



WITH respect to this difference, Verb (*is*) can by itself express *absolute existence*, but never the *qualified*, with subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not expressed, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (*is*) serves to subjoin some such Form, it has a little more force, than that of a *mere assertion*. It is under the same character that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as we observed just before, *Riseth*, means, *is rising*; *Writeth* is *writing*.

AGAIN—As to EXISTENCE in general it is either *mutable* or *immutable*; *mutable* as in the *Objects of Sensation*; *immutable* as in the *Objects of Intellection and Science*. Now *mutable* Objects exist all in *Time*, and admit the several Distinctions of present

past, and future. But *immutable Objects know no such Distinctions*, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

AND hence two different Significations of the substantive Verb (*is*) according as it denotes *mutable*, or *immutable* Being.

For example, if we say, *This Orange is ripe*, (*is*) meaneth *that it existeth so now at this present*, in opposition to *past* time, when it was green, and to *future* time when it will be rotten.

BUT if we say, *The Diameter of the Square is incommensurable with its side*, we do not intend by (*is*) that it is incommensurable *now*, having been *formerly* commensurable, or being to become so *hereafter*; on the contrary we intend that *Perfection of Existence*, to which *Time* and its *Distinctions* are utterly unknown. It is under the same meaning we employ this

Verb, when we say TRUTH IS, or, GOD IS. The opposition is not of *Time present* to *other Times*, but of *necessary Existence* to *all temporary Existence whatever*.<sup>(c)</sup> And so much for *Verbs of Existence* commonly called *Verbs Substantive*.

WE are now to descend to the common Herd of *Attributives*, such as *black* and *white*, *to write*, *to speak*, *to walk*, &c. among which when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive, *make* without

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<sup>(c)</sup> *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non cum dicimus NUNC ESSE, sed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut hac ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, ad nullam dici substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, NUNC EST. Quare cum dicimus ESSE, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter EST addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.*

farther help a *perfect assertive* Sentence ; while the rest, though otherwise perfect, are *in this respect* deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise*, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an *Assertion*, to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Assertion elsewhere, an *(is)* or a *(was)* to complete the Sentence, saying, *Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent.* On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the Words *(writeth)* and *(walketh)* imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now all those Attributives, which have

this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call VERBS. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take *the Attribute alone* without the Assertion, then have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of ADJECTIVES.

AND thus it is, that ALL ATTRIBUTIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES.

BESIDES the Distinctions above mentioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in *Motion*; such are *to walk, to fly, to strike, to live*. Others have it in the *privation of Motion*; such are *to stop, to rest, to cease, to die*. And lastly, others have it in subjects, *which have nothing to do with either motion or its Privation*; such are the

Attributes of *Great* and *Little*, *White* and *Black*, *Wise* and *Foolish*, and in a word the several *Quantities* and *Qualities* of all Things. Now these last are *ADJECTIVES*; those which denote *Motions*, or their *Privation* are either *VERBS* or *PARTICIPLES*.

AND this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explained as follows. That *all Motion is in Time*, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies *Time* as its concomitant, is evident to all and requires no proving. But besides this, *all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise*. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in *one Place* for *one Instant* only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. † To stop therefore or rest, is to be in *one Place* for *more than one instant*, that is to say,

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† Thus *Proclus* in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning *Motion*: Ἡμεῖς ἐστὶ τὰ πρότερον ἢ ὑπεραιν τῇ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ὄν, ἢ αὐτὸ, ἢ τὰ μέγα.

during an *Extension* between two *Instants*, and *this* of course gives us the Idea of *TIME*. As therefore *Motions* and their *Privation* imply *Time* as their concomitant, so *VERBS*, which denote them, come to denote *TIME* also.<sup>(d)</sup> And hence the origin and use of *TENSES*, “which are so many different “forms, assigned to each Verb, to shew, “without altering its principal meaning, the “various *TIMES* in which such meaning, may “exist.” Thus *Scribit*, *Scriptsit*, *Scripserat*, and *Scribet*, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

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<sup>(d)</sup> The antient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb— ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνου *a Verb is something which signifies Time OVER AND ABOVE* (for such is the force of the Proposition, Πρὸς.) If it should be asked, *over and above what?* It may be answered over and above its *principal* Signification, which is, to denote some *moving* and *energizing* Attribute. See *Aristot. de Interpret. c. 3.* together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius*.

SHOULD it be asked, whether *Time* itself may not become upon occasion the Verb's *principal* Signification ; it is answered, No. And this appears, because *the same Time* may be denoted by different verbs (as in the words *writeth* and *speaketh*, and *different Times* by the same verb (as in the words, *writeth* and *wrote*); neither of which could happen, were *Time* any thing more than a mere *Concomitant*. Add to this, that when words denote Time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives, or substantives. Of the adjective kind are *Timely, Yearly, Dayly, Hourly, &c.* of the substantive kind are *Time, Year, Day, Hour, &c.*

THE most obvious division of TIME is into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any language complete, whose verbs have not TENSES, to mark these distinctions. But we may go still farther. Time past and



future are both *infinitely* extended. Hence it is that in *universal Time past*, we may assume *many particular Times past*, and in *universal Time future*, *many particular Times future*, some more, some less, remote and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even *present Time itself* is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies *some degree of Extension*, as does every given line, however minute.

HERE then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not, it seems, enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without

which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.

HOWEVER as the knowledge of TENSES depends on the theory of TIME, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.

## CHAP. VII.

*Concerning Time, and Tenses.*

**TIME** and **SPACE** have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as such they both of them imply *Extension*. Thus between *London* and *Salisbury* there is the Extension of *Space*, and between *Yesterday* and *To-morrow*, the Extension of *Time*. But in this they differ, that all the parts of *Space* exist *at once* and *together*, while those of *Time* only exist *in Transition* or *Succession*.<sup>(a)</sup> Hence then we may gain some Idea of **TIME**, by considering it under the

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<sup>(a)</sup> See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by *Ammónius*—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ μόνον τὸ ΝΥΝ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθίρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. **TIME** doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single **NOW** or **INSTANT**; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. *Amm. in Predicam.* p. 82. b.

notion of a *transient Continuity*. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of *Transition* go, Time is *different* from Space ; but as to those of *Extension* and *Continuity*, they perfectly coincide.

LET us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE we may assume any where a *Point*, and therefore in every given *Line* there may be assumed infinite *Points*. So in every given TIME we may assume any where a *Now* or *Instant*, and therefore in every given *Time* there may be assumed infinite *Nows* or *Instants*.

FARTHER still—A POINT is the *Bound* of every finite *Line* ; and A NOW or INSTANT, of every finite *Time*. But although they are *Bounds*, they are neither of them *Parts*, neither the *Point* of any *Line*, nor the *Now* or *Instant* of any *Time*. If this appear strange, we may remember, that the *parts* of any thing *extended* are neces-


sarily extended also, it being essential to their character, *that they should measure their Whole*. But if a *Point* or *Now* were extended, each of them would contain within itself *infinite other Points*, and *infinite other Nows* (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest Extension) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

THESE assertions therefore being admitted, and both *Points* and *Nows* being taken as *Bounds*, but not as *Parts*,<sup>(b)</sup> it will follow, that in the same manner as *the*

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<sup>(b)</sup>—φανερὸν ὅτι ἐδὲ μόνιον τὸ ΝΥΝ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὥσπερ ἐδ' αἱ τιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ δύο τῆς μίαις μέρια. *It is evident that a Now or Instant is no more a part of Time, than POINTS are of a Line. The parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines.* NATUR. AUSE. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before—Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἓ μέρος. μετρεῖ, τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, ἃ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ἓ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν ΝΥΝ. *A Now is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole, and the Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but TIME doth not appear to be made up of Nows* Ibid. c. 14.

*same Point* may be the *End* of one Line, and the *Beginning* of another, so the *same Now* or *Instant* may be the *End* of one Time and the *Beginning* of another. Let us suppose, for example, the Lines, A B, B C.



I say that the Point B, is the End of the Line AB, and the Beginning of the Line BC. In the same manner let us suppose AB, BC, to represent certain Times, and let B be a *Now* or *Instant*. In such case I say that the *Instant* B is the End of the Time AB, and the Beginning of the Time BC. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the *Now* or *Instant*, which they include, the first of them is necessarily PAST TIME, as being *previous* to it; the other is necessarily FUTURE, as being *subsequent*. As therefore every Now

or. **INSTANT** always exists in Time, and without being Time, is *Time's Bound*; the Bound of *Completion* to the *Past*, and the Bound of *Commencement* to the *Future*; from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is, *to be the medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole.*<sup>(c)</sup>

FROM the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place *there cannot* (strictly speaking *be any*

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<sup>(c)</sup> Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἐστὶ συνέχεια χρόνου, ὡς περ ἐλέχθη. συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως πέρας χρόνος ἐστίν· ἐστὶ γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀρχή, τῷ δὲ τελευτή. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Junction or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.

*such thing as Time present.* For if all Time be *transient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot like a Line be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present *at once*, it would so far quit its *transient* nature, and be *Time* no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can *Time* possibly be *present*, to which such Continuity is essential?

FARTHER than this—If there be no such thing as *Time Present*, there can be no *Sensation of Time* by any one of the senses. FOR ALL SENSATION is of the \**Present only*, the Past being preserved not by *Sense* but by *Memory*, and the Future being anticipated by *Prudence* only and wise *Foresight*.

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\* Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αἰσθήσει sc.) οὔτε τὸ μέλλον, οὔτε τὸ γηγνόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. Αἰρις. περὶ Μνημ. Α. α.



BUT if *no Portion* of Time be the object of *any Sensation* ; farther, if the Present *never* exist ; if the Past be *no more*, if the Future be not *as yet* ; and if these are all the parts, out of which TIME is compounded : how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it ? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity.<sup>(d)</sup> Let us try however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.

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<sup>(d)</sup> Ὅτι μὲν ἔν ὅλῳς ἔκ ἔστιν, ἡ μόγις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δέ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς γέγονε, καὶ ἔκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ ἔπο ἔστιν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν καὶ ὁ ἀπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται· τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἂν δοξείη κατέχειν ποτὲ ὅσας. *That therefore TIME exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence : A part of it has been, and is no more ; a part of it is coming and is not as yet ; and out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of Entity.* Natural. Ausc. L. IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M. S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

THE World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble no one more, than some moving spectacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is *immediately present*, which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to the Soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to the *Imagination*, and above all to the *Intellect*, these several *Nows* or *Instants* are not lost, as to the *Senses*, but are preserved and made objects of *steady* comprehension, however in their own nature they may be *transitory* and *passing*. "Now it is from contemplating two or more of these Instants under one view, together with that Interval of Continuity, which subsists between them

“ that we acquire ‘insensibly the Idea of  
 “ TIME.”<sup>(c)</sup> For example *The Sun rises* ;

<sup>(c)</sup> Τότε φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, όταν τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστερῷ ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησὶν λάβωμεν. Ὅριζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξὺ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· όταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερα τῷ μέσῳ νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ NYN, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τῷ φαμέν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ. *It is then we say there has been TIME, when we can acquire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two Nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is TIME, and this it is we call TIME.* Natural. Auscult. L. IV. c. 16. *Themistius's Comment upon this passage is to the same purpose. Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νῦν ἀναμνησθεὶς τῷ NYN, ὁ χθὲς εἴπεν ἕτερον πάλιν εἴπῃ τὸ τήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον εὐθὺς ἐνενόησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο NYN ὀριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπὸ περάτων δυοῖν· καὶ ἔτω λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι ποσὸν ἔστι πεντεκαίδεκα ὥρων, ἢ ἑκκαίδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου γραμμῆς πηχυστάαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμνόμενος. For when the Mind, remembering the Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another Now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of TIME, terminated by these two Nows, as by two Boundaries ; and thus is it enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line by two Points. Themist. Op. Edit. Aldi. p. 45. b.*

this I remember ; *it rises again* ; this too I remember. These Events are not together ; there is an *Extension* between them—not however of *Space*, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognize *some* Extension between them. Now what is this Extension, *but a natural Day* ? And what is that, but pure *Time* ? It is after the same manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extension between these : two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension between these ; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are all so many Intervals, described as above ; that is to say, *passing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together*.

AND thus it is, THE MIND acquires the Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be remembered is PAST TIME ONLY, which is always the *first* Species that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we

acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The answer is, we acquire it *by Anticipation*. Should it be demanded still farther, *And what is Anticipation?* We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night by another day; that day by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights *in futurity*. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession*, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future*.

WE go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural* Periods, but even in matters of *human* and *civil* concern. For example: Having observed in ~~many~~ past instances how health had succeeded to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we anticipate *future* health to those, who, being *now* sickly use exercise; and *future* sickness to those, who, being *now* healthy, are slothful. It is a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Master-Artist, or Man of *practical* Wisdom. If they respect the human body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if ~~matters~~ national, the Statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralist; and the same in other subjects. All these several characters in their respective ways may be said to possess a kind of prophetic discernment, which not only presents them ~~the~~

*barren prospect* of futurity (a prospect not hid from the meanest of men) but shews withal those events, which are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except those, who have had diviner assistances) we may justly say, as was said of old,

*He's the best Prophet who conjectures well.*<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Μάντις δ' ἄριστος, ὅστις εἰκάζει καλῶς.

So Milton.

*Till old Experience do attain*

*To something like Prophetic Strain.*

*Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodammodo*

*Divinationem.*

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as the Future does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the Past, For tho' it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phrase) *it actually was*, yet was it then something Present, and not something Past. As Past, it has no existence but in THE MIND or MEMORY, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called Past. It was this intimate connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made some Philosophers doubt, *whether if there*

FROM what has been reasoned it appears that knowledge of *the Future* comes from knowledge of *the Past*; as does knowledge of *the Past* from knowledge of *the Present*, so that their *Order to us* is that of PRESENT PAST, and FUTURE.

OF these Species of knowledge, that of the *Present* is the lowest, not only as *first in perception*, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all *animal* Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess *Sensation*. Knowledge of *the Past* comes next, which is superior

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*was no Soul, there could be any Time*, since Time appears to have its Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ ᾖσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, κ. τ. λ. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 20. Themistius, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμύμενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὴ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ ἂν ὑποσάιη, μὴ ὄντος τῆ ἀριθμήσοντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ, φανερόν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὁ χρόνος εἴη, μὴ ᾖσης ψυχῆς. Them. p. 48. Edit. Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de An. p. 94.



to the *former*, as being confined to those animals, that have *Memory* as well as *Senses*. Knowledge of *the Future* comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason *the most excellent* as well as *the most rare*, since Nature in her super-additions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse.\*


AND now having seen how we acquire the knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time future*; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to *the present Now* or *Instant*, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

IN the first place there may be *Times* both *past* and *future*, in which the *present Now* has no existence, as for example in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

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\* See below, note (r) of this chapter.

AGAIN, *the present Now* may so far belong to *Time* of either sort, as to be *the End* of the past, and *the Beginning* of the future; but it cannot be included *within* the limits of either. For if it were possible let us suppose C the *present Now* included



within the limits of the *past Time* AD. In such case CD, part of the past Time AD, will be subsequent to C the *present Now*, and so of course be *future*. But by the Hypothesis it is *past*, and so will be both Past and Future at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a *future Time*, such as BE.

WHAT then shall we say of such *Times*, as *this Day*, *this Month*, *this Year*, *this*

Century; all which include within them *the present Now*? They cannot be *past Times* or *future*, from what has been proved; and *present Time has no existence*, as has been proved likewise.\* Or shall we allow them to be present, *from the present Now, which exists between them*; so that from the presence of *that* we call *these* also present, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent? If so, and in conformity to custom we allow such *Times present*, as present Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each must of necessity be *a compound of the Past and of the Future*, divided from each other by some present Now or Instant, and *jointly* called PRESENT, *while that Now remains within them*. Let us suppose for example the Time XY, which

X    A    B    C    D    E    Y

f.. ————— .. g

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\* Sup. p. 104.

let us call a Day, or a Century; and let the present *Now* or *Instant* exist at A. I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA,AY, *Time present*. The same holds if we suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the present Now exists at Y, then is the whole XY *Time past*, and still more so when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In like manner before the Present Now entered X, as for example when it was at f, then was the whole XY *Time future*; it was the same, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became *Time present*. And thus it is, that TIME is PRESENT, while passing, in its PRESENT NOW OR INSTANT. It is the same indeed here, as it is in *Space*. A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that Plane *in a single Point at once*

while during the whole progression its parts absent are *infinite*.<sup>(a)</sup>

From what has been said, we may perceive that **ALL TIME**, of every denomination

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<sup>(a)</sup> **PLACE**, according to the antients, was either mediate or immediate. I am (for example) in *Europe*, because I am in *England*; in *England*, because in *Wiltshire*; in *Wiltshire*, because in *Salisbury*; in *Salisbury*, because in *my own house*; in *my own house*, because in *my study*. Thus far **MEDIATE PLACE**. And what is my **IMMEDIATE PLACE**? It is the *internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body*. Τῇ περιέχοντος πέρας, καθ' ὃ περιέχει τὸ περιεχόμενον. Now as this *immediate Place* is included within the limits of all the former *Places*, it is from this relation that those *mediate Places* also are called each of them *my Place*, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to **TIME**. The *Present Century* is present in the *present Year*; that, in the *present Month*; that, in the *present Day*; that, in the *present Hour*; that, in the *present Minute*. It is thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at **THAT REAL AND INDIVISIBLE INSTANT** which by being itself the *very Essence of the Present*, diffuses **PRESENCE** throughout all even the largest of *Times*, which are found to in-

*is divisible and extended.* But if so, then whenever we suppose a *definite Time*, even though it be a *Time present*, it must needs have a *Beginning*, a *Middle* and an *End*. And so much for *TIME*.

Now from the above doctrine of *TIME*, we propose by way of Hypothesis the following Theory of *TENSES*.

*THE TENSES* are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either *indefinitely* without reference to any Beginning, Middle,

*clude it within their respective limits. Nicephorus Blemmides speaks much to the same purpose. 'Ενεσὼς ὃν χρόνος ἔστιν ὁ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίως ΝΥΝ χρόνος μερικὸς, ἐκ παρεληλυθότος ἢ μέλλοντος συνεφὸς, ἢ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κυρίως ΝΥΝ γεινῳασιν, ΝΥΝ λεγόμενος ἢ αὐτός. PRESENT TIME therefore is that which adjoins to the REAL NOW or INSTANT on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its vicinity to that REAL NOW said to be NOW also itself. Ἐπιτ. φυσικῆς Κεφ. θ'. See also Arist. Physic. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.*

or End; or else *definitely*, in reference to such distinctions.

If *indefinitely*, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If *definitely*, then have we three Tenses to mark the *Beginnings* of these three Times; three to denote their *Middles*; and three to denote their *Ends*; in all NINE.

THE three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Compleitive Present, the Compleitive Past, and the Compleitive Future.

AND thus it is, that the TENSES in their natural number appear to be TWELVE;

*three* to denote *Time absolute*, and *nine* to denote it *under its respective distinctions*.

### Aorist of the Present.

Γράφω. *Scribo*. I write.

### Aorist of the Past.

\*Ἐγραφα. *Scriptsi*. I wrote.

### Aorist of the Future.

Γράψω. *Scribam*. I shall write.

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### Inceptive Present.

Μέλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus sum*. I am going to write.

### Middle or Extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo* or *Scribens sum*. I am writing.

### Completive Present.

Γέγραφα. *Scriptsi*. I have written.

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### Inceptive Past.

\*Ἐμελλον γράφειν. *Scripturus eram*. I was beginning to write.



## Middle or extended Past:

Ἐγραφεῖς ἐπὶ χανὼν γράφων. *Scribebam.*

I was writing.

## Completive Past.

Ἐγεγράφεῖς. *Scripseram.* I had done writing.

## Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero.* I shall be beginning to write,

## Middle or extended Future.

Ἐσομαι γράφων. *Scribens ero.* I shall be writing.

## Completive Future.

Ἐσομαι γεγραφώς. *Scripsero.* I shall have done writing,

It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with

Tenses, as with other affections of speech ; be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere authority and chance.

It may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly, in the nature and reason of things.

IN the first place as to AORISTS. *Aorists* are usually by Grammarians referred to the *Past* : such are ἦλθον, *I went* ; ἔπεσον, *I fell* &c. We seldom hear of them in the *Future*, and more rarely still in the *Present*. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscription, than that of Simple

*present, past or future, the Tense is AN AORIST.*

**THUS Milton.**

*Millions of spiritual creatures WALK the earth  
Unseen, both when we wake, and when we sleep.*

P. L. IV. 277.

Here the verb (WALK) means not that they were walking *at that instant only, when Adam spoke*, but ἀορίσως indefinitely, take any instant whatever. So when the same author calls *Hypocrisy*,

—*the only Evil, that WALKS  
Invisible, except to God alone,*

the Verb (WALKS) hath the like aoristical or indefinite application. The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the Gnomologic kind, such as

*Ad pœnitendum PROPERAT, cito qui judicat.  
Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte FACIT, &c.*

ALL these Tenses are so many AORISTS OF THE PRESENT.

*Gnomologic* Sentences after the same manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE FUTURE.

*Tu nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine pœnæ*

Hor.

So too *Legislative* Sentences, *Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, &c.* for this means no one *particular* future Time, but is a prohibition extended *indefinitely* to every part of Time future.<sup>(h)</sup>

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<sup>(h)</sup> The *Latin* Tongue, appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aorists*. It has no peculiar form even for an *Aorist of the Past*, and therefore (as *Priscian* tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of *that Aorist*, and of the *perfect Present*, its application in particular instances being to be gathered from the Context. Thus it is that *FECI* means (as the same author informs us) both *πεποίηκα* and *ἐποίησα*, *I have*

WE pass from *Aorists*, to THE INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliar, ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφειν, *Scripturus sum*. I AM GOING to write. But the *Latins* go farther, and have a species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses and are themselves for that reason called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo*, I am warm, comes *Calesco*, I begin to grow warm; from *Tumeo*, I swell, comes *Tumescio*, I begin to swell. These *Inchoative* Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the *Beginnings* of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its *Completion*, and therefore have neither *Perfectum*, *Plusquam-perfectum*, or *Per-*

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done it, and I did it; VIDI both ἑώρακα and εἶδον I have just seen it, and I saw it once. *Prisc. Gram. L. VIII. p. 814, 838. Edit. Putsch.*

*fect Future*. There is likewise a species of Verbs called in *Greek* Ἐφεταῖα, in *Latin* *Desiderativa*, the *Desideratives* or *Meditatives*, which if they are not strictly *Inceptives*, yet both in *Greek* and *Latin* have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμῶ, *Bellaturio* I have a desire to make war ; βρωσῶ, *Esurio*, I long to eat.<sup>(1)</sup> And so much for THE INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THE two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called<sup>(2)</sup> THE MIDDLE TENSES (which express Time as ex-

<sup>(1)</sup> As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is *future*, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the *Greek* ones from a future Verb; the *Latin* from a future Participle. From πολεμήσο and βρώσω come πολεμῶ and βρωσῶ; from *Bellaturus* and *Esurus* come *Bellaturio* and *Esurio*. See *Macrobius*, p. 691. Ed. Var. ἔ πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ ΓΕΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ ἐποίησας γελάσαι. Plato in *Phædone*.

<sup>(2)</sup> Care must be taken not to confound these *middle* Tenses with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among *Grammarians*.

tended and passing) and the PERFECT or COMPLETIVE, which express its *Completion* or *End*.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious *Accidence* of Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational edition of *Homer's Iliad*. Nay, long before either of these we find the same scheme in *Scaliger* and by him<sup>(1)</sup> ascribed to †*Grocinus*, as its

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<sup>(1)</sup> *Ex his percipimus Grocinum acutè admodum Tempora divisisse, sed minus commodè. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, sed quæ bifariam secat, Perfectum, et Imperfectum: sic, Præteritum imperfectum, Amabam: Præteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Rectè sanè. Et Præsens imperfectum, Amo. Rectè hactenus; continuat enim amorem, neque absolvit. At Præsens perfectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non malè sentit, ita controversum est. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero. Non male, inquam: significat enim Amavero, amorem futurum et absolutum iri: Amabo perfectionem nullam indicat. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113.*

† His name was *William Grocin*, an *Englishman*, con-

author. The learned *Gaza* (who was himself a *Greek*, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner.<sup>(m)</sup> What *Apollonius* hints, is exactly consonant.<sup>(n)</sup> *Priscian*, too, advances the

temporary with *Erasmus*, and celebrated for his learning. He went to *Florence* to study under *Landin*, and was Professor at *Oxford*. *Spec. Lit. Flor.* p. 205.

<sup>(m)</sup> THE PRESENT TENSE (as this author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεσήμενον ἢ ἀτελὲς *that which is now Instant and incomplete*; THE PERFECTUM τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄρτι, ἢ ἐντελὲς τῷ ἐνεσῶτος, *that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present*; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρατεταμένον ἢ ἀτελὲς τῷ παρωχημένῳ, *the extended and incomplete part of the Past*; and the PLUSQUAM-PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς πάλαι, ἢ ἐντελὲς τῷ παρακειμένῳ, *that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum.* Gram. L. IV.

<sup>(n)</sup> Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι ἡ παρωχημένη συντέλειαν σημαίνει ὁ παρακείμενος, τὴν γε μὴν ἐνεσῶσαν—*Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but PRESENT COMPLETION.* Apollon. L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle ἂν, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would assort (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but



same doctrine from the *Stoics*, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to *Dialectic*, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these *Grammatical Speculations*.<sup>(1)</sup>

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never with this PERFECTUM, because this implied such a complete and indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a *Contingent*.

(1) By these Philosophers the *vulgar present Tense* was called THE IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the *vulgar Præteritum*, THE PERFECT PRESENT, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear *Priscian*, from whom we learn these facts—PRÆSENS TEMPUS proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præteritū, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsentī, hoc est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præteritū vel futura est. Unde STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRÆSENS etiam IMPERFECTUM vocabant (ut dictum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteritū, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam scribo versum, priore ejus parte scriptā; cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsentī utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed IMPERFECTUM est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur—Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nascitur etiam

BEFORE we conclude, we shall add a few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

AND first, the *Latins* used their *Præteritum Perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, *VIXIT*, signified, IS DEAD; *FUIT*, signified, NOW IS NOT, IS NO MORE. It was in this sense that *Cicero* addressed the people of *Rome*, when he had put to death the leaders in the *Catalinarian* Conspiracy. He appeared in the

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*Perfectum.* Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum.—And soon after speaking of the *Latin Perfectum*, he says—sciendum tamen, quod *Romani* PRÆTERITO PERFECTO non solum in re modo completa utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos παρακείμενος vocatur, quem STOICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΩΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀορίτῃ accipitur, &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.

Forum, and cried out with a loud voice,

\**VIXERUNT*.—So VIRGIL,

——† *FUIMUS Troes, FUIT Ilium et ingens*

*Gloria Dardanidum*——

Æn. II.

And again,

——*Locus Ardea quondam*

\* So among the *Romans*, when in a Cause all the Plead-ers had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim *DIXERUNT*, i. e. *they have done speaking*. Ascon. Pæd. in Verr. II.

† So *Tibullus* speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

*Hæc fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,*

*Prodigia indomitis merge sub æquoribus.*

Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19.

*Let these events HAVE BEEN in days of old*;—by Implication therefore—*But HENCEFORTH let them be no more*.

So *Æneas* in *Virgil* prays to *Phæbus*.

*Hæc Trojana tenuis fuerit fortuna secuta.*

*Let Trojan Fortune* (that is, adverse, like that of *Troy*, and its inhabitants) *HAVE so far FOLLOWED us*. By implication therefore, *but let it follow us no farther. Here let it end, Hic sit Finis*, as *Servius* well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the *Tense*, but of the *Mood*, the *PRECATIVE* or *IMPERATIVE*, not in the *Future* but in the *PAST*. See p. 154, 155, 156.

*Dictus avis, et nunc magnum manet Ardea  
nomen,*

\* *Sed fortuna* FUIT—

Æn. VII.

THE reason of these significations is derived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of *Contraries*. It is thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity: with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence, then, in the instances above, the *completion* of one contrary is put for the *commencement* of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, OR HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, OR, IS NO MORE.

\* *Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:*

*Cumque nihil speres firmitus esse,* FUIT.

Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190.

*Sive crimus, seu nos Fata* FUISSE volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32.

It is remarkable in \* *Virgil* that he frequently joins in the same sentence this *complete* and *perfect Present* with the *extended* and *passing Present*; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of *Time*, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

— *Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens  
Scorpius, et cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

G. I.

*Terra tremit; fugere feræ—*

G. I.

*Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis  
Incubuit, glomeratque ferens incendia ventus.*

G. II.

— *illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,  
Ad terram fugit, et portu se condidit alto.*

Æn. V.

In the same maner he joins the same two modifications of *Time in the Past*, that

\* See also *Spenser's Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19.  
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.

*He hath his Shield redeem'd, and forth his Sword he draws*

is to say, the *complete* and *perfect* Past with the *extended* and *passing*.

—Inruerant *Danai, et tectum omne tenebant.*

Æn. II.

*Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubis aquosæ,*

*Addiderant rutili tres ignis, et alitis austri.*

*Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque metumque*

*Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus iras.*<sup>(p)</sup>

Æn. VIII.

As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is sometimes employed to denote what is *usual* and *customary*. Thus *surgebat* and *scribebat* signify not only, *he was rising, he was*

<sup>(p)</sup> The intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into *English*.

—*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens*

*Scorpius et cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

*For thee the scorpion* IS NOW CONTRACTING *his claws, and* HATH ALREADY LEFT *thee more than a just portion of Heaven*. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting *Augustus* among the heavenly signs, that though he *has already made* him more than room enough, yet he *still continues to*

*writing*, but upon occasion they signify, *he USED to rise, he USED to write*. The reason of this is, that whatever is *customary* must be something which has been *frequently repeated*. But what has been *frequently repeated*, must needs require *an Extension of Time past*, and thus we fall insensibly into the TENSE here mentioned.

AGAIN, we are told by *Pliny* (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the

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be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *relinquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean* manuscript.

—*Ille noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,*

*Ad terram fugit, et portu se condidit alto.*

*The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING to land, and IS HID within the lofty harbour.* We may suppose this Harbour (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was *completely hid* from those spectators who had gone out to see the Ship-race, but yet *might still continue sailing* towards the shore within.

ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of Inscription*, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. It was Ἀπελλῆς ἐποίει, *Apelles faciebat*, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίησε or *fecit*. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that *it was once indeed in hand*, but no pretension that *it was ever finished*.<sup>(9)</sup>

It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the *Latins* derive these Tenses

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—Inruerant *Danai, et tectum omne tenebant*.

*The Greeks* HAD ENTERED and WERE THEN POSSESSING the whole house; as much as to say, *they had entered and that was over*, but their Possession continued still.

<sup>(9)</sup> *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the antient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H.*



from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From *the passing Present* come the passing Past, and Future. *Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam.* From *the perfect Present* come the perfect Past, and Future.—*Scripsi, Scripseram, Scripsero* And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tulerām* and *Tulero*.

We shall conclude by observing, that the ORDER of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already.<sup>(\*)</sup> Hence it is, that the *Present*

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*Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus,* which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes*.

<sup>(\*)</sup> See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—*Ordo autem*

*Tense* stands first ; then *the Past Tenses* ; and lastly *the Future*.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses which denote Time *indefinitely* ; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it definitely (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Compleitive), we here finish the subject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to consider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

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(*Temporum scil.*) *aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præteritū, prius est, quam quod est, atque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo : quomobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit ; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoriâ prædita sunt. Futurum verò etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia ; præteritorum, &c.*

## CHAP. VIII.

*Concerning Modes.*

WE have observed already <sup>(a)</sup> that the Soul's leading powers are those of *Perception* and those of *Volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that *all Speech or Discourse* is a *publishing* or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain *Perception* or a certain *Volition*. Hence, then, according as we exhibit it either in *a different part*, or after *a different manner*, hence I say the variety of **MODES** or **MOODS**.<sup>(b)</sup>

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<sup>(a)</sup> See Chap. II.

<sup>(b)</sup> *Gaza* defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is—βέλημα, εἰρ' ἐν πάθημα ψυχῆς διὰ φωνῆς σημαίνόμενον—a *Volition or Affection of the Soul, signified through some Voice or Sound articulate*. Gram. L. IV: As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is *Apollonius* observes—

IF we simply *declare*, or *indicate* something to be, or not to be (whether a Perception or Volition it is equally the same), this constitutes that Mode called the DECLARATIVE OR INDICATIVE.

### A Perception.

—*Nosco crines, incanaque menta*  
*Regis Romani*—— Virg. *Æn.* VI.

### A Volition.

*In nova* FERT ANIMUS *mutatas dicere formas*  
*Corpora*—— Ovid *Metam.* I.

IF we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something *possible* only, and in the number of *Contingents*, this makes that Mode, which

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τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἑξαίτερος παράκειται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις—the  
*Soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs.*  
*De Synt.* L. III. c. 13. Thus too *Priscian*: *Modi sunt*  
*diversæ INCLINATIONES ANIMI, quas varia consequitur*  
*DECLINATIO VERBI.* L. VIII. p. 821.

Grammarians call the **POTENTIAL**; and which becomes on such occasions the leading Mode of the sentence.

*Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, HABERET  
Plus dapis, &c.* Hor.

YET sometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only *subjoined* to the Indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the *End*, or *final Cause*; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen, in despite of all our foresight, is therefore exprest most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

*Ut JUGULENT homines, surgunt de nocte latrones.*  
Hor.

*Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's throats.*

HERE that they *rise*, is *positively asserted* in the *Declarative* or *Indicative* Mode; but as to their *cutting men's throats*, this is

only delivered *potentially*, because how truly soever it may be the *End* of their rising, it is still but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but the **SUBJUNCTIVE**.

BUT it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely *to declare* ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have *some Perception informed* or *some Volition gratified*. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we *interrogate*, it is the **INTERROGATIVE MODE**; if we *require*, it is the **REQUISITIVE**. Even the Requisite itself hath its *subordinate Species*: With respect to inferiors, it is an **IMPERATIVE MODE**; with respect to

equals and superiors, it is a **PRECATIVE** or **OPTATIVE**.\*

AND thus have we established a variety of Modes; the **INDICATIVE** or **DECLARATIVE**, *to assert what we think certain*; the **POTENTIAL**, *for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent*; the **INTERROGATIVE**, *when we are doubtful, to procure us information*; and the **REQUISITIVE**, *to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions*. The Requisite too appears under two distinct species, either as it is **IMPERATIVE** to inferiors, or **PRECATIVE** to superiors.<sup>(c)</sup>

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\* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of *Protagoras*. *Homer* (says he) in beginning his *Iliad* with—*Sing, Muse, the Wrath*,—When he thinks to *pray*, in reality *commands*. εὐχέσθαι οἰόμενος, ἐπιράττει. *Aristot. Poet. c. 19*. The solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical form being in both cases the same.

<sup>(c)</sup> The Species of *Modes* in great measure depend on the

As therefore all these several Modes have their foundation in nature, so have

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*Species of Sentences.* The *Stoics* increased the number of Sentences far beyond the *Peripatetics*. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note <sup>(\*)</sup> they had many more, as may be seen in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*, L. VII. 66. The *Peripatetics* (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative; and the Assertive.—There is no mention of a *Potential* Sentence, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive or Indicative. The Vocative (which the *Peripatetics* called the εἶδος κλητικόν, but the *Stoics* more properly προσαγορευτικόν) was nothing more than the Form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. *Ammonius* and *Boethius*, the one a *Greek* *Peripatetic*, the other a *Latin* have illustrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the following manner.

Ἄλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ πέντε εἰδῶν, τῷ τε ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ὥς  
 τὸ, ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρείδῃ—  
 καὶ τῷ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὥς τὸ,  
 Βάσκ' ἴθι, Ἴρι ταχέα—

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certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be

ἢ τῷ ἘΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ, ὥς τὸ,

Τίς, πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν ;——

ἢ τῷ ἘΥΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὥς τὸ,

Αἱ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ——

ἢ ἐπὶ τέτοις, τῷ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΥ, καθ' ὃν ἀποφαινόμεθα

περὶ ὁτιούν τῶν πραγμάτων, οἷον

——Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν——

ἢ περὶ παντός, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἑρμ. p. 4.

Boethius's Account is as follows. *Perfectarum vero Orationum partes quinque sunt* : DEPRECATIVA, ut,

*Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,*

*Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma.*

IMPERATIVA, ut,

*Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, et labere pennis.*

INTERROGATIVA, ut,

*Dic mihi, Damæta, cujus pecus?——*

VOCATIVA, ut,

*O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas.*

ENUNTIATIVA, in quâ Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut,

*Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.*

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

enabled by our discourse to signify them one to another. And hence those various **MODES** or **MOODS**, of which we find in common Grammars so prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than “so many “ *literal* Forms, intended to express these “ *natural* Distinctions.”<sup>(a)</sup>

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In *Milton* the same sentences may be found, as follows.  
**THE PRECATIVE,**

—*Universal Lord ! be bounteous still*  
*To give us only Good—*

**THE IMPERATIVE,**

*Go, then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.*

**THE INTERROGATIVE,**

*Whence and what art thou, execrable Shape ?*

**THE VOCATIVE,**

—*Adam, earth's hallow'd Mold,*  
*Of God inspir'd—*

**THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNCIATIVE,**

*The conquer'd also and enslaved by war*  
*Shall, with their Freedom lost, all virtue lose.*

<sup>(a)</sup> The *Greek* Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes, and all dis-

ALL these MODES have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their Peculi-

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tinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in *multiplying* or *diminishing* the number of Syllables, or else in *lengthening* or *shortening* their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a species of *Greek* somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives, it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the *Auxiliar, sum*. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the *English* Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May*, and *Can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, I *am* writing, I *have* written;

arities and Distinctions are in part as follows.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGATIVE MODES are distinguished from *the Indicative* and *Potential*, that whereas these *last seldom call for a Return*, to the two *former* it is *always necessary*.

IF we compare the REQUISITIVE MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the *Return*, but in other Peculiarities.

*The Return to the Requisite is sometimes*

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sometimes two together, as I *have been* writing, I *should have* written ; sometimes no less than three, as I *might have been* lost, he *could have been* preserved. But for these, and all other speculations, relative to the *Genius* of the *English Language*, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Dr. *Lowth*, intitled, *A short Introduction to English Grammar*.

made in *Words*, sometimes in *Deeds*. To the request of *Dido* to *Eneas*—

———*a primâ dic, hospes, origine nobis  
Insidias Dandum*———

the *proper* Return was in *Words*, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief——*date obolum Belisario*——the *proper* Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to *the Interrogative*, the *Return* is necessarily made in *Words* alone, in Words, which are called a *Response* or *Answer*, and which are always actually or by implication some *definitive assertive Sentence*. Take Examples. *Whose Verses are these?* The Return is a Sentence——*These are Verses of Homer. Was Brutus a worthy Man?*——The Return is a Sentence——*Brutus was a worthy Man.*

AND hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near affinity

of this *Interrogative* Mode with the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near, indeed, is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form,<sup>(\*)</sup> nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone or Accent.<sup>(s)</sup>

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(\*) "Ἦγε ἔν προκειμένη ὀριτικῇ ἐγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τῷ καλεῖσθαι ὀριτικῇ—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὀριτικῇ. *The Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative—when it reassumes the Assertion it returns again to its proper Character.* Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. *Theodore Gaza* says the same, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(s) It may be observed of the INTERROGATIVE, that as often as the *Interrogation* is *simple* and *definite*, the Response may be made in almost the *same* Words, by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, ac-

BUT to return to our comparison between the *Interrogative* Mode and the *Requisitive*.

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the language of Grammarians) has all *Persons* of both

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cording as the truth is, either one or the other. For example—*Are these Verses of Homer?*—Response—*These Verses are of Homer.* *Are those Verses of Virgil?*—Response—*Those are not Verses of Virgil.* And here the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses; YES, for all the affirmative; NO, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we say—*Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?*—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we say in general—*Whose are these Verses?*—We cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no Interrogation can be answered by a simple *Yes*, or a simple *No*, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not, perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot subsist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance—*Are these*

*Numbers.* The REQUISITIVE or IMPERATIVE has no *first Person* of the *singular*, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally absurd in *Modes* for a

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*Verses Homer's or Virgil's?* (1.) *They are Homer's—* (2.) *They are not Homer's—* (3.) *They are Virgil's—* (4.) *They are not Virgil's—* we may add *They are of neither.* The indefinite Interrogations go still farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance—*Whose are these Verses?* We may answer affirmatively—*They are Virgil's They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.*—or negatively—*They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's They are not Ovid's* and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single *Yes*, or a single *No*, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which must be always answered by a *Sentence*. Yet even here Custom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the *single essential characteristic Word*, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—*How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?*—we answer in the short monosyllable, *Two*; whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—*Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle.*

The Ancients distinguished these two Species of Inter-



person to *request* or *give commands* to *himself*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the speaker to become *the subject of his own address*.\*

AGAIN,<sup>6</sup> we may *interrogate* as to all *Times*, both *Present*, *Past*, and *Future*. *Who* WAS *Founder* of *Rome*? *Who* IS *King* of *China*? *Who* WILL DISCOVER *the Longitude*?—But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the *Essence* of the *Requisitive Mode*) have a necessary respect to the *Future*<sup>(c)</sup> only. For indeed what

rogation by different names. The simple they called 'Ερώτημα, *Interrogatio*; the complex, πύσμα, *Percontatio*. *Ammonius* calls the first of these 'Ερώτησις διαλεκτική; the other, 'Ερώτησις πνευματική. See *Am. in. Lib. de Interpr.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 66. *Quintil. Inst.* IX. 2.

\* Sup. p. 74, 75.

<sup>(c)</sup> *Apollonius's* Account of the *Future*, implied in all *Imperatives*, is worth observing. 'Επὶ γὰρ μὴ γινόμενοις ἢ μὴ γεγονόσιν ἢ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγονότα, ἐπιτηδεώτητα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἐσεῖσθαι, ΜΕΛ-

have they to do with the present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary ?

ΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἔστι. A COMMAND has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to THE FUTURE. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—“ Ἀπαντα τὰ προ-  
 πακτικά ἐγκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τῷ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χηδὸν  
 γὰρ ἐν ᾧσιν ἔστι τὸ, Ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ  
 ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩ, τῷ ΤΙΜΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρόνους ἔννοίαν  
 τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὼ τὸ μὲν προπακτικόν, τὸ δὲ  
 ὀριστικόν. All IMPERATIVES have a disposition within  
 them, which respects THE FUTURE—with regard therefore  
 to TIME, it is the same thing to say, LET HIM, THAT  
 KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONOURED, or, HE, THAT KILLS  
 ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED ; the difference being only in  
 the Mode, in as much as one is IMPERATIVE, the other  
 INDICATIVE or Declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi. L. I. c. 35.  
 Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time,  
 as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Pre-  
 sent to be nothing else than an immediate Future, as op-  
 posed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero Præsens et  
 Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitate videtur  
 posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsentī  
 statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futuro.  
 Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is from this connection of *Futurity* with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative* and that to say to any one, *YOU SHALL DO THIS*, has often the same force with the *Imperative*, *DO THIS*. So in the *Decalogue*—*THOU SHALT NOT KILL*—*THOU*

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It is true the *Greeks* in their *Imperatives* admit certain *Tenses* of the *Past*, such as those of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aorists*. But then these *Tenses*, when so applied, either totally lose their *temporary* Character, or else are used to insinuate such a *Speed of execution*, that the deed should be (as it were) *done* in the very instant when *commanded*. The same difference seems to subsist between our *English* *Imperative*, *BE GONE*, and those others of, *Go*, or *BE GOING*. The first (if we please) may be stiled the *Imperative of the Perfectum* as calling in the very instant for the completion of our *Commands*: the others may be stiled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterwards.

It is thus *Apollonius* in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between *σκαπτέρω τὰς ἀμπέλεις*, *Go to digging the Vines*, and *σκαφάτω τὰς ἀμπέλεις*, *Get the Vines dug*. The first is spoken (as he calls it) *εἰς παράτασιν*, *by way of Extension*, or *allowance of Time for the work*; the

SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS—  
which denote (we know) the strictest and  
most authoritative Commands.

As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its *subordinate* or *subjunctive* Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the *Requisitive* and *Interrogative*, by implying a kind of feeble and weak *Assertion*, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and

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second εἰς συντελείωσιν, with a view to immediate Completion. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, Σκάπτει and Σκάψον, he says of the last, ὅ μόνον τὸ μὴ γινόμενον προστάσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει, that it not only commands something which has not been yet done, but forbids also that which is now doing in an Extension, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in Greek ΓΡΑΦΕ, WRITE for that he is now, and has been long doing) but ΓΡΑΨΟΝ GET YOUR WRITING DONE: MAKE NO DELAYS. See Apoll. L. III. c. 24. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. et Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Latini non aestimaverunt, &c.

Falsehood. Thus, if it be said potentially, *This may be*, or *This might have been*, we may remark without absurdity, *It is true*, or *It is false*. But if it be said, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or *Can this be done?* meaning, *to square the Circle*, we cannot say in either case, *it is true* or *it is false*, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the *Potential* does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a *dubious* and *conjectural* Assertion, whereas that of the Indicative is absolute, and without reserve.

THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this which publishes our sublimest perceptions, which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfections of desires and wants: which includes the

whole of *Time*, and its minutest distinctions ; which, in its various *Past* Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the remembrance of former Events ; in its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming ; but above all in its *Present* Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences by just Demonstrations to establish *necessary Truth* ; THAT TRUTH, which from its nature *only exists in the Present* ; which knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where, and always invariably one.<sup>(A)</sup>

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<sup>(A)</sup> See the quotation, Note <sup>(c)</sup> Chapter the Sixth. *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non cum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.*

*Boethius*, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a *Roman* of the first quality ; by religion, a *Christian* ; and by philosophy a *Platonic* and *Peripatetic* ; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as *Themistius*, *Porphry*, *Iambli-*

THROUGH all the above Modes, with their respective Tenses, the Verb being considered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE has always reference to some Person, or SUBSTANCE. Thus if we say, *Went*, or, *Go*, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gone*, we must add a Person or Substance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero *went*; Cæsar *might have gone*; *Whither goeth the Wind?* *Go*; *Thou Traitor!* But there is a Mode or Form, under which

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*chus*, *Ammonius*, and others. There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction between things existing *in Time* and *not in Time*, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that *Boethius* here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

“THE THINGS THAT EXIST IN TIME, are those  
 “whose Existence Time can measure. But if their  
 “Existence may be measured by Time, then there may  
 “be assumed a Time greater than the Existence of any  
 “one of them; as there may be assumed a number  
 “greater than the greatest multitude that is capable of

Verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Persons or Substances. For example—*To eat is pleasant*;

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“ being numbered. And hence it is that *things temporary*  
 “ have their Existence, as it were, *limited by Time*; that  
 “ they are confined within it, as within some bound; and  
 “ that in some degree or other they *all submit to its*  
 “ *power*, according to those common Phrases, that *Time*  
 “ *is a destroyer*; that *things decay through Time*; that  
 “ *men forget in Time*, and *lose their abilities*, and seldom  
 “ that they improve, or grow young, or beautiful. The  
 “ truth indeed is, *Time always attends Motion*. Now the  
 “ natural effect of Motion is to *put something, which now*  
 “ *is, out of that state, in which it now is*, and so far there-  
 “ fore to destroy that state.

“ The reverse of all this holds with THINGS THAT  
 “ EXIST ETERNALLY. These exist *not in Time*, because  
 “ Time is so far from being able to measure their Exist-  
 “ ence, that *no Time can be assumed, which their Exist-*  
 “ *ence doth not surpass*. To which we may add, that they  
 “ *feel none of its effects*, being no way obnoxious either to  
 “ damage or dissolution.

“ To instance in examples of either kind of Being.  
 “ There are such things at this instant, as *Stonehenge*  
 “ and the *Pyramids*. It is likewise true at this instant,  
 “ that the *Diameter of the Square is commensurable with*  
 “ *its side*. What then shall we say? Was there ever



*but to fast is wholesome.* Here the Verbs, *To eat*, and *To fast*, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the *Latin* and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, *INFINITIVES*. *Sanctius* has given them the name of *Impersonals*; and the *Greeks* that of 'Απα-

“ a Time, when it was *not incommensurable*, as it is certain  
 “ there was a Time, when there was no Stonehenge, or  
 “ Pyramids? or is it *daily growing less incommensurable*,  
 “ as we are assured of Decays in both those massy Structures?” From these unchangeable Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the unceasing Intellection of the Universal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See *Nat. Ausc.* L. IV. c. 19. *Metaph.* L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I p. 262. Note VII. The following Passage may deserve Attention:

Τοῦ γὰρ Νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῶν· ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκε, καὶ νοεῖ. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος οὐπω τέλειος, ἂν μὴ προσθῇς αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ νοεῖν αἰεὶ, καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα, ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἐντελέστατος ὁ νοῶν αἰεὶ καὶ πάντα, καὶ ᾄμα. *Max. Tyr. Diss. XVII. p. 201. Ed. Lond.*

*ῥεφάτα*, from the same reason of their *not discovering* either Person or Number.

THESE INFINITIVES go farther. They not only lay aside the character of *Attributives*, but they also assume that of *Substantives*, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several *Attributes*. Thus in the instance above, *Pleasant* is the Attribute attending the infinitive *To Eat*; *Wholesome* the attribute attending the Infinitive, *To Fast*. Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like kind are innumerable:

*Dulce et decorum est pro patria MORI.*

*SCIRE tuum nihil est—*

Οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ θεινόν, ἀλλ' αἰσχροῦς θανεῖν.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> It is from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes Ὀνομα ῥηματικόν A

THE *Stoics*, in their grammatical inquiries, had this Infinitive in such esteem, that they held this alone to be the genuine PHMA or VERB, a name which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true ver-

VERBAL NOUN; sometimes Ὀνομα ῥήματος, THE VERB'S NOUN. The Reason of this Appellation is in *Greek* more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; τὸ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν, τῇ γράφειν. The same construction is not unknown in *English*.

Thus *Spencer*,

*For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,  
Could save the Son of Thetis FROM TO DIE—*

ἀπὸ τῷ θανεῖν. In like manner we say, *He did it, to be rich*, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, FOR. *He did it, for to be rich*, the same as if we had said, *He did it for gain*—ἐνεκα τῷ πλετεῖν, ἐνεκα τῷ κέρδεσς—in *French* pour s'enrichir. Even when we speak such Sentences as the following, *I choose TO PHILOSOPHIZE*, rather than TO BE RICH, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βέλομαι, ἢ περ τὸ πλετεῖν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, *I choose PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES*, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν βέλομαι, ἢ περ τὸν πλετον. Thus too *Priscian*, speaking of *Infiniti-*

bal character to be contained *simple* and *unmixed* in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the Infinitives, Περπατεῖν, *Ambulare, To Walk*, mean *simply* that energy, and *nothing more*. The other Modes, besides expressing this energy, *superadd certain Affections* which respect persons and circumstances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not simply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and, *Walk Thou*. And hence they are all of them resolvable into the *Infinitive*, as their *Prototype*, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper Character. *Am-*

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*tives*—CURRERE enim est CURSUS ; et SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA ; et LEGERE LECTIO. Itaque frequenter et Nominibus adjunguntur, et aliis casualibus, more Nominum ; ut Persius,

*Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, et dicier, hic est.*

And soon after—Cum enim dico, BONUM EST LEGERE, nihil aliud significo, nisi, BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also *Apoll.* L. I. c. 8. *Gaza Gram.* L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφατον, ὄνομά ἐστι ῥήματος κ. τ. λ.

*bulo, I walk*; this is, *Indico me ambulare, I declare myself to walk. Ambula, Walk Thou*; that is *Impero te ambulare, I command thee to walk*; and so with the Modes of every other species. Take away therefore the *Assertion*, the *Command*, or whatever else gives a *Character* to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE which (as *Priscian* says) *significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum.*<sup>(4)</sup>

THE application of this Infinitive is somewhat singular. It *naturally coalesces*

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<sup>(4)</sup> See *Apollon. L. III. 13.* Καθόλης πᾶν παρηγμένον ἀπό τινος κ. τ. λ. See also *Gaza*, in the note before. *Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere INFINITIVUM possumus dignoscere; res autem in Personas distributa facit alios verbi motus.—Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, transumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131.* From these Principles *Apollonius* calls the Infinitive Ῥῆμα γενικώτατον, and *Priscian, Verbum generale.*

with all those Verbs, that denote any *Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say βέλωμαι ζῆν, *Cupio vivere, I desire to live*; but not to say ἔσθίω ζῆν, *Edo vivere*, or even in *English, I eat to live*, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of *I eat for to live*; as we say ἐνεκα τῆς ζῆν, or *pour vivre*. The reason is, that though *different Actions* may unite in the *same Subject*, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, *He walked and discoursed*) yet the *Actions* notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to *Volitions, and Actions*. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that *the Volition* is unintelligible, till *the Action* be exprest. *Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—What?—The Sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect. We must help them then by Infinitives, which express the proper Actions to which they*

tend. *Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to learn, I want to see.* Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment as in syntax.<sup>(1)</sup>

AND so much for MODES, and their several SPECIES. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism (which last is no more than a combination of such truths) must always be exprest under positive assertions, and as positive assertions only belong to the *Indicative*, we

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<sup>(1)</sup> *Priscian* calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluntativa*; they are called in *Greek* προαιρετικά. See L. XVIII. 1129, but more particularly see *Apollonius*, L. III. c. 13, where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. et Lat.* p. 685. Ed. Var.

—*Nec omne ἀπαρέμφατον cuiusunque Verbo, &c.*

may denominate it for that reason the **MODE OF SCIENCE.**<sup>(m)</sup> Again, as the *Potential* is only conversant about *Contingents*, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode, **THE MODE OF CONJECTURE.** Again, as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming *Proficients*; hence we may call the *Interrogative*, **THE MODE OF PROFICIENCY.**

*Inter cuncta leges, et PERCONTABERE doctos,  
Quâ ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,  
Quid purè tranquillet, &c.* Hor.

Farther still, as the highest and most excellent use of the *Requisitive* Mode is legislative command, we may stile it for this reason **THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE.** *Ad*

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<sup>(m)</sup> *Ob nobilitatem præiit INDICATIVUS, solus Modus aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis.* Scal. de Caus. L. Lat. c. 116.



*Divos adeunto castè*, says *Cicero* in the character of a *Roman* law-giver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the laws of *England*; and in the same *Mode* speak the *laws* of every other nation. It is also in this *Mode* that the geometrician, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science which he is about to establish.

THERE are other *supposed* affections of Verbs, such as *Number* and *Person*. But these surely cannot be called a part of their essence, nor indeed are they the essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect the *Number* and *Person* of every *Substantive*, that we may know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attend-

ant verbal Attributes. The same may be said of *Sex* with respect to Adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect Beings male or female, tho' *Substances* past dispute are alone susceptible of sex.<sup>(\*)</sup> We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like kind, as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials<sup>(\*)</sup> of language, which essentials are

~ (\*) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammarian as *Sanctius*, should justly deny *Genders*, or the distinction of Sex to *Adjectives*, and yet make *Persons* appertain, not to *Substantives* but to *Verbs*. His commentator *Perizonius* is much more consistent, who says—*At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus et Pronominibus vel maxime, imò unicè inest ipsa Persona; et Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva, quibus solis autor* (*Sanctius* scil. L. I. c. 7.) *et rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis.* Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12. There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of *Sex* and *Person*. There are but two *Sexes*, that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two *Persons* (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker and the Party addressed. The third Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.

(\*) Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance

the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

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referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note <sup>(A)</sup> of this chapter, may consult *Letters concerning Mind*, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. *John Petvin, Vicar of Ilsington, in Devon*, a person who though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Moderns and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

## CHAP. IX.

*Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their other remaining properties.*

ALL Verbs, that are strictly so called, denote <sup>(a)</sup> Energies. Now as all *Energies* are *Attributes*, they have reference of course to certain *energizing Substances*. Thus it is impossible there should be such Energies, as *To love, to fly, to wound, &c.* if there were not such beings as *Men, Birds, Swords, &c.* Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some *Subject*. For example, if we say, *Brutus loves*—we must

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(a) We use this word ENERGY, rather than *Motion*, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both *Motion* and its *Privation*. See before, p. 94, 95.

needs supply—loves *Cato, Cassius, Portia*, or some one. *The Sword wounds*—i. e. wounds *Hector, Sarpedon, Priam*, or some one. And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is *active*, and a Subject which is *passive*. Hence, then, if the Energizer lead the sentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call A VERB ACTIVE.—Thus we say *Brutus amat, Brutus loves*. On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call A VERB PASSIVE.—Thus we say, *Portia amatur, Portia is loved*. It is in like manner that the *same Road* between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is *Ascent*, with respect to the foot is *Descent*. Since then every Energy respects an Energizer or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in lan-

guage a necessary reference to some *Noun* for its *Nominative Case*.<sup>(b)</sup>

BUT to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus loved Portia*—Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; *loved*, the *Energy*; and *Portia*, the *Subject*. But it might have been *Brutus* loved *Cato* or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the *Energy* is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among these infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur which is the Energizer also, as when we say *Brutus* loved *himself*, slew *himself*, &c. in such Case the *Energy* hath to the same being a double *Relation* both active and passive. And this

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<sup>(b)</sup> The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV, c. 3. *Priscian* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub fin. In which places the reader will see a proper *Nominative* supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.

it is which gave rise among the *Greeks* to that species of Verbs, called VERBS MIDDLE <sup>(c)</sup> and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*se* or *himself*) is expressed like other accusatives.

AGAIN, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth*, it is impossi-

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<sup>(c)</sup> Τὰ γὰρ καλέμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμπτωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργητικῆς ἢ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως. *The Verbs called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and passive Character.* Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic *Kuster*, entitled, *De vero Usu Verborum Mediorum*. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.

ble the *Energy* should pass out (as in the case of those Verbs called by the Grammarians VERBS TRANSITIVE) because both the *Energizer* and the *Passive Subject* are united in the same Person. For what is the cause of this walking or sitting?—It is the *Will* and *Vital Powers* belonging to *Cæsar*. And what is the subject, made so to move or to sit?—It is the *Body* and *Limbs* belonging also to the same *Cæsar*. It is this then forms that species of Verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call VERBS NEUTER, as if indeed they were void both of *Action* and *Passion*, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather said to *imply both*. Not however to dispute about names, as these Neuters in their *Energizer* always discover their *passive Subject*,<sup>(c)</sup> which other Verbs cannot,

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<sup>(c)</sup> This Character of Neuters the *Greeks* very happily express by the Terms, *Αὐτοπάθεια* and *Ἰδιοπάθεια*, which *Priscian* renders, *quæ ex se in seipsâ fit intrinsecus Passio*. L. VIII. 790 *Consentii Ars apud Putsch.* p. 2051.



their passive Subjects being infinite ; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these Neuters to have the Subject expressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars that *Verbs*

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It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called *Actives*, can, upon occasion, lay aside their transitive character, that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and assume the Form of *Neuters*, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere *Energy* or *Affection* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, ἐκ οἷδεν ἀναγινώσκειν ἄνθρωπος, *This Man knows not how to read*, speaking only of the Energy in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them ; ἐκ οἷδεν ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ Ὅμηρου, *He knows not how to read Homer*, or *Virgil*, or *Cicero*, &c.

Thus *Horace*,

Qui CUPIT aut METUIT, juvat illum sic domus aut res,  
Ut lippum pictæ tabulæ—

*He that DESIRES or FEARS (not this thing in particular, nor that, but in general he within whose breast those affections prevail) has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the*

*Active require an Accusative, while Neuters require none.*

OF the above species of Verbs, the *Middle* cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. THE SPECIES OF VERBS, therefore, remaining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and the NEUTER, and those seem essential to all languages whatever.<sup>(a)</sup>

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*Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.* So *Cæsar* in his celebrated *Laconic Epistle* of, VENI, VIDI, VICI, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was in the rapid Sequel of the Events. Conquest came as quick as he could come himself, and look about him. Whom he saw, and whom he conquered, was not the thing of which he boasted. See *Apoll. L. III c. 31. p. 279.*

<sup>(a)</sup> The Stoics, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts.

When a Verb, co-inciding with the Nominative of some Noun made without farther help a perfect assertive Sentence, as Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, *Socrates walketh*; then as

THERE remains a remark or two farther and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of *Energy* and

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the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason Κατηγορημα, a *Predicable*; or else, from its readiness συμβαλνεν, to co-incide with its Noun in completing the Sentence, they called it Σύμβαμα, a *Co-incider*.

When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such Noun but under some oblique Case, as Σωκράτει μεταμέλει, *Socratem pænitet*: Such a Verb, from its near approach to just Co-incidence and Predication, they called Παρασύμβαμα or Παρακατηγορημα,

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a Noun in its Nominative, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other Noun under an oblique Case, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα, *Plato loveth Dio* (where without Dio or some other, the Verb loveth would rest indefinite), such Verb, from this Defect, they called ἥττον ἢ σύμβαμα, or ἡ κατηγορημα, something less than a Co-incider, or less than a Predicable.

Lastly, when a Verb required two Nouns in oblique Cases, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we say

*Motion.* But there are some which appear to denote nothing more, than a *mere simple Adjective*, joined to an Assertion. Thus *ισάζει* in *Greek*, and *Equalleth* in *English* mean nothing more than *ἴσός ἐστι*, *is equal*. So *Albeo*, in *Latin*, is no more than *albus sum*.

*Campique ingentes ossibus albeant.* Virg.

THE same may be said of *Tumeo*. *Mons*

Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδους μέλει, *Tædet me Vitæ*, or the like : Such Verb they called ἥττον, or ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα, or ἡ παρακατηγόρημα, *something less than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable*.

These were the *Appellations* which they gave to Verbs, when employed along with Nouns to the forming of Propositions. As to the Name of 'PHMA, or VERB, they denied it to them all, giving it only to the *Infinitive*, as we have shewn already. See page 164. See also *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 37. Apollon. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Theod. Gaza Gram. L. IV.*

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all *Verbs Neuter* are Συμβάματα ; *Verbs Active* ἥττονα ἢ συμβάματα.

*tumet*, i. e. *tumidus est*, is *tumid*. To express the Energy in these instances, we must have recourse to the Inceptives.

*Fluctus uti primo cæpit cum ALBESCERE Vento.*  
Virg.

————— *Freta ponti*  
*Incipiunt agitata TUMESCERE.* Virg.

THERE are Verbs also to be found which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in *Abstract Nouns* (such as *Whiteness* from *White*, *Goodness* from *Good*) as also in the *Infinitive Modes* of Verbs, the *Attributive* is converted into a *Substantive*; here the *Substantive* on the contrary is converted into an *Attributive*. Such are *Κυνίζεν* from *κύων*, to act the part of a Dog, or be a Cynic; *Φιλippiζεν* from *Φίλιππος*, to Philippize or favour Philip; *Syllaturire* from *Sylla*, to meditate acting the same part as Sylla did. Thus too the wise and virtuous Emperor, by way of counsel to himself—

ὅρα μὴ ἀποκαιοσάρῳθῃς, *beware thou beest not*  
*BECÆSAR'D*; as though he said, *Beware,*  
*that by being Emperor, thou dost not dwindle*  
*into A MERE CÆSAR.*<sup>(1)</sup> In like manner  
 one of our own witty Poets,

STERNHOLD *himself* he OUT-STERNHOLDED.

And long before him the facetious *Fuller*,  
 speaking of one *Morgan*, a sanguinary  
 Bishop in the Reign of Queen *Mary*, says  
 of him, *that he* OUT-BONNER'D *even* BON-  
 NER *himself*.\*

AND so much for that Species of AT-  
 TRIBUTES, called VERBS IN THE STRICT-  
 EST SENSE.

<sup>(1)</sup> *Marc. Antonin. L. VI. § 30.*

\* *Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21.*

## CHAP. X.

*Concerning those other Attributives, Participles and Adjectives.*

THE nature of Verbs being understood, that of PARTICIPLES is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an *Attribute*; of *Time*; and of an *Assertion*. Now if we take away the *Assertion*, and thus destroy the *Verb*, there will remain the *Attribute* and the *Time*, which make the essence of a PARTICIPLE. Thus take away the *Assertion* from the Verb, Γράφει, *Writeth*, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, *Writing*, which (without the *Assertion*) denotes the same *Attribute*, and the same *Time*. After the same manner, by withdrawing the *Assertion*, we discover Γράψας in Έγραψε, Γράψων in Γράψει,

for we chuse to refer to the *Greek*, as being of all languages the most complete, as well in this respect as in others.

### AND so much for PARTICIPLES.<sup>(a)</sup>

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<sup>(a)</sup> The *Latins* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or* (commonly called Deponents), have Active Participles of all Times (such as *Loquens, Locutus, Locuturus*), but none of the **Passive**. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as *Scribens* and *Scripturus* but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as *Scriptus*) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as *Scribendus* and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for *γράφας* they say *cum scripsisset*—for *γραφόμενος*, *dum scribitur*, &c. In *English* we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars which form our Modes and Tenses.

The *English* Grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our Language, it seems



THE nature of *Verbs* and *Participles* being understood, that of *ADJECTIVES* becomes easy. . A *Verb* implies (as we have said) both an *Attribute*, and *Time*, and an *Assertion* ; a *Participle* only implies an *Attribute*, and *Time* ; and an *ADJECTIVE* only implies an *Attribute* ; that is to say, in other Words, an *ADJECTIVE* has no *Assertion*, and only denotes such an *Attribute* as has not its essence either in *Motion* or its *Privation*. Thus in general the Attributes of quantity, quality, and relation (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*, *black* and *white*, *good* and *bad*, *double*

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wrong to annihilate the few *Traces* that may be found. It would be well, therefore, if all writers who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, *it was wrote*, for, *it was written* ; *he was drove*, for, *he was driven* ; *I have went*, for, *I have gone*, &c. in all which instances a *Verb* is absurdly used to supply the proper *Participle*, without any necessity from the want of such Word.

*treble, quadruple, &c.*) are all denoted by  
ADJECTIVES.

It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the idea of *Motion*, assume an assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *albo*, *tumeo*, *ισάζω*, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives*. It is in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus *doctus* in *Latin*, and *learned* in *English*, lose their power, as *Participles*, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not *a man now speaking*, but a man, *who possesses the habit of speaking*, whether he speak or no. So when we say in *English* he is a *thinking Man*, an *understanding Man*, we mean not a person, whose mind is in *actual Energy*, but whose mind is en-

*riched with a larger portion of those powers.* It is indeed no wonder, as all *Attributives* are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in *natural* species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

WE have shewn already <sup>(b)</sup> in the Instances of Φιλippiζεν, *Syllaturire*, 'Αποκαιοσρωθήναι, and others, how *Substantives* may be transformed into *Verbal Attributives*. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into *Adjectives*. When we say the party of *Pompey*, the stile of *Cicero*, the philosophy of *Socrates*, in these cases the party, the stile, and the philosophy spoken

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<sup>(b)</sup> Sup. p. 182, 183.

of, receive a stamp and character from the persons whom they respect. Those persons therefore perform the part of Attributes, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then *they actually pass into Attributes*, and assume, as such, the form of *Adjectives*. And thus it is we say, the *Pompeian* party, the *Ciceronian* stile, and the *Socratic* philosophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet of *Brass* we say a *brazen* Trumpet ; for a Crown of *Gold*, a *golden* Crown, &c. Even *Pronominal* Substantives admit the like mutation. Thus instead of saying, the Book of *Me*, of *Thee*, and of *Him*, we say, *My* Book, *Thy* Book and *His* Book ; instead of saying, the Country of *Us*, of *You*, and of *Them*, we say, *Our* Country, *Your* Country, and *Their* Country, which Words may be called so many *Pronominal Adjectives*.

It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that *Adjectives*,

as marking *Attributes*, can have no sex.<sup>(a)</sup> And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their Substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, though with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as *never properly denoting Substances*. But of this we have spoken before.<sup>(a)</sup>

THE *Attributives* hitherto treated, that is to say, *VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and ADJECTIVES*, may be called *ATTRIBUTIVES*

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<sup>(a)</sup> Sup. p. 171.

<sup>(a)</sup> Sup. C. VI, Note <sup>(a)</sup>. See also C. III. p. 28. &c.

OF THE FIRST ORDER. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER, to which we now proceed in the following chapter.

## CHAP. XI.

*Concerning Attributives of the second Order.*

AS the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote *the Attributes of Substances*, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote *the Attributes only of Attributes*.

To explain by examples in either kind —when we say, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent ; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote ;* in these instances the Attributives *eloquent* and *wrote*, are immediately referable to the substantives, *Cicero, Virgil, &c.* As therefore denoting THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we say, *Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent ; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admir-*

*ably*; in these instances, the *Attributives*, *Moderately*, *Exceedingly*, *Indifferently*, *Admirably*, are not referable to *Substantives*, but to *other Attributives*, that is, to the words, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*. As therefore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we call them **ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER**.

GRAMMARIANS have given them the Name of Ἐπιρρήματα, ADVERBIA, ADVERBS. And indeed if we take the word ῥῆμα, or, *Verb*, in its most *comprehensive Signification*, as including not only *Verbs properly so called*, but also *Participles* and *Adjectives* [an usage, which may be justified by the best authorities <sup>(a)</sup>] we shall find

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<sup>(a)</sup> Thus *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Interpretatione*, instances ἄνθρωπος as a *Noun*, and λεῦκος as a *Verb*. So *Ammonius*—κατὰ τῆτο τὸ σημαίνον, τὸ μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ ἐν ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ ἐν ὅσα τοιαῦτα—ῥΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι ἐν ἐκ ὀΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this *Signification* (that is of



the name, *Επίρρημα*, or ADVERB, to be a very just appellation, as denoting A PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL APPENDAGE OF VERBS. So great is this dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that an *Adverb* can no more subsist without its *Verb*, than a *Verb* can subsist without its *Substantive*. It is the same here as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its existence as much requires a Superficies, as the Superficies for its existence requires a solid body.<sup>(b)</sup>

denoting the Attributes of Substance and the Predicate in Propositions) the words, FAIR, JUST, and the like, are called VERBS, and not NOUNS. *Am. in libr. de Interp.* p. 37. b. *Arist. de Interp.* L. I. c. I. See also of this Treatise, c. 6. Note <sup>(a)</sup> p. 87.

In the same manner the *Stoics* talked of the Participle. *Nam PARTICIPIUM connumerantes Verbis, PARTICIPIALE VERBUM vocabant vel CASUALE. Priscian. L. I. p. 574.*

<sup>(b)</sup> This notion of ranging the *Adverb* under the same Genus with the *Verb* (by calling them both *Attributives*) and of explaining it to be the *Verb's Epithet* or *Adjective*

AMONG the Attributes of Substance are reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus we say, *a white Garment, a high Mountain*. Now some of these Quantities and Qualities are capable of Intension, and Remission. Thus we say, *a Garment, EXCEEDINGLY white; a Mountain TOLERABLY high, or MODERATELY high*. It is plain

(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is conformable to the best authorities. *Theodore Gaza* defines an ADVERB, as follows—μέρος λόγος ἄπτωτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι, καὶ οἷον ἐπιθετον ῥήματος. *A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective*. L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an *Aptote*, since its principal sometimes *has cases*, as in *Valdè Sapiens*; sometimes *has none*, as in *Valdè amat*.) *Priscian's* definition of an Adverb is as follows—ADVERBIUM est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio Verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix Vir; feliciter vivit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the *Stoics*, he says—Etiam ADVERBIA Nominibus vel VERBIS CONNUMERABANT, et quasi ADJECTIVA VERBORUM nominabant. L. I. p. 574. See also *Apoll. de Synt.* L. I. c. 3. *sub fin.*

therefore that Intension and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, *Intension*, and *Remission*. The *Greeks* have their *θauμασῶς, μάλιστα, ὡάνυ, ἥκιστα*; the *Latins*, their *valdè, vehementer, maximè, satis, mediocriter*; the *English*, their *greatly, vastly, extremely, sufficiently, moderately, tolerably, indifferently, &c.*

FARTHER than this, where there are different Intensions of the same Attribute, they may be *compared* together. Thus if the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY *White*, and the Garment B be MODERATELY *White*, we may say, *the Garment A is MORE white than the Garment B.*

IN these instances the Adverb MORE not only denotes Intension, but *relative Intension*. Nay, we stop not here. We

not only denote Intension *merely relative*, but *relative Intension*, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only say *the Mountain A is MORE high than the Mountain B*; but that *it is the MOST high of all Mountains*. Even *Verbs*, properly so called, as they admit *simple* Intensions, so they admit also these *comparative* ones. Thus in the following Example—*Fame he LOVETH MORE than Riches, but Virtue of all things he LOVETH MOST*—the Words MORE and MOST denote the different *comparative Intensions* of the Verbal Attributive, *Loveth*.

AND hence the rise of COMPARISON, and of its different *Degrees*; which cannot well be more than the two Species above mentioned, one to denote *Simple Excess*, and one to denote *Superlative*. Were we indeed to introduce *more* degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce *infinite*, which is absurd. For why stop

at a limited Number, when in all subjects, susceptible of Intension, the intermediate Excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite degrees of *more* White, between the *first Simple White*, and the *Superlative, Whitest*; the same may be said of *more* Great, *more* Strong, *more* Minute, &c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about *three* such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is† no Comparison at all, and because their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* itself. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the MOST WISE of all the Athenians—Homer was the MOST SUBLIME of all Poets—*

—*Cadit et Ripheus, JUSTISSIMUS UNUS  
Qui fuit in Teucris—* Virg.

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† Qui (scil. Gradus Positivis) quoniam perfectus est, a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. Consentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

It must be confessed these Comparatives, as well the *simple* as the *superlative*, seem sometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus in the Degree, denoting *simple* Excess,

Tristior, et lacrumis oculos suffusa nitentes. Virg.

Rusticior paulo est—

Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more usual. *Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man*,—that is to say, not the *bravest* and *most learned* Man that ever existed, but a man possessing those Qualities in an *eminent Degree*.

THE Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of *More fair*, they say FAIRER; instead of *Most fair*, FAIREST, and the same holds true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*. This Practice however has reached no farther

than to *Adjectives*, or at least to *Participles*, sharing the nature of *Adjectives*. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some Attributives, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote *that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure*; as when we say, a *Circular Table*, a *Quadrangular Court*, a *Conical Piece of Metal*, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it *equally*, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is *more* or *less* quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all Attributives, denoting *definite Quantities*, whether *continuous* or *discrete*, whether *absolute* or *relative*. Thus the *two-foot Rule* A cannot be *more* a *two-foot Rule*, than any

other of the same length. *Twenty* Lions cannot be *more twenty*, than *twenty* Flies. If A and B be both *triple*, or *quadruple* to C, they cannot be *more triple*, or *more quadruple*, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be *no Comparison* without *Intension and Remission*; there can be no Intension and Remission in things *always definite*; and such are the *Attributives*, which we have last mentioned.

IN the same reasoning we see the cause, why *no Substantive is susceptible of these Comparative degrees*. A *Mountain* cannot be said *MORE TO BE*, or *TO EXIST*, than a *Mole-hill*, but the *More* and *Less* must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the Lion A cannot be called *more a Lion*, than the Lion B, but if more any thing, he is *more fierce*, *more speedy*, or exceeding in some such Attribute. So again, in referring many Species to one



Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are *more bulky, more strong, &c.* the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that saying of the acute *Stagīrite*—that SUBSTANCE is not susceptible of MORE and LESS.<sup>(c)</sup> But this by way of digression, to return to the subject of Adverbs.

OF the Adverbs, or secondary Attributives already mentioned; these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of *Quantity continuous*; *Once, Twice, Thrice*, are Adverbs of *Quantity discrete*; *More and Most, Less and Least*, to which may be added *Equally, Proportionally, &c.*

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<sup>(c)</sup> ἐκ αὐτῶν ἐπιδέχονται ἡ ἔσχα τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, *Categor.* c. 5. See also *Sanctius*, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also *Priscian*, p. 598. *Derivantur igitur Comparativa a Nominibus Adjectivis, &c.*

are Adverbs of *Relation*. There are others of *Quality*, as when we say, *HONESTLY industrious*, *PRUDENTLY brave*, *they fought BRAVELY*, *he painted FINELY*, *a Portico formed CIRCULARLY*, *a Plain cut TRIANGULARLY*, &c.

AND here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same *Essence*, assumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ *Honest*, *Honestly*, and *Honesty*. The Answer is, they are in *Essence* the same, but they differ, in as much as *Honest* is the *Attributive of a Substantive*; *Honestly*, of a *Verb*; and *Honesty*, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes the *Power of a Substantive*, so as to stand by itself.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common, to *Verbs of every Species*; but

there are some, which are peculiar to *Verbs properly so called*, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Privations*. All MOTION and REST imply TIME and PLACE, as a kind of necessary *Coincidents*. Hence, then, if we would express the *Place* or *Time* of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper Adverbs; of *Place*, as when we say, *he stood THERE; he went HENCE; he travelled FAR, &c.* of *Time*, as when we say, *he stood THEN; he went AFTERWARD; he travelled FORMERLY, &c.* Should it be asked—why *Adverbs of Time*, when Verbs have *Tenses*? The Answer is, though Tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of Time, yet to denote them all by Tenses would be à perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote *Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow, Formerly, Lately, Just now, Now, Immediately, Presently, Soon, Hereafter, &c.* It was this then that made the Tem-

*poral* Adverbs necessary; over and above the *Tenses*.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those which denote the *Intensions and Remissions peculiar to Motion*, such as *speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c.* as also *Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions*, such as ἀνω and κάτω from ἀνὰ and κατὰ, in *English upward and downward, from up and down*. In some instances the Preposition suffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we say, CIRCA equitat, *he rides ABOUT*; PROPE cecidit, *he was NEAR falling*; Verum ne POST conferas culpam in me, *But do not AFTER lay the blame on me.*<sup>(a)</sup>

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<sup>(a)</sup> *Sosip. Charistii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent. Eun. Act. II. Sc. 3.*

THERE are likewise *Adverbs of Interrogation*, such as *Where, Whence, Whither, How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their *Interrogative* power, they assume that of a *Relative*, so as even to represent the *Relative* or *Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus Ovid

*Et Seges est, UBI Troja fuit—*

translated in our old *English Ballad*,

*And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town stood.*

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, IN QUO* &c. *Corn groweth in that place, IN WHICH* &c. the power of the *Relative*, being implied in the *Adverb*. Thus Terence,

*Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,*  
*UBI me excarnufices—* Heaut. IV. 6.

where *UBI* relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus*.

IT is in like manner that the *Relative Pronoun* upon occasion becomes an *Interrogative*, at least, in *Latin* and *English*. Thus *Horace*,

QUEM *Virum aut Heroa lyrá, vel acri*  
Tibiá sumes celebrare, *Clio?*

So *Milton*,

WHO *first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?*

THE reason of all this is as follows. The *Pronoun* and *Adverbs* here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, RELATIVES. Even when they become Interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still Relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that *without* an Interrogation, they have reference to a Subject which is *antecedent, definite and known*; *with an Interrogation*, to a Subject which is *subsequent, indefinite, and unknown*, and which it is expected that the *Answer* should express and ascertain,

WHO *first seduc'd them?*—

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which though *unknown*, the Pronoun, *Who*, has a *reference*.

*Th' infernal Serpent—*

Here in the *Answer* we have the *Subject*, which was *indefinite*, ascertained; so that the *Who* in the *Interrogation* is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any interrogation at all, *It was the Infernal SERPENT, who first seduced them.*

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for *ADVERBS*, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those which are common to all *Attributives*. We have likewise attempted to explain *their general Nature*, which we have found to consist in being the *Attri-*

*butes of Attributes.* There remains only to add, that ADVERBS may be derived from almost every part of Speech; from PREPOSITIONS, as when from *After* we derive *Afterwards*—from PARTICIPLES, and through these from Verbs, as when from *Know* we derive *Knowing*, and thence *Knowingly*; from *Scio Sciens*, and thence *Scienter*—from ADJECTIVES, as when from *Virtuous* and *Vicious*, we derive *Virtuously* and *Viciously*—from SUBSTANTIVES as when from Πίθηκος, *an Ape*, we derive Πιθήκειον βλέπεν, *to look APISHLY*; from Λέων, *a Lion*, Λεονίωδῶς, *Leoninely*—nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we derive *Socratically* and *Demosthenically*. *It was Socratically reasoned*, we say; *it was Demosthenically spoken*.\* Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old Gramma-

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\* Aristotle has Κυκλοπικῶς *Cyclopically*, from Κύκλωψ *a Cyclops*. Eth. Nic. X. 9.



rians, such as *Catiliniter* from *Catilina*, *Sisenniter* from *Sisenna*, *Tullianè* from *Tullius*, &c.<sup>(1)</sup>

NOR are they thus extensive only in *Derivation*, but in *Signification* also. *Theodore Gaza* in his *Grammar* informs us,<sup>(2)</sup> that *ADVERBS* may be found in every one of the *Predicaments*, and that the readiest way to reduce their *Infinity*, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal *Genera*. The *Stoics* too called the *ADVERB* by the name of Πανδέλης, and that from a view to the same *multiform Nature*. *Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessâ sibi rerum variâ potestate*. It is thus that *Sosipater* explains the

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<sup>(1)</sup> See *Prisc.* L. XV. p. 1022. *Sos. Charis.* 161. Edit. *Putschii*.

<sup>(2)</sup>—διὸ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον ἴσως δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐπιρρήματων γένη θέσθαι ἐκείνα, ἑσταν, ποιὸν, ποσὸν, πρὸς τι, κ. τ. λ. *Gram. Introd.* L. II.

Word,<sup>a</sup> from whose authority we know it to be *Stoical*. But of this enough.

And now having finished those PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, we proceed to those AUXILIARY PARTS, which are ONLY SIGNIFICANT WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as these make the Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

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<sup>a</sup> *Sosip. Char.* p. 175. Edit. *Putschii*.



**HERMES**  
OR  
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY  
CONCERNING  
**UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.**

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**BOOK II.**

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**CHAP. I.**

*Concerning Definitives.*

**WHAT** remains of our Work, is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here, as in some Historical Picture ; when the principal Figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.

**DEFINITIVES**, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, **ARTICLES**, **ARTICULI** Ἀρθρα. They are of two kinds, either those *properly and strictly so called*, or else the *Pro-*

*nominal Articles*, such as *This*, *That*, *Any* &c.

WE shall first treat of those *Articles more strictly so denominated*, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

THE visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least to some Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it *Dog*, or *Horse*, or *Lion*

or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus and call it, *Animal*.

BUT this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? *Known* or *unknown*? Seen now *for the first time* or *seen before*, and now remembered?—It is here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (THE.) (A) respects our *primary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *unknown*; (THE) respects our *secondary* Perception and denotes individuals as *known*. To explain by an example. I see an object pass by, which I never saw till now. What do I say?—*There goes A Beggar with A long Beard*. The Man departs, and returns a week after. What do I say then?—*There goes THE Beggar with THE long Beard*. The Article only is changed, the rest remains un-altered.

YET mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, *once vague*, is now recognized *as something known*, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of *previous* acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past.<sup>(a)</sup>

The Truth is, the Articles (A) and (THE) are both of them *Definitives*, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the most part to denote Individuals. The difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself *unascertained*, whereas the Article (THE) *ascertains the Individual also*, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

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<sup>(a)</sup> See B. I. c. 5. p. 63. 64.

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article 'Ο. 'Ο ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, *THE man fell*—ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, *A Man fell*, without anything prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn.<sup>(b)</sup> Even in *English*, where the Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is exprest

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<sup>(b)</sup> Τὰ γὰρ, ἀοριτωδῶς· πότε νοόμενα, ἢ τῷ ἄρθρῳ παρά-  
 θεσις ὑπὸ ὀρισμὸν τῷ προσώπῳ ἄγει. *Those things, which*  
*are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the*  
*Article makes to be definite as to their Person.* Apoll. L.  
 IV. c. I. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. ποιῷ  
 (τὸ Ἄρθρον sc.) δ' ἀναπόλησιν προεγνωσμένῳ τῷ ἐν τῇ  
 συντάξει· οἷον εἰ μὲν λέγοι τις, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ΗΚΕ,  
 ἄδηλον τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. εἰ δὲ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, δῆλον,  
 προεγνωσμένον γὰρ τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. Τῷτο δὲ αὐτὸ  
 βέβλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τ' ἄρθρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης  
 γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. *The Article causes a Review within*  
*the Mind of something known before the texture of the*  
*Discourse.* Thus if any one says Ἀνθρωπος ἦκε, *MAN*  
*CAME* (which is the same as when we say in *English* *A man*



by the same Negation. *Those are THE Men*, means those are individuals, of which we possess some *previous* Knowledge. *Those are Men*, the Article àpart, means no more than that they are so many *vague* and *uncertain* Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

BUT though the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to the Article (A), yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their 'O, to the Article THE. 'Ο βασιλεῦς, THE King; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel ex-

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*came*) it is not evident, of whom he speaks But if he says ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦκε THE MAN CAME, then it is evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together. Theod. Gaza. L. IV,

amples, but by the Attributes of the *Greek Article*, as they are described by *Apollonius*, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining.

Ἔστιν ὃν καθὼ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, ἴδιον ἄρθρων ἢ ἀναφορὰ, ἣ ἐστὶ προκατειλεγμένον προσώπων παραστατική.—Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article as we have shown elsewhere, is that Reference, which implies some certain Person already mentioned. Again Οὐ γὰρ δήγε τά ὀνόματα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρῖσιν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, ὃ ἐξαίρετός ἐστιν ἢ ἀναφορά. For Nouns of themselves imply not Reference, unless they take to them the Article, whose peculiar Character is Reference. Again—Τὸ ἄρθρον προϋφeszῶσαν γνῶσιν δηλοῖ—The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance.<sup>(c)</sup>

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<sup>(c)</sup> *Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7.* His account of RE-

HIS reasoning upon *Proper Names* is worth remarking. *Proper Names* (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two *Grecian* chiefs who bore the name of *Ajax*. It was not therefore without reason, that *Menestheus* usēs *Epithets*, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

Ἄλλὰ περ οἷοι' ἴτω Τελαμῶνι' ἄλκιμον' Αἴας.

Hom.

*If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared,  
 ———at least alone  
 Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.*

*Apollonius* proceeds——Even *Epithets*

REFERENCE is as follows—Ἰδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς προκατειλεγμένε προσώπῳ δευτέρα γνώσις. *The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned.* L. II. c. 3.

themselves are diffused through various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

IN order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes *an Article* before it, that it may indicate *a Reference to some single Person only*, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορά, according to the Author's own Phrase. And thus it is we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικὸς, *Trypho the Grammarian*; Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, *Apollodorus the Cyrenean*, &c. The Author's Conclusion of this Section is worth remarking. Δεόντως ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ πρόσθεσις ἐστὶ τῷ ἄρθρῳ, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι—*It is with reason therefore that the Article is here also added, as it brings the Adjec-*

*tive to an Individuality, as precise as the proper Name.*<sup>(d)</sup>

WE may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the *Article* even common *Appellatives* come to have the force of *proper Names*, and that unassisted by epithets of any kind. Among the *Athenians* Πλοῖον meant *Ship*; ἑνδεκα, *Eleven*; and ἄνθρωπος, *Man*. Yet add but the *Article*, and Τὸ Πλοῖον, *THE SHIP* meant *that particular Ship, which they sent annually to Delos*; Οἱ ἑνδεκα, *THE ELEVEN*, meant *certain officers of Justice*; and Ὁ ἄνθρωπος, *THE MAN*, meant *their public Executioner*. So in *English*, *City* is a *Name* common to many places; and *Speaker*, a name common to many

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<sup>(d)</sup> See *Apoll. L. I. c. 12.* where by mistake *Menelaus* is put for *Menestheus*.

Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, **THE CITY** means our Metropolis; and **THE SPEAKER**, a *high Officer* in the *British Parliament*.

AND thus it is by an easy transition, that the Article, from denoting *Reference*, comes to denote *Eminence* also; that is to say, from implying an *ordinary* pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of *general and universal Notoriety*. Thus among the *Greeks* 'Ο Ποιητής, **THE POET**, meant *Homer*; <sup>(a)</sup> and 'Ο Σταγειρίτης, **THE STAGIRITE** meant *Aristotle*; not that there were not many Poets, beside *Homer*; and many Stagirites, beside *Aristotle*; but none

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<sup>(a)</sup> There are so few exceptions to this Observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet *Aristotle* twice denotes *Euripides* by the Phrase ὁ ποιητής, once at the end of the seventh Book of his *Nichomachian Ethics* and again in his *Physics*, L. II. 2. *Plato* also in his tenth Book of *Laws* (p. 901. *Edit. Serr.*) denotes *Hesiod* after the same manner.

equally illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

IT is on a like principle that *Aristotle* tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert—*εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν*, or, TO *ἀγαθόν*—that, *Pleasure is A GOOD*, or THE GOOD. The first only makes it a *common Object of Desire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it *that supreme and sovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours.<sup>o</sup>

BUT to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require *defining* for

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<sup>o</sup> *Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.*

it is by nature a *Definitive*.—And *what Words* are these?—Not those which already are *as definite, as may be*. Nor yet those, which, *being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise*. It remains then they must be *those, which though indefinite, are yet capable, through the Article, of becoming definite*.

UPON these Principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, Ο ΕΓΩ, THE I, or Ο ΣΥ, THE THOU, because nothing can make those Pronouns more *definite*, than they are.<sup>(s)</sup> The same may be asserted

<sup>(s)</sup> *Apollonius* makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition, to refuse co-alescence with the Article. 'Εκείνο ἐν Ἀντωνυμίᾳ, τὸ μετὰ δέξεως ἢ ἀναφοράς ἀντονομαζόμενον, ᾧ ἂν σύνεσι τὸ ἄρθρον. *That therefore is a Pronoun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and with WHICH THE ARTICLE DOETH NOT ASSOCIATE*. L. II. c. 5. So *Gaza*, speaking of Pronouns—Πάντη δὲ—ἐκ ἐπιδέχονται ἄρθρον. L. IV. *Priscian* says the same. *Jure igitur apud Græcos prima et secunda persona pro-*



of Proper Names, and though the *Greeks* say *ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Ξάνθη*, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in *Greek* Οἱ Ἀμφοτέροι, or in *English*, THE BOTH, because these Words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus if it be said, *I have read BOTH Poets*, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already ; *Δυὰς ἐγνωσμένη*, a known Duad, as *Apollonius* expresses himself,<sup>(A)</sup> when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said *I have read*

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*nominum, quæ sine dubio demonstrativæ sunt, articulis adjungi non possunt ; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est.* L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.*

<sup>(A)</sup> *Apollon.* L. I. c. 16.

Two *Poets*, this may mean *any Pair* out of all that ever existed. And hence this Numeral, being in this Sense *indefinite* (as indeed are all others, as well as itself) is forced to *assume the Article*, whenever it would become *definite*.\* And thus it is, THE Two in *English*, and ΟΙ ΔΥΟ in *Greek*, mean nearly the same thing, as BOTH or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence also it is, that as Two, when taken alone, has reference to some *primary* and *indefinite* Perception, while the Article, THE, has reference to some *secondary* and *definite*;† hence I say the Reason, why it is bad *Greek* to say ΔΥΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad *English*, to say Two THE MEN. Such

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\* This explains *Servius* on the XII<sup>th</sup> *Æneid*. v. 511. where he tells us that *Duorum*, is put for *Ambarum*. In *English* or *Greek* the Article would have done the business, for the *Two*, or τοῖν δυοῖν are equivalent to *Both* or ἀμφοτέρων, but not so *Duorum*, because the *Latins* have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216.

Syntax is in fact a *Blending of Incompatibles*, that is to say of a *defined Substantive* with an *undefined Attributive*. On the contrary to say in *Greek* ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in *English*, BOTH THE MEN, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise it is correct to say, ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEN, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends its Power* as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, *because they are by Nature as definite as may be*, so there are others, which admit it not, *because they are not to be defined at all*. Of this sort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we question about

*Substances*, we cannot say Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS?<sup>(1)</sup> The same as to *Qualities* and both kinds of *Quantity*. We say without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟΣΟΙ ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in *English*, WHAT SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The Reason is, that the Articles 'Ο, and THE respect Beings, *already known*; Interrogatives respect Beings, *about which we are ignorant*; for as to what we know, Interrogation is superfluous.

IN a word, *the natural Associators with Articles*, are all those *common Appellatives*, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different *Article*, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being

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<sup>(1)</sup> *Apollonius* calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναντιώτατον τῶν ἄρθρων, a Part of Speech, *most contrary, most averse to Articles*. L. IV. c. 1.

perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge.<sup>(\*)</sup>

WE shall here subjoin a few Instances of the Peculiar Power of ARTICLES.

EVERY Proposition consists of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *English* these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing *first*, the Predicate *last*. *Happiness is Pleasure*—Here *Happiness* is the *Subject*; *Pleasure* the *Predicate*. If we change their order, and say, *Pleasure is Happiness*; then *Pleasure* becomes *the Subject*, and *Happiness* the *Predicate*. In *Greek* these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the *Article*, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predi-

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(\*) What is here said respects *the two* Articles, which we have in *English*. In *Greek*, the article does no more, than imply a *Recognition*. See before p. 216, 217, 218.

cate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. *Happiness is Pleasure*—ἡδονὴ ἢ εὐ-  
 δαιμονία—*Pleasure is Happiness*—ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐ-  
 δαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπὰ  
 τὰ καλά—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χα-  
 λεπὰ καλά.

IN *Greek* it is worth attending, how in the same Sentence, the same *Article*, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—*Ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιάρχῃσας ἐτιμήθη*—*Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publicly honoured.* The Participle γυμνασιάρχῃσας has here no other force, than to denote to us *the Time, when* Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the *Article*, and say, *Ὁ γυμνασιάρχῃσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη*, our meaning is then—*The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games,*

*was honoured.* The Participle in this case, *being joined to the Article*, tends tacitly to indicate not one *Ptolemy* but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour.<sup>(1)</sup>

IN *English* likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the *Articles*, though we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched—*And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART THE MAN.\** In that single, *THE*, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him who doubts it, only change the *Article*, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his

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<sup>(1)</sup> *Apollon.* L. I. c. 33, 34.

\* ΣΥ ΕΙ 'Ο ΑΝΗΡ. Βασιλ. Β'. κεφ. ιβ'.

reasoning.—*And Nathan said unto David,*  
THOU ART A MAN. Might not the King  
well have demanded upon so impertinent  
a position,

*Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?*

BUT enough of such Speculations. The  
only remark, which we shall make on  
them, is this; that “minute Change in  
“ PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in  
“ EFFECTS; so that well are PRINCIPLES  
“ intitled to our regard, however *in appear-*  
“ *ance* they may be trivial and low.”

THE ARTICLES already mentioned are  
those *strictly* so called; but besides these  
there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES,  
such as *This, That, Any, Other, Some, All,*  
*No, or None, &c.* Of these we have spoken  
already in our chapter of Pronouns,<sup>(m)</sup>

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<sup>(m)</sup> See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been  
some view of words, like that here given, which induced  
*Quintilian* to say of the *Latin* tongue—*Noster sermo*



where we have shown, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be *to define and ascertain*, they are much more properly Articles than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, *THIS Picture I approve, but THAT I dislike*, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more*

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*Articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur. Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. His declaratis, satis constat Græcorum Articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἔλεξεν ὁ δῆλος) expletur a Latinis per IS aut ILLE; Is, aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græçè Καῖσαρ ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.*

*near the other as the more distant?* So when we say, *SOME men are virtuous, but ALL men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of this *ALL* and *SOME*, but to define that *Universality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such Sentences, as—*SOME substances have sensation; OTHERS want it—Choose ANY way of acting, and SOME men will find fault, &c.* For here *SOME*, *OTHER*, and *ANY*, serve all of them to *define* different Parts of a given Whole; *SOME*, to denote a *definite Part*; *ANY*, to denote an *indefinite*; and *OTHER*, to denote the *remaining Part*, when a Part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last Word denotes a *large indefinite Portion*, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining Part, which receives from such Opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus *Virgil*,

*Excudent ALII spirantia mollius æra ;  
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus ;*

*Orabunt causas melius, cœlique meatus*

*Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent :*

*TU regere imperio populos, ROMANE, memento,*  
*&c. Æn. VI.*

NOTHING can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; *one Act* set as equal to *many other Acts taken together*, and the Roman *singly* (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to *all other Men*; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of ALII to TU.

BUT here we conclude, and proceed to treat of CONNECTIVES.

## CHAP. II.

*Concerning Connectives, and first those called Conjunctions.*

CONNECTIVES are the subject of what follows ; which, according as they connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are called by the different Names of CONJUNCTIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of these Names, that of the *Preposition* is taken from a *mere accident*, as it commonly stands in connection before the Part which it connects. The name of the *Conjunction*, as is evident, has reference to its *essential character*.

OF these two we shall consider the CONJUNCTION first, because it connects, not *Words*, but *Sentences*. This is conformable to the Analysis, with which we be-

gan this inquiry,\* and which led us, by parity of reason, to consider *Sentences themselves* before *words*. Now the Definition of a CONJUNCTION is as follows—a *Part of speech, void of Signification itself, but so formed as to help Signification, by making TWO or more significant Sentences to be ONE significant Sentence.*<sup>(a)</sup>

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\* Sup. p. 11, 12.

<sup>(a)</sup> Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather *single parts of Speech*, than *whole Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This *Sanctius* justly explodes. *Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.* Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed *Scaliger*, who had asserted the same before him. *Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed Conjunctio est, quæ conjungit Orationes plures.* De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

THIS therefore being the general Idea of CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species

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This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by *Apollonius*, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sentences and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support *Scaliger* and *Sanctius*, and that is *Aristotle's* Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν πεφυκῖα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικὴν. *An articulate Sound, devoid of signification, which is so formed as to make ONE significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant.* Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence which follows. *If Men are by nature social, it is their interest to be just, though it were not so*

in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS, while they *connect sentences*, either *connect*

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*ordained by the Laws of their Country.* Here are three Sentences. (1.) *Men are by nature social.* (2.) *It is Man's Interest to be just.* (3.) *It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man should be just.* The first two of these Sentences are made *One* by the Conjunction, *IF*; these, *One* with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, *THO'*; and the three, thus united, make that *φωνή μία σημαντική*, *that one significant articulate Sound*, of which *Aristotle* speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his *Rhetoric*, where he mentions the same Subject. 'Ο γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά· ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαίρεθῃ, δῆλον ὅτι τεναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἐν πολλά. *The Conjunction makes many, ONE; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be MANY.* Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made *many* out of *one*, is, *ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην*, *veni, occurri, rogavi*, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution (for *ἦλθον*, *ἀπήντησα*, and *ἐδεόμην*, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences), prove that these are the proper Subjects of the *Conjunction's* connective faculty.

also their meanings, or not. For example : let us take these two Sentences—*Rome was enslaved—Cæsar was ambitious*—and connect them together by the Conjunction, **BECAUSE.** *Rome was enslaved BECAUSE Cæsar was ambitious.* Here the *Meanings*, as well as the *Sentences*, appear to be connected. But if I say,—*Manners must be reformed, OR Liberty will be lost*—here the Conjunction, **OR**, though it join the Sen-

*Ammonius's* account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπαρξιν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἷς, ἀνάλογος ἂν εἴη τῇ μηδέπω τετμημένῃ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τῆτο ἐνὶ λεγομένῃ· ὁ δὲ πλείονας ὑπαρξεις δηλῶν, ἕνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνώσθαι πως δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ νηὶ τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκειμένη ξύλῳ, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχούσῃ τὴν ἑνωσιν. *Of Sentences, that which denotes one Existence simply, and which is strictly ONE, may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet severed, and called on this account One. That which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made ONE by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity.* Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6.



*tences*, yet as to their respective *Meanings*, is a perfect *Disjunctive*. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions *conjoin Sentences*, yet with respect to the *Sense*, some are **CONJUNCTIVE**, and some **DISJUNCTIVE**; and hence<sup>(b)</sup> it is that we derive their different Species.

THE *Conjunctions which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either **COPULATIVES** or **CONTINUATIVES**. The principal Copulative in *English* is, **AND**. The Continuatives are, **IF**, **BECAUSE**, **THEREFORE**, **THAT**, &c. The Difference between these is this—*The Copulative* does no more than barely *couple* Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures *are not incompatible*. *Continuatives*, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate Sentences

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<sup>(b)</sup> Thus Scaliger. *Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero disjunt.* De C. L. Lat. c. 167.

into *one continuous Whole*, and are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an *essential Co-incidence*.

To explain by examples—It is no way improper to say, *Lysippus was a Statuary, AND Priscian was a Grammarian—The Sun shineth, AND the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, *Lysippus was a Statuary, BECAUSE Priscian was a Grammarian*; though not to say, *the Sun shineth, BECAUSE the Sky is clear*. The Reason is, with respect to the first, *the Co-incidence* is merely *accidental*; with respect to the last, it is *essential*, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives*.<sup>(c)</sup>

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<sup>(c)</sup> *Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Sensum*. Thus *Priscian*, p. 1026. But *Scaliger* is more

As to *Continuatives*, they are either SUP-  
POSITIVE, such as, IF; or POSITIVE, such  
as, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, AS, &c. Take  
Examples of each—you *will live happily*,  
IF you *live honestly*—you *will live happily*,  
BECAUSE you *live honestly*. The differ-  
ence between these Continuatives is this  
—The *Suppositives* denote *Connection*, but  
assert not actual *Existence*; the *Positives*  
imply *both the one and the other*.<sup>(4)</sup>

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explicit—*si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut ne-  
cessariò, aut non necessariò; et si non necessariò, tum fiunt  
Copulativæ, &c.* De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's  
own account of Continuatives is as follows. *Continua-  
tivæ sunt, quæ continuationem et consequentiam rerum signi-  
ficant*—ibid. Scaliger's account is—*causam aut præsti-  
tuunt, aut subdunt*. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for  
the Copulative was Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the  
Continuative, συναπτικός; the Etymologies of which  
words justly distinguish their respective characters.

<sup>(4)</sup> The old Greek Grammarians confined the name  
Συναπτικοί, and the Latins that of *Continuativæ*, to those

FARTHER than this, the Positives above mentioned are either CAUSAL, such as, BECAUSE, SINCE, AS, &c. or COLLECTIVE, such as, THEREFORE, WHEREFORE, THEN, &c. The Difference between these is this—the *Causals* subjoin *Causes to Effects*—*The Sun is in Eclipse,*

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Conjunctions, which we have called *Suppositive* or *Conditional*, while the Positive they called *παρασυνανπτικοί*, or *Subcontinuativæ*. They agree however in describing their proper Characters. The first according to *Gaza* are, οἱ ὑπαρξιν μὲν ἐ, ἀκολουθίαν δὲ τινα ἐν τάξιν δηλῶντες—L. IV. *Priscian* says, they signify to us, *qualis est ordinatio et natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquâ essentia rerum*—p. 1027. And *Scaliger* says, they conjoin *sine subsistentiâ necessariâ; potest enim subsistere et non subsistere; utrumque enim admittunt*. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Positive, or *παρασυνανπτικοί* (to use his own name) *Gaza* tells us, ὅτι ἐν ὑπαρξιν μετὰ τάξεως σημαίνουσιν ἕτοιγε—And *Priscian* says, *causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum*—And *Scaliger*, *non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt*. Ibid.

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the *Posi-*

BECAUSE *the Moon intervenes*—*The Collectives* subjoin *Effects to Causes*—*The Moon intervenes*, THEREFORE *the Sun is in Eclipse*. Now we use *Causals* in those instances, where, the effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and *Collectives*, in *Demonstrations*, and *Science properly so called*, where the Cause being

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*tive* Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the *Suppositive*, which by their ancient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what *actually is*; the Suppositive extend to *Possibles*, nay even as far as to *Impossibles*? Thus it is false to affirm, *As it is Day, it is Light*, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, because the, *If*, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please), even Impossibles. We may say, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks*. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—*amplitudinem Continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit*. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

known first, by its help we discern consequences.<sup>(\*)</sup>

ALL these *Continuatives* are resolvable into *Copulatives*. Instead of *BECAUSE it is Day, it is light*, we may say, *It is Day, AND it is Light*. Instead of, *If it be Day, it is Light*, we may say, *It is at the same time necessary to be Day, AND to be Light;* and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connections, as well to the *essential*, as to the *casual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the *Continuative* may be resolved into a *Copulative* and *something more*, that is to say, into a *Copulative* implying an *essential* Co-incidence<sup>(†)</sup> in the Subjects conjoined.

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(\*) The *Latins* called the *Causals*, *Causales* or *Causativæ*; the *Collectives*, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*: The *Greeks* called the former *Αἰτιολογικοί*, and the latter *Συλλογιστικοί*.

(†) *Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod Causa cum Effectu Subapte naturâ conjuncta est.*  
Séal. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.

As to the *Causal* Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE it is made of Metal*—THE FORMAL—*The Trumpet Sounds, BECAUSE it is long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE an Artist blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet sounds, THAT it may raise our courage.* Where it is worth observing, that the three first Causes are exprest by the strong affirmation of the *Indicative Mode*, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential*. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, though it may be *first in Speculation*, is always *last in Event*. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and

which, like other Contingents, may either happen, or not.<sup>(6)</sup> Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such as, THAT, *ἵνα*, UT, &c.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS which connect both Sentences and their Meanings, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTINUATIVE; the Continuatives are either Conditional or Positive; and the Positives are either Causal or Collective.

AND now we come to the DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words, which bear this contradictory Name, because while they *disjoin the Sense*, they *conjoin the Sentences*.<sup>(7)</sup>

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<sup>(6)</sup> See B. I, c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes, see Vol. I. Note XVII. p. 280.

<sup>(7)</sup> Οἱ δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντιθέασι, καὶ ἡ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ πρᾶγματος, ἢ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ προσώπου δια-



WITH respect to these we may observe, that as there is a principle of UNION diffused throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation ; so there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order.<sup>(1)</sup>

ζευγνύντες, τὴν φράσιν ἐπισυνδῶσιν. *Gazæ Gram. L. IV. Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent. Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative Truth. For though this as to its Intellection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly synthetical, as any Truth, that is affirmative. See Chap. I. Note*<sup>(b)</sup> p. 3.

<sup>(1)</sup> The DIVERSITY which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately lose all Distinction : such for instance are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to *Species*, but as to *Genus* are the same : such are *Man* and *Lion*. There are others again, which differ as to *Genus*, and co-

Now it is *to express in some degree the Modifications of this Diversity*, that DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS seem first to have been invented.

OF these DISJUNCTIVES, some are SIMPLE, some ADVERSATIVE — *Simple*, as when we say, *EITHER it is Day, OR it*

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incide only in those *transcendental Comprehensions* of *Ens*, Being, Existence, and the like: such are *Quantities* and *Qualities*, as for example *an Ounce*, and the Colour, *White*. Lastly ALL BEING whatever differs, as *Being*, from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION with respect to each other, in as much as each thing *is itself*, and *not any* of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not *the same*. In RELATIVES, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in *these* it is *more striking*, than in ordinary Subjects, because *these* always shew it, *by necessarily inferring each other*. In CONTRARIES, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous and Vicious, in *these* the Opposition goes still farther; because *these* not only *differ*, but are even *destructive of each other*.

is *Night*—*Adversative* as when we say, *It is not Day, BUT it is Night*. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than *merely disjoin*; the *Adversative* disjoin, with an *Opposition concomitant*. Add to this, that the *Adversative* are *definite*; the Simple, *indefinite*. Thus when we say, *The Number of Three is not an even Number, BUT an odd*, we not only disjoin

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But the most potent *Opposition* is that of *Ἀντιφασις*, or CONTRADICTION, when we oppose *Proposition* to *Proposition*, *Truth* to *Falsehood*, asserting of any Subject, *either it is, or it is not*. This indeed is an *Opposition* which extends itself to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its *Negative*, though multitudes by nature have neither *Relatives*, nor *Contraries*.

Besides these Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others that deserve notice: such for instance, as the Diversity between the *Name* of a thing, and its *Definition*; between the *various Names*, which belong to the *same thing*, and the *various things*, which are denoted by the *same Name*; all which *Diversities* upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of DIVERSITY.

two opposite Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we say, *The Number of the Stars is EITHER even OR odd*, though we assert one Attribute *to be*, and the other *not to be*, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is left indefinite. And so much for *simple Disjunctives*.<sup>(\*)</sup>

As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply Oppo-

(\*) The simple Disjunctive  $\eta$ , or *Vel*, is mostly used *indefinitely*, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used *definitely*, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous and has the same force with  $\eta$   $\epsilon$ , or, *Et non*. It is thus *Gaza* explains that Verse of *Homer*.

βέλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι.

Ιλ. Α.

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, AND NOT be destroyed*, the Conjunction  $\eta$  being *ἀναιρετικός*, or *sublative*. It must however be confessed, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of *μᾶλλον*, or *αὐτίς*, concerning which see the Commentators.

SITION. Now there can be no Opposition of the *same Attribute*, in the *same Subject*, as when we say *Nireus was beautiful* ; but the Opposition must be either of the *same Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we say *Brutus was a Patriot* BUT *Cesar was not*—or of *different Attributes* in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Georgias was a Sophist*, BUT *not a Philosopher*—or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher*, BUT *Hippias was a Sophist*.

THE *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES.

BUT there are *other Adversatives*, besides these ; as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful* .THAN *Achilles*—*Virgil was as great a Poet* AS *Cicero was an Orator*. The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not

only *Opposition*, but that *Equality* or *Excess*, which arises among Subjects from their being *compared*. And hence it is they may be called **ADVERSATIVES OF COMPARISON**.

BESIDES the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are **UNLESS** and **ALTHO'**. For example—*Troy will be taken UNLESS the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken ALTHO' Hector defend it*. The Nature of these *Adversatives* may be thus explained. As every *Event* is naturally *allied* to its *Cause*, so by parity of reason it is *opposed* to its *Preventive*. And as every *Cause* is either *adequate*<sup>(1)</sup> or *in-adequate* (*in-adequate*, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like

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<sup>(1)</sup> This Distinction has reference to *common Opinion*, and the *form of Language*, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.

manner is every *Preventive*. Now *adequate Preventives* are exprest by such Adversatives, as *UNLESS*—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved*; that is *This alone is sufficient to prevent it*. The *in-adequate* are exprest by such Adversatives as *ALTHO'*—*Troy will be taken ALTHO' Hector defend it*; that is, *Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual*.

THE Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures.<sup>(m)</sup> They may be better perhaps called *ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE* and *IN-ADEQUATE*.

AND thus it is that all *DISJUNCTIVES*, that is *CONJUNCTIONS*, *which conjoin Sen-*

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<sup>(m)</sup>They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, *Adversativa*, or *Εναντιωματικοί*.

*tences, but not their meanings*, are either SIMPLE, OR ADVERSATIVE; and that all ADVERSATIVES are either *Absolute* or *Comparative*; or else *Adequate* or *In-adequate*.

WE shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

IN the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the *same* Disjunctive appears to have *greater* or *less* force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, *Every Number is even, OR odd—Every Proposition is true, OR false*—nothing seems to disjoin *more strongly* than the *Disjunctive*, because no things are in Nature more *incompatible* than the Subjects. But if we say, *That Object is a Triangle, OR Figure contained under three right lines*—the (OR) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than *dis-*



*tinctly* to express the Thing, first by its *Name*; and then by its *Definition*. So if we say, *That Figure is a Sphere, OR a Globe, OR a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the *several Names*, which belong to the *same Thing*.<sup>(n)</sup>

· AGAIN—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the same nature, such as, *Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, &c.* may be properly called ADVERBIAL CONJUNCTIONS, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—*of Conjunctions*, as they *conjoin* Sen-

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<sup>(n)</sup> The *Latins* had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called *Subdisjunctiva*, a *Subdisjunctive*; and that was *SIVE*. *Alexander sive Paris; Mars sive Mavors*. The *Greek* Εἴη ἢ seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, *Scaliger* thus speaks—*Et sane nomen Subdisjunctivarum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris.* De C. L. Lat. c. 170.

tences; of *Adverbs*, as they denote the Attributes either of *Time*, or of *Place*.

AGAIN—these *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps *most of the Prepositions* (contrary to the Character of *accessory Words*, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of *obscure* Signification, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophytes* in Nature; a kind of <sup>(o)</sup> *middle Beings*, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together. <sup>(p)</sup>

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<sup>(o)</sup> Πολλαχού γὰρ ἡ φύσις δῆλη γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβαίνοσα, ὥστε ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τίνων, πότερον ζῶον ἢ φυτὸν. *Themist.* p. 74. Ed. Ald. See also *Arist. de Animal.* Part. p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.

<sup>(p)</sup> It is somewhat surprizing that the politest and most elegant of the *Attic* Writers, and *Plato* above all the rest,

AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS, their Genus, and their Species.

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should have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there must be *Words had to connect*; but that where the Connection is little or none, such Connectives are of little use? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one would chuse to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

*Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c.*

## CHAP. III.

*Concerning those Connectives called  
Prepositions.*

**PREPOSITIONS** by their name express their *Place*, but not their *Character*. Their Definition will distinguish them from the former Connectives. A **PREPOSITION** is a *Part of Speech*, devoid itself of Signification, but so formed as to unite two Words that are significant, and that refuse to co-alesce or unite of themselves.<sup>(\*)</sup>

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(\*) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος, *Præpositiva Conjunctio*, a *Prepositive Conjunction*. Ὡς μὲν ἔν ἐκ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συντάξεως γίνονται παρεμφατικά, λέλεκται ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἐκ ἀφορμῇ εὔρηται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τῷ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος. Now in what manner even in other applications (besides the present) *Prepositions* give proof of their *Conjunctive Syntax*, we have mentioned already; whence too the Stoics

This connective Power (which relates to *Words* only, and not *Sentences*), will be better understood from the following Speculations.

SOME things co-alesce and unite of *themselves*; others refuse to do so *without help*, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone co-alesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities co-alesce immediately with their Substances. Thus it is we say, *a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain*; and from *this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident*, arises the Gram-

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took occasion to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTIONS. Apollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive *Sketch*, than a complete *Definition*, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See Gaz. L. IV. de Præposit. Prisc. L. XIV. p. 983.

*matrical Concord of Substantive and Adjective.*

In like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus it is we say, *Alexander conquers ; Darius is conquered.* Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, *Agent, Energy, and Patient*, co-alesce with the same facility ; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius.* And hence, that is from *these Modes of natural Co-alescence*, arises *the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb.* Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized ; as when we say of such Attributives as *ran, beautiful, learned*, *he ran swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was moderately learned, &c.* And hence the *Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives.*

THE general Conclusion appears to be

this. "THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE  
 " OF THEMSELVES IN GRAMMAR, WHOSE  
 " ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF  
 " THEMSELVES IN NATURE." To which  
 we may add, as following from what has  
 been said, that *the great Objects of Natural  
 Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE.*  
 Now though *Substances* naturally co-incide  
 with their *Attributes*, yet they absolutely  
 refuse doing so, *one with another.*<sup>(b)</sup> And  
 hence those known Maxims in Physics,  
 that *Body is impenetrable*; that *two Bodies*  
*cannot possess the same place*; that *the same*  
*Attribute cannot belong to different Sub-*  
*stances, &c.*

FROM these Principles it follows, that  
 when we form a Sentence, the *Substantive*

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<sup>(b)</sup> *Causa, propter quam duo Substantiva non ponuntur  
 sine copulâ, e Philosophiâ petenda est: neque enim duo sub-*  
*stantialiter unum esse potest, sicut Substantia et Accidens;*  
*itaque non dicas, CÆSAR, CATO PUGNAT. Scal. de Caus.*  
*Ling. Lat. c. 177.*

without difficulty co-incides with the *Verb*, from the natural Co-incidence of *Substance* and *Energy*—THE SUN WARMETH. So likewise the *Energy* with the *Subject*, on which it operates—WARMETH THE EARTH. So likewise both *Substance* and *Energy* with their proper *Attributes*.—THE SPLENDID SUN,—GENIALLY WARMETH—THE FERTILE EARTH. But suppose we were desirous to add other Substantives, as for instance, AIR or BEAMS. How would these co-incide, or under what Character could they be introduced? Not as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives*, for both those places are already filled; the Nominative by the Substance, SUN; the Accusative by the Substance, EARTH. Not as *Attributes* to these last, or to any other thing; for *Attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made*. Here then we perceive the Rise and Use of PREPOSITIONS. By these we connect those Substantives to Sentences, which at the time are unable to co-alesce



*of themselves.* Let us assume for instance a pair of these Connectives, *THRO'* and *WITH*, and mark their Effect upon the Substances here mentioned. *The splendid Sun. WITH his Beams genially warmeth THRO' the air, the fertile Earth.* The Sentence, as before, remains *intire and one*; the *Substantives* required are both *introduced*; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

IT must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the *Relations of PLACE*.<sup>(c)</sup> The reason is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies* or *natural Substances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are

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<sup>(c)</sup> *Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliquâ notâ, quæ TO ΠΟΥ significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, sive esset in altero extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus Præpositionis, essentialem definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c., 152.*

contiguous or remote, whether in motion, or at rest.

It may be said indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this UNIVERSE or VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as much ONE by that general Comprehension as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we have Prepositions to denote the *contiguous Relation* of Body, as when we say, *Caius walked WITH a Staff; the Statue stood UPON a Pedestal; the River ran OVER a Sand*; others for the *detached Relation*, as when we say, *He is going TO Italy; the Sun is risen ABOVE the Hills; these Figs came from Turkey*. So as to *Motion and Rest*, only with this difference, that *here* the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, *that Lamp hangs FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition, FROM, assumes a Character of *Quiescence*. But if we say, *that Lamp is falling FROM*.

*the Ceiling*, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of *Motion*. So in *Milton*,

—*To support uneasie Steps*  
OVER *the burning Marle*—Par. L. I.

Here OVER denotes *Motion*.

Again—

—*He—with looks of cordial Love*  
*Hung* OVER *her enamour'd*— Par. L. IV.

Here OVER denotes *Rest*.

BUT though the original use of Prepositions was to denote *the Relations of Place* they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual* as *local*. Thus, because in Place he, who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him, who is *below*, hence we transfer OVER and UNDER to *Dominion* and *Obedience*; of a king we say, *he ruled OVER his People*;

of a common Soldier, *he served* UNDER *such a General*. So too we say, *with* Thought; *without* Attention; thinking *over* a Subject; *under* Anxiety; *from* Fear; *out of* Love; *through* Jealousy, &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind, shew that the *first Words* of Men, like their *first Ideas*, had an immediate reference to *sensible Objects*, and that in after days, when they began to discern with their *Intellect*, they took those Words, which they found *already* made, and transferred them by metaphor to *intellectual* Conceptions. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new Words*, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion.<sup>(\*)</sup>

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<sup>(\*)</sup> Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to *Anaxagoras* Ὀμοιομέτεια; to *Plato* Ποιότης; to *Cicero*, *Qualitas*; to *Aristotle* Ἐντελέχεια; to the *Stoics*, Οὐσίς, κέρανς and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Me-

IN the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied *κατὰ*

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taphor from common to special Meanings, to the *Platonists* we may ascribe Ἰδέα; to the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, Κατηγορία, and Κατηγορεῖν; to the *Stoics*, Κατάληψις, ὑπόληψις, καθήκον; to the *Pyrrhonists*, Ἐξεσι, ἐνδέχεται, ἐπέχω, &c.

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the *Greek* Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words; and new Significations given to old Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical;—He, I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders: will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philosophy, as his eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without further help, it is impossible he should attain.

*παράθεσιν*, by way of *Juxta-position*, that is to say, where they are prefixt to a Word, without becoming a Part of it. But they may be used also *κατὰ σύνθεσιν*, by way of *Composition*, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it.<sup>(1)</sup> Thus in *Greek* we have *Ἐπίστασθαι*, in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in *English*, to *Understand*. So also, to *foretel*, to *overact*, to *undervalue*, to *outgo*, &c. and in *Greek* and *Latin*, other instances innumerable. In this case, the Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of PLACE,<sup>(2)</sup> as used either in its *proper* or *metaphorical* acceptance.

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<sup>(1)</sup> See *Gaz. Gram.* L. IV. Cap. de *Præpositione*.

<sup>(2)</sup> For example, let us suppose some given Space. E

LASTLY, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature,

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and F signify *out of* that Space; PER, *through it*, from beginning to end; IN, *within it*; SUB, *under it*. Hence then E and PER in composition *augment*; *Enormis*, something not simply big, but big in Excess; something got *out of the rule*, and *beyond the measure*; *Dico*, to *speak*; *Edico*, to *speak out*; whence *Edictum*, an *Edict*, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So *Terence*,

*Dico, Edico vobis*—Eun. V. 5. 20.

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an Αὐξησις. *Fari*, to *speak*; *Effari*, to *speak out*—hence *Effatum*, an *Axiom*, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. *Cic. Acad. II. 29. Per magnus, Perutilis*, great *through-out*, useful *through every part*.

On the contrary, IN and SUB diminish and lessen. *Injustus, Iniquus, unjust, inequitable*, that lies *within* Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls *short of them*; *Subniger, blackish*; *Subrubicundus, reddish*; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet *under* the standard, and *below* perfection.

*Emo* originally signified to *take away*; hence it came to signify to *buy*, because he who buys, *takes away* his purchase. INTER, *Between*, implies *Discontinuance*,

being converted into Adverbs, and used in Syntax accordingly. Thus *Homer*,

—Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.

—*And Earth smil'd all around.*

IA. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter.<sup>(\*)</sup> One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is exprest by two Methods, either

for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, *Interimo*, to kill, that is to say, to take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also *Perimo*, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek Verb, 'Αναπαῖν, and the English Verb, *To take off*, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is, that Prepositions become Parts of other Words,

(\*) See before, p. 205.



by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*; the *Nominative and Accusative Cases* by *Situation*; the *rest* by *Prepositions*. But this we shall make the subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning *Prepositions*.

## CHAP. IV.

*Concerning Cases.*

AS CASES, or at least their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepositions*; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter as the present.

THERE are no CASES, in the modern Languages, except a few among the *primitive Pronouns*, such as I, and ME; JE, and MOY; and the *English Genitive*, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect, however, we may be


enabled to discover in some instances *what a Case is*, the *Periphrasis*, which supplies its place, being *the Case* (as it were) *unfolded*. Thus *Equi* is analyzed into *Du Cheval, Of the Horse*; *Equo* into *Au Cheval, To the Horse*. And hence we see that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive's Preposition being *A, De, or Ex*, the Dative's Preposition being *Ad, or Versus*.

WE have not this assistance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE VOCATIVE we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the *Nominative*.

THE ABLATIVE likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Case they seem to have adopted to associate with their *Prepositions*, as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the *Greeks* do as well without it, and because with the *Romans* themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

THERE remains the NOMINATIVE, which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no Case, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary* and *original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such, for example, as the line AB.



The Variations from the Nominative, they considered, as if AB were to fall from its

perpendicular, as for example, to AC, or AD. Hence then they only called these Variations, ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, CASUS, CASES, or FALLINGS. The *Stoics* on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the *Nominative* a CASE also. Words they considered (as it were) to fall from the *Mind* or *Discursive Faculty*. Now when a Noun fell thence in its primary Form, they then called it ΠΤΩΣΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ, CASUS RECTUS, AN ERECT, or UPRIGHT CASE or FALLING, such as AB, and by this name they distinguish the *Nominative*. When it fell from the *Mind* under any of its variations, as for example in the form of a *Genitive*, a *Dative*, or the like, such variations they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, or SIDE-LONG FALLINGS (such as AC, or AD) in opposition to the other (that is AB) which was erect and perpendicular.<sup>(\*)</sup> Hence

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(\*) See *Ammon*. in *Libr. de Interpr.* p. 35.

too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, **ΚΑΙΣΙΣ**, **DECLINATIO**, & **DECLENSION**, it being a sort of *progressive Descent from the Noun's upright Form thro' its various declining Forms*, that is, a Descent from **AB**, to **AC**, **AD**, &c.

OF these CASES we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the **NOMINATIVE**, the **ACCUSATIVE**, the **GENITIVE** and the **DATIVE**.

It has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are **SUBSTANCE** and **ATTRIBUTE**. Now from this *Natural Concord* arises the *Logical Concord* of **SUBJECT** and **PREDICATE**, and the *Grammatical Concord* of **SUBSTANTIVE** and **ATTRIBUTIVE**.<sup>(\*)</sup> These **CONCORDS** in **SPEECH**

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(\*) See before p. 264.

produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES, as that previous CONCORD in NATURE produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, *Nature's Substance, the Logician's Subject, and the Grammarian's Substantive* are all denoted by that Case, which we call the NOMINATIVE. For example, CÆSAR pugnat, Æs fingitur, DOMUS ædificatur. We may remark too by the way, that *the Character of this Nominative* may be learnt from its *Attributive*. The Action implied in pugnat, shews its Nominative CÆSAR to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in fingitur, shews its Nominative Æs to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in ædificatur prove DOMUS to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attribute would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has

Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a *Nominative* also. So we find it in such instances as—CICERO *est* ELOQUENS; VITIUM *est* TURPE; HOMO *est* ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cases (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to content itself with such assimilations as it has, those of Number and Person;\* as when we say, CICERO LOQUITUR; NOS LOQUIMUR; HOMINES LOQUUNTUR.

FROM what has been said, we may make the following observations—that as there can be no *Sentence without a Substantive*, so that Substantive, if the Sentence be *regular*, is always denoted by a *Nominative*—that on this occasion *all the Attributives, that have Cases*, appear as *Nominatives* also—that there may be a regular and perfect Sentence *without any of the*

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\* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see before, p. 170. 171.



*other Cases, but that without one Nominative at least, this is utterly impossible. Hence therefore we form its Character and Description—THE NOMINATIVE is that Case, without which there can be no regular<sup>(c)</sup> and perfect Sentence. We are now to search after another Case.*

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is some *Verb denoting Action*, we may be assured the *principal Substantive* is some *active efficient Cause*. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lysippus* in such Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit*. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still *in suspense*, and finds its conception *incomplete*. ACTION, it well knows, not only requires some *Agent*, but

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<sup>(c)</sup> We have added *regular* 'as well as *perfect*, because there may be *irregular* Sentences, which may be *perfect* without a *Nominative*. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the *Stoics* Παρασυνμβάματα or Παρακατηγορήματα, such as Σωκράτει μετ'άμελει, *Socratem pœnitel, &c.* See before, p. 180.

it must have a *Subject* also to work on, and it must produce some *Effect*. It is then to denote one of these (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors of Language have destined THE ACCUSATIVE. *Achilles vulneravit HECTOREM*—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lysippus fecit STATUAS*—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—THE ACCUSATIVE is *that Case, which, to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action, subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject*. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate as follows.

IT has been said in the preceding Chapter,<sup>(4)</sup> that when the Places of the *Nominative* and the *Accusative* are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of *Prepositions*. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the *Term* or *Point*, which something commences FROM, and the *Term* or *Point*, which something tends TO. These Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them,

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<sup>(4)</sup> See before, p. 265.

'when they occurred, *by peculiar Terminations of their own*, which exprest their force, *without the help of a Preposition*. Now it is here we behold the Rise of the antient Genitive and Dative, the GENITIVE *being formed to express all Relations commencing FROM itself*; THE DATIVE, *all Relations tending TO itself*. Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the Analysis of these Cases in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already.<sup>(1)</sup>

It is on these Principles that they say in Greek—*Ἀεὶμαί ΣΟΙ, δίδωμι ΣΟΙ, Ὅρ* *thee I ask, To thee I give*. The reason is, in requests the person requested is one whom something is expected *from*; in donations, the person presented, is one whom something passes *to*. So again—

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<sup>(1)</sup> See before, p. 275. 276.

<sup>a</sup>Πεποιήται λίθῃ, *it is made of Stone*. Stone was the passive Subject, and thus it appears in the *Genitive*, as being the *Term from*, or *out of which*. Even in *Latin*, where the Syntax is more formal and strict, we read—

*Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferinae.*

Virg.

The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνω τῷ ὕδατος, is a Phrase in *Greek*; and, *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phrase in *French*, as much as to say, *I take some or a certain part, FROM or OUT OF a certain whole.*

WHEN we meet in Language such Genitives as *the Son of a Father*; *the Father of a Son*; *the Picture of a Painter*; *the*

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<sup>a</sup> Χρυσῷ πεποιημένος, ἐκ ἐλέφαντος, *made of Gold and Ivory*. So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter, L. V. p. 400. See also *Hom. Iliad*, Σ. 574.

*Painter of a Picture, &c.* these are all RELATIVES, and therefore each of them reciprocally a *Term* or *Point* to the other, FROM OR OUT OF which it derives its *Essence*, or at least its *Intellection*.<sup>(c)</sup>

THE *Dative*, as it implies *Tendency* to, is employed among its other uses to denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Cause to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

—TIBI suaveis dædala tellus

*Submittit flores—*

Lucret.

<sup>(c)</sup> All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often express by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιγέγοντα λέγεσθαι, οἷον ὁ δῆλος δεσπότης δῆλος, ἢ ὁ δεσπότης δῆλα δεσπότης λέγεσθαι εἶναι, ἢ τὰ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, ἢ τὸ ἡμῖσι διπλάσις ἡμῖσι. Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ recipiuntur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium. Categor. C. VII.

—TIBI *brachia contrahit ardens*  
*Scorpius*— Virg. G. I.

TIBI *serviat ultima Thule.* Ibid.

AND so much for CASES, their Origin and Use; a sort of Forms, or Terminations, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance <sup>(A)</sup> both in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues: but which, however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

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<sup>(A)</sup> *Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his ferè destitutas, plurima per præpositiones et verba auxiliaria segnitè expedire? Sanè facile quis conjiciat (utcumque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. Bacon. de Augm. Sient. VI. 1.*

## CHAP. V.

*Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—  
Conclusion.*

BESIDES the Parts of Speech before mentioned, there remains THE INTERJECTION. Of this Kind among the *Greeks* are Ω, Φῆ, Αἰ, &c. among the *Latins*, *Ah ! Heu ! Hei !* &c. among the *English*, *Ah ! Alas ! Fie !* &c. These the *Greeks* have ranged among their *Adverbs* ; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an Attributive. Now INTERJECTIONS co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification. The *Latins* seem therefore to have done better



in † separating them by themselves, and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

SHOULD it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events.<sup>(a)</sup>

† *Vid. Servium in Æneid, XII. v. 486.*

<sup>(a)</sup> INTERJECTIONES a Græcis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum incurruntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut quæ NATURALES sint NOTA; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. I. INTERJECTIO est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classium extrema, INTERJECTIO. Hujus appellatio non similiter se habet

“AND thus we have found that ALL  
 “WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY  
 “THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT  
 “WHEN ASSOCIATED—*that those signi-*

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*ac Conjunctionis* Nam cum hæc dicatur *Conjunctio*, quia *conjungat*; *Interjectio* tamen, non quia *interjacet*, sed quia *interjicitur*, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de *σολῶ* ejus est, ut *interjiciatur*; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab eâ incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM non esse partem Orationis sic ostendo: Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: Sed gemitus et signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturâ, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci Adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Græci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam—Papæ! quid video?—vel per se—Papæ!—etiāsi non addatur, Miror; habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores separatim hanc partem ab Adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in sese Verbi, et plenam motûs animi significationem, etiāsi non addatur Verbum, demonstrare. Interjectio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci *σχετλιασµὸν*, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.

*“ficant by themselves denote either SUB-  
 “ STANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are called  
 “ for that reason SUBSTANTIVES and AT-  
 “ TRIBUTIVES—that the Substantives are  
 “ either NOUNS or PRONOUNS—that the  
 “ ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY or  
 “ SECONDARY—that the Primary Attri-  
 “ butives are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES,  
 “ or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary, AD-  
 “ VERBS—Again, that the Parts of Speech,  
 “ only significant when associated, are either  
 “ DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES—that  
 “ the Definitives are either ARTICULAR,  
 “ or PRONOMINAL—and that the Connec-  
 “ tives are either PREPOSITIONS or CON-  
 “ JUNCTIONS.”*

AND thus have we resolved LANGUAGE,  
 AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT  
 PARTS, which was the first thing, that we  
 proposed, in the course of this Inquiry.<sup>(\*)</sup>

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(\*) See before, p. 7.

BUT now, as we conclude, methinks I hear some objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule—“*Is there* “*no speaking then without all this trouble?* “*Do we not talk, every one of us, as well* “*unlearned as learned; as well poor Pea-* “*sants, as profound Philosophers?*” We may answer by interrogating on our part—Do not those same poor Peasants use the Lever and the Wedge, and many other Instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those Geometrical Principles, from which those Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of these Peasants a reason for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that occur every day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion—of Light, of Colours, and of Gravitation—of our very Senses and Intellect, by which we perceive every thing else—

THAT they are, we all know, and are perfectly satisfied—WHAT they are, is a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last Question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all Philosophy at once out of the world.<sup>(ω)</sup>

BUT a graver Objector now accosts us.  
*“What (says he) is the UTILITY?  
 “Whence the Profit, where the Gain?”*  
 Every Science whatever (we may answer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent for the gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for

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(ω) 'Αλλ' ἔτι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἃ τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξιν ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν ἰσὶαν ὥσπερ ἦτε κίνησις, ἐν ᾧ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἐκάτε γὰρ τέτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμον ἐν ἀναμφίλεκτον· τίς δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ἰσότης, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ὁραθῆναι. Ἔστι δὲ δὴ τί τῶν τοιούτων ἐν ἡ ψυχῇ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμωτάτον ἐν φανερώτατον· τί δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν, ὃ ῥᾶδιον καταμαθεῖν. Ἀλεξανδ. Ἀφροδ. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Β'. p. 142.

the measuring of Estates ; Astronomy, for the making of Almanacks ; and Grammar, perhaps, for the drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

THUS—much to the *Sordid*—If the *Liberal* ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.

PERHAPS too *there is a Pleasure even in Science itself*, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are

not Health and Strength of *Body* desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen? And have not Health and Strength of *Mind* their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid Emolument? Why should there not be a *Good* (could we have the Grace to recognize it) in the mere *Energy* of our *Intellect*, as much as in *Energies* of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, *why they pursue such things*; but if they answer, *they pursue them, because they are Good*, it would be folly to ask them farther, *WHY they PURSUE what is GOOD*. It might well in such case be replied on their behalf (how strange soever it may at first appear) *that if there was not something GOOD, which was in no respect USEFUL, even things useful themselves could not*

*possibly have existence.* For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are ENDS, some things are MEANS, and that if there were NO ENDS, there could be of course NO MEANS.

IT should seem then the Grand Question was, WHAT IS GOOD—that is to say, *what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself*; for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed.

IN the mean time it is plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures, Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for Country, others for Town; some easy, indolent, and soft; others boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are



enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, *without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained.* Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all Men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called *Misers*, or Miserable.

IF there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for itself without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the *subordinate* kind ; shall we not allow the same praise to the *sublimest* of all Objects ? Shall THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleasures *in its Energy*, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense ? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods were to be controverted, may not the *Intellectual* Sort be defended, as rationally as any of them ? Whatever may be urged in

behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that it is “the  
 “ Good of that Part, which is most excellent within us ; that it is a good accommodated to all Places and Times ;  
 “ which neither depends on the will of others nor on the affluence of external Fortune ; that it is a Good, which decays not with decaying Appetites, but  
 “ often rises in vigour, when those are no more.”<sup>(d)</sup>

THERE is a Difference, we must own, between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral* Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Employment, may be called more HUMAN, as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes of human Life. But INTELLEC-

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<sup>(d)</sup> See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.

TUAL VIRTUE may be surely called more DIVINE, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

INDEED for *Moral Virtue*, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vitious, it would be impious to suppose THE DEITY to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet GOD IS, and LIVES. So we are assured from Scripture itself. What then may we suppose the DIVINE LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of *Endymion*. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTELECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE

NO OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT ITSELF? For in pure INTELECTION it holds the reverse of all Sensation, that THE PERCEIVER AND THING PERCEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was Speculation of this kind concerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which in-

<sup>(1)</sup> Εἰ δὲ ἔτι εὖ ἔχει, ὥς ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς αἰὲν θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτε θαυμασιώτερον· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ Νῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωὴ. Ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκεῖνη ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδίου. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδίον, ἄριτον· ὥτε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἰδίου ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ· ΤΟΥΤΟ γὰρ Ο ΘΕΟΣ· Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φύς· Δ'. Ζ'. It is remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING GOD, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of Humanity.

duced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—"That the Man, who  
 " could live in the pure enjoyment of his  
 " *Mind*, and who properly cultivated that  
 " *divine Principle*, was *happiest in himself*,  
 " *and most beloved by the Gods*. For if the  
 " Gods had any regard to what past among  
 " Men (as it appeared they had) it was  
 " probable they should rejoice in *that*  
 " *which was most excellent*, and by nature  
 " *the most nearly allied to themselves*; and,  
 " as this was MIND, that they should  
 " requite the Man, who most loved and  
 " honoured *This*, both from his regard to  
 " that which was *dear* to themselves, and

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To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νῆς κατὰ μετέληπεν τῇ νοητῇ νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεται, διγγάνων ἐν νοῶν  
 &c: TAYTON NOYE KAI NOHTON.

“ from his acting a Part, which was laud-  
“ able and right.” <sup>ο</sup>

AND thus in all Science there is some-  
thing *valuable for itself*, because it contains  
within it something which is *divine*.

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ο 'Ηθικ' Νικομαχ' τὸ Κ'. κεφ. ή.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK.



HERMES  
OR  
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY  
CONCERNING  
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

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BOOK III.

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CHAP. I.

*Introduction—Division of the Subject into  
its principal Parts.*

SOME things the MIND performs thro' the BODY; as for example the various Works and Energies of Art.—Others it performs *without such Medium*; as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as being immediately



referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is MIND *ultimately the Cause of all*; of every thing at least that is *Fair* and *Good*.

AMONG those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one.—*Corpo-real* Separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animalcule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But <sup>(\*)</sup> the *Mind* surmounts all

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(\*) *Itaque Naturæ facienda est prorsus Solutio & Separatio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum.* Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16.

power of *Concretion*, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself, convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.

AND thus it is, that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conspicuous Parts*, but persisting, till it even separate those *Elementary Principles*, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the *minutest Part*, as much as in the *mightiest Whole*.<sup>(b)</sup>

NOW if MATTER and FORM are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as *the principal* among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this

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<sup>(b)</sup> See below, p. 312.

Treatise, to seek whether *these*, or *any thing analogous to them*, may be found in SPEECH OR LANGUAGE.<sup>(c)</sup> This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

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<sup>(c)</sup> See before, p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in Greek ΥΑΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the *tangible, corporeal or concrete*, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments, or Chemical Process.

The original meaning of the Word ΥΑΗ, was SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus *Homer*,

—Τρέμε δ' ἔρεια μακρὰ ἐν ΥΑΗ,  
Ποσσὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰόντος.

*As Neptune past, the Mountains and the Wood  
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.*

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word ὕλη, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this sense Brass was called the ὕλη or *Matter* of a Statue: Stone, the ὕλη or

EVERY thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution

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*Matter* of a Pillar; and so in other instances.—The *Platonic Chalcidius* and other Authors of the latter Latinity use SYLVA under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER and BODY have been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. By these, every thing was called ΥΛΗ, or MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was *capable of becoming something else*, or *of being moulded into something else*, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Brass* the "Υλη of a Statue, and Timber, of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "Υλαι of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "Υλαι of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "Υλαι of Syllogisms. The *Stoics* held all things out of our own power (τὰ ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, Health and Sickness, .

compounded of something COMMON,  
and something PECULIAR; of something

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Life and Death, to be the ὕλαι or *Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness*, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these (Vid. *Arr. Epict. L. I. c. 29.* Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous treatises, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where the ὕλκον and Αἰτιῶδες are opposed to each other). The *Peripatetics*, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be ἀσώματος, or *Incorporeal*, yet still talked of a Νῆς Ὑλικός, a *material Mind or Intellect*.—This to modern Ears may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the words, *Natural Capacity*, and consider them as only denoting that *original and native Power* of Intellection, which being previous to all *human Knowledge*, is yet necessary to its *reception*; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of ΥΛΗ, or MATTER. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim.* p. 144. b. 145. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 121, 122, 141. *Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid.* p. 22, 23.

As to ΕΙΔΟΣ, its original meaning was that of FORM or FIGURE, considered as denoting *visible Symmetry*, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from Εἶδω, *to see*, Beauty of person being one of the noblest and most excellent Objects of Sight. Thus *Euripides*,

Πρῶτον μὲν Εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος.

*Fair FORM to Empire gave the first pretence.*

*Common*, and belonging to many other things; and of something *Peculiar*, by

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Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of visible Beings tended principally to *distinguish* them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, *whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal)*, was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its *Υλη* or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or *FORM*. Thus not only the *Shape* given to the Brass was called the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Statue; but the *Proportion* assigned to the Drugs was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Medicine; the *orderly Motion* of the human Body was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Dance; the *just Arrangement* of the Propositions, the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Syllogism. In like manner the *rational and accurate Conduct* of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἶδος or *Form*, described by Cicero to his Son,—FORMAM quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiæ, &c. De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes, this Supreme Intelligence has been called ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every

which it is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self:

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Being those *essential* and *distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing else*.

And so much concerning FORM, as before concerning MATTER. We shall only add, that it is in the *uniting* of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their *separating*, to *perish*, and *be at an end*—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by *juxta-position*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more *intimate Coincidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *Form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the *Artificer*, or if natural, within the *Supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse*

*Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.*

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their *immediate generating Cause*; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is a SOUND*. But then on the contrary it has

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

#### MATTER.

*Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatus hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte): eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c.—Acad. I. 8.*

#### FORM.

*Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur.—HAS RERUM FORMAS appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri: cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et viâ disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis Formam speciemque ridigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.*



*in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language a *MEANING or SIGNIFICATION* is *essential*.—Again, *Language*, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from NATURE*, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from COMPACT*.<sup>(1)</sup>

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<sup>(1)</sup> The *Peripatetics* (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant *κατὰ συνθήκην*, by *Compact*. See *Aristot. de Interp.* c. 2. 4. *Boethius* translates the Words *κατὰ συνθήκην*, *ad placitum*, or *secundum placitum*, and thus explains them in his comment—*SECUNDUM PLACITUM* vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res à naturâ est, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus

FROM hence it becomes evident, that LANGUAGE, taken in the most comprehensive view, *implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings*; and that of these two Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the MEANING as that peculiar and characteristic FORM, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

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*libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.*

## CHAP. II.

*Upon the Matter or common Subject of Language.*

THE YAH or MATTER OF LANGUAGE comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this YAH or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is *that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect.*<sup>(a)</sup>

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<sup>(a)</sup> This appears to be *Priscian's* Meaning when he says of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*sum sensible aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the *Stoics*, which refers the cause of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any—'Ακούειν δὲ, τὸ μεταξύ τῆ τε

As the Causes of this Percussion are various, so from hence *Sound* derives the Variety of its Species.

FARTHER, as all these Causes are either Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand *Species* of Sounds are likewise *Animal* or *Inanimate*.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound Inanimate*; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cause, which is merely *accidental*. But that, *which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward*

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φωνοῦντος ἐν τῷ ἀκρόντος ἀέρος πληττομένῃ σφαιροειδῶς, εἴτα κυματουμένῃ, ἐν ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτοντός, ὡς κυματῆται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τῷ ἐμβληθέντος λίθῳ—*Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aër verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus, auribus influit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitur lapide.* Diog. Laert. VII.

*Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a VOICE.*

As Language therefore implies that Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may perceive that *to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice*, is in fact to know THE MATTER or common Subject of Language.

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

WHAT these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers and Anatomists. Be this as

it will, it is certain that the *mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth*, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now *pure and simple VOICE*, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) *transmitted to the Mouth*. HERE then, by means of certain *different Organs*, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives *the Form or Character of ARTICULATION*. FOR ARTICULATION is in fact nothing else, than *that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c.* The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or Acute, more loud or soft (which are its *primary Qualities*) but it acquires

to these Characters certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted *to exist along with them.*<sup>(b)</sup>

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<sup>(b)</sup> The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of *Speech*, but those very different ones likewise of *Mastication* and *Respiration*; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in vain*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Discourse* in *Man*, who is a *Discursive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. De Animâ. L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.*

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to *themselves*.

THE *simplest* of these new Characters are those acquired thro' the *mere Open-*

The following account from *Ammonius* will show whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority we have to distinguish VOICE from mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIMPLE VOICE.

Καὶ ΨΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστὶ πληγὴ αἰσθητὴ ἀκοῇ· ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμβύχης γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συστολῆς τῷ θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τῷ πνεύμονος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀῆρ προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλεσμένῃ τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, ἐν τῇ ὑπερώῳ, ἥτοι τῷ γαργαεῶνι, ἐν διὰ τῆς πληγῆς ἀποτελεῖται τινα ἤχον αἰσθητὸν, κατὰ τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευστῶν παρὰ τοῖς μῦσικοῖς καλεσμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, ὅλον αὐτῶν ἐν συρίγγων· τῆς γλώττης, ἐν τῶν ὀδόντων, ἐν χειλέων πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαίων ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ἈΠΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ἐπ' ἅντως συμβαλλομένων.—*Estque SONUS, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: Vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo ἐμπνευστὰ a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medis. Sect. 626. 630.*



*ings of the Mouth*, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several VOWELS; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal*,<sup>(c)</sup> and *easy to be sounded of themselves alone*.

THERE are *other articulate Forms*, which the Mouth makes, not by mere Openings, but by *different Contacts of its different parts*; such, for instance, as it makes by

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It appears that the *Stoics* (contrary to the notion of the *Peripatetics*) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, which justifies the definition given by *Priscien*, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be—Ἄηρ, ἐκ δυνάμεως πεπληγμένον, *Air struck* (and so made audible) *by some animal impulse*; and HUMAN or RATIONAL SOUND they defined—Ἑσπεθρὸς ἢ ἐκ δυνάμεως διασκευασμένη, *Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty*. *Diag. Laert.* VII. 55.

<sup>(c)</sup> ΦΩΝΗΕΝΤΑ.

the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion Silence, than to produce a Voice ; hence it is, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the *Articulations so produced* are called CONSONANT, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with some Auxiliary Vowel.*<sup>(a)</sup>

THERE are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

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<sup>(a)</sup> ΣΥΜΦΩΝΑ.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of **ELEMENT**,<sup>(\*)</sup> in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their *smallest* Combination they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration* or *Discourse*.

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(\*) The *Stoic* Definition of an **ELEMENT** is as follows—  
 "Ἐστὶ δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ εἰς δὲ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. *An ELEMENT is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176.* What *Aristotle* says upon **ELEMENTS** with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκεται ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα· ἐκείνα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἐτέρας τῷ εἶδει αὐτῶν. *The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are those things, out of which the VOICE is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.*

AND thus it is that to Principles *apparently* so trivial,<sup>o</sup> as about twenty plain elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have been

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<sup>o</sup> The *Egyptians* paid divine Honours to the *Inventor of letters*, and *Regulator of Language*, whom they called THEUTH. By the GREEKS he was worshipped under the Name of HERMES, and represented commonly by a *Head alone without other Limbs*, standing upon a *quadrilateral Basis*. The Head itself was *that of a beautiful Youth*, having on it a *Petasis*, or *Bonnet*, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the ΕΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, THE HERMES OF LANGUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the HEAD, because *no other* was deemed *requisite to rational Communication*. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as *Homer* well describes them) Επεα πτερόεντα, *Winged Words*, were represented in their *Velocity* by the WINGS of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a HERMES, having the *Front of his Basis* (the usual place for Inscriptions) *adorned with some old Alphabet*, and having a *Veil flung across*, by which that Alphabet is *partly covered*. Let A YOUTH be seen *drawing off this Veil*; and A NYMPH, near the Youth, *transcribing what She there discovers*.

sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

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Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS OF MAN (*Naturæ Deus humanæ*, as *Horace* styles him); THE NYMPH to be MNHMOΣYNH, or MEMORY; as much as to insinuate, that "MAN, for the Preservation of his " *Deeds and Inventions, was necessarily obliged to have* " *recourse to LETTERS; and that MEMORY, being con-* " *scious of her own Insufficiency, was glad to avail herself* " *of so valuable an Acquisition."*

MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the *Antiquities of Athens*, has adorned this Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taste truly *Attic and Simple*, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.

As to HERMES, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, Figure, &c. Vid. *Platon. Philob. T. II. p. 18. Edit. Serran. Diod. Sic. L. I. Horat. Od. X. L. 1. Hesiod. Theog. V. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thucid VI. 27. et Scholiast. in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. Thesaur. T. IX. p. 1164.*

For the value and importance of *Principles*, and the difficulty in attaining them, see *Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 34.*

It appears from what has been said, that THE MATTER OR COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE IS *that Species of Sounds called VOICES ARTICULATE.*

WHAT remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar FORM, that is to say, Language considered, not with respect to *Sound*, but to *Meaning*.

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The following Passage, taken from that able Mathematician *Tacquet*, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been said in this chapter concerning *Elementary Sounds*, p. 324. 325.

*Mille milliones scriptorum mille annorum millionibus non scribent omnes 24 litterarum alphabeti permutationes, licet singuli quotidie absolverent 40 paginas, quarum unaquæque contineret diversos ordines litterarum 24. Tacquet. Arithmetica Theor. p. 381. Edit. Antverp. 1663.*

## CHAP. III.

*Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of  
Language.*

**WHEN** to any articulate Voice there accedes *by compact* a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called **A WORD**; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) *under the same Compact,*<sup>(a)</sup> unite in constituting **A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE**.

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<sup>(a)</sup> See before Note <sup>(a)</sup> p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 1. Notes <sup>(a)</sup> and <sup>(a)</sup>

The following Quotation from *Ammonius* is remarkable — Καθάπερ ἐν τῷ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖσθαι, θέσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, ἡ δὲ θύρα, θέσει· ὅτω καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων σημαίνειν, θέσει—καὶ ἔοικε τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὄργανον ἔσαν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν,

It appears from hence, that A WORD may be defined *a Voice articulate, and significant by Compact*—and that LANGUAGE may be defined *a System of such Voices, so significant.*

It is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may

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δυνάμεων γνωστικῶν, ἢ ὁρεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις· τὸ δὲ ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τέτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν (ἐκέτι φύσει ἔσιν, ἀλλὰ θέσει) ἐξαιρετον ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, διότι ἐν μόνος τῶν θνητῶν αὐτοκινήτης μετέχει ψυχῆς, ἐν τεχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φωνεῖν ἡ τεχνικὴ αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δελῶσι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλος συντιθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων. *In the same manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is something positive; so is the power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from*



be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars.

AND yet it may be doubted, how far this is true. For if *Pictures* and *Images*

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*Nature, in like manner as irrational animals : but as to the employing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the thing thus employed being founded, not in Nature, but in Position) this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul; which can move itself, and operate artificially ; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power shows itself ; as the various elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon. de. Interpr. p. 51, a.*

It must be observed, that the *operating artificially*, (ἐπεργεῖν τεχνηκῶς) of which Ammonius here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the Human Soul, means something very different from the mere producing works of elegance and design ; also it could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159, &c.

are all of them *Imitations*, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the Original, will by help of the same faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its *Greek* or *Latin* Name.

THE Truth is, that every Medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is an IMITATION; or else from *Accidents* quite arbitrary, and then it is a SYMBOL.<sup>(a)</sup>

(a) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τῷ πράγματι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βέβηται, καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσσει· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένον τῷ Σωκράτι ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ φαλακρὸν, καὶ τὸ σιμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐξώφθαλμον ἔχει τῷ Σωκράτι, ἐκεῖ ἂν αὐτῷ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δὲ γε σύμβολον, ἥτοι σημεῖον (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος αὐτὸ ὀνομάζει), τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔχει, ὅτε καὶ ἐκ μόνης ὑπετάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας ὅλον, τῷ πότε δεῖ

Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their *natural* Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and that yet through such Voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow that WORDS *must of necessity* be SYMBOLS, because it appears that they cannot be *Imitations*.

BUT here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—"Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have *Imitations* been neglected, and Symbols

συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τὰς πολεμῶντας, δύναται σύμβολον εἶναι ἢ σάλπιγγος ἀπήχσεις, ἢ λαμπάδος ῥήψις, καθάπερ φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφείθη πυρσὸς, ὥς τυρσηνικῆς

Σάλπιγγος ἤχος, σῆμα φοινίου μάχης.

Δύναται δέ τις ὑποθεσθαι ἢ δόρατος ἀνάτασιν, ἢ βέλους ἀφesis, ἢ ἀλλὰ μυρία.—A REPRESENTATION or RESEMBLANCE differs from a SYMBOL, in as much as the Resemblance aims as far as possible to represent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary it. Thus a REPRESENTATION intended for Socrates in a Picture, if it have not those circumstances peculiar to

“ preferred, although Symbols are only  
 “ known by Habit or Institution, while  
 “ Imitations are recognized by a kind of  
 “ natural Intuition?” To this it may be  
 answered, that if the Sentiments of the  
 Mind, like the Features of the Face, were  
 immediately visible to every beholder, the  
 Art of Speech or Discourse would have  
 been perfectly superfluous. But now,  
 while our Minds lie enveloped and hid,  
 and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every  
 thing but itself, we are necessarily

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*Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the Eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a Representation of him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch (according to what Euripides says,*

*But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign*

*Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.)*

*or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.*

compelled, when we communicate our Thoughts, to convey them to each other *through a Medium which is Corporeal.*<sup>(c)</sup> And hence it is, that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols must needs be *sensible*, and addressed *as such* to the *Senses.*<sup>(d)</sup> Now THE SENSES, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by *Symbols*

<sup>(c)</sup> Αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν ὄσαι τῶν σωμάτων, ἡδύναντο δι' αὐτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα· Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώμασι συνδέονται, δίκην νέφους περικαλύπτουσιν αὐτῶν τὸ νοερόν, ἰδεήθησαν τῶν ὀνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνουσιν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. *Animi nostri a corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum autem corporibus involuti sint, perinde ac nebula ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegitur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter se significarent.* Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 18, a.

<sup>(d)</sup> *Quidquid sciendū possit in differentias satis numerosas, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentia illa sensui perceptibiles sint) fieri potest vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem.* Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. I.

but by *Imitations*, as far as things are characterized by Figure and Colour, our Imitation would be necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the same reason be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how *complicated* such Imitation would prove.

IF we set LANGUAGE therefore, as a *Symbol*, in opposition to *such Imitation*; if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other; if we consider the Ease and Speed with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a \*Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the diffi-

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\* Εὔρα πρόοινα—See before, p. 325.

culty and length of Imitations ; if we remember that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols ; we may plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed, “ Why, in the “ common intercourse of men with men, “ Imitations have been rejected, and Symbols preferred ? ”

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason, *why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things*, as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant* ; if to some Beings sound and Motion are no Attributes at all ; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is

impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between *the Medium* and *themselves* there is nothing CONNATURAL.<sup>(2)</sup>

It is true, indeed, when *Primitives* were once established, it was easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus the Sounds, *Water* and *Fire*, being once annexed to those two Elements, it was certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, *Watery*, of the last, *Fiery*, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what *natural Connections* the *Primitives* themselves might not be commuted, it will be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others.

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<sup>(2)</sup> See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.



We may here also see the Reason, why ALL LANGUAGE IS FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species.

THE Question remains if WORDS are Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—If it be answered, OF THINGS, the Question returns, OF WHAT THINGS?—If it be answered, *of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings which exist around us*—to this, it is replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be, in fact, a *proper Name*. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

AGAIN, if all *Words* are *proper Names*, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so,

then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, *Words must be infinite also*. But if infinite, then *incomprehensible*, and never to be attained by the wisest Men ; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which Missionaries (if they may be credited) attribute to the *Chinese*.

AGAIN, if *all Words are proper Names*, or (which is the same) the Symbols of *Individuals* ; it will follow, as *Individuals* are not only *infinite*, but ever *passing*, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown *now*, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of *Individuals*, which it follows.

AGAIN, if *all Words are proper Names*,

the Symbols of *Individuals*, it will follow that in Language there can be no *general Proposition*, because upon the Hypothesis *all Terms are particular* ; nor any *Affirmative Proposition*, because *no one Individual in nature is another*. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but *Particular Negatives*. But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating *General Affirmative Truths*—If so, then of communicating *Demonstration*—If so, then of communicating *Sciences*, which are so many Systems of *Demonstrations*—If so, then of communicating *Arts*, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little the better for it either in Speculation or in Practice.<sup>(c)</sup> And so much for this Hypothesis ; let us now try another.

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(c) The whole of *Euclid* (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon *general Terms*, and *general Propositions*, most of which are *affirmative*. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their stile,

*Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,  
Neve Negativis, rectè concludere si vis.*

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of course, they must be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident, if they are not Symbols of things *without*, they can only be Symbols of something *within*.

HERE then the Question recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS? —OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several *Ideas*, which *Particulars* imprint, must needs be as *infinite* and *mutable* as they are themselves.

IF then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing else, except of GENERAL IDEAS, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And

what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS?—We mean such AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which exist now, but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, *Man, Lion, Cedar*.—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas*, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with *proper Names*.

It follows that *one Word* may be, not *homonymously*, but *truly and essentially common to many Particulars*, past, present, and future; so that however these Particulars may be *infinite*, and *ever fleeting*, yet Language notwithstanding may be *definite* and *steady*. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the *Chinese Absurdity*.\*

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\* See p. 338, 339.

AGAIN, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it stands *for the same general Ideas*, may be as intelligible *now*, as it was *then*. The like may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of *ever new* and *ever changing* Objects.

AGAIN, it follows that Language may be expressive of *general Truths*; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind.<sup>67</sup>

Now if it be true “that none of these  
“ things could be asserted of Language,  
“ were not Words the Symbols of *general*  
“ *Ideas*—and if it be further true, that these  
“ things may be all undeniably asserted  
“ of Language”—it will follow (and that

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<sup>67</sup> See before, Note <sup>(6)</sup>.

necessarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF GENERAL IDEAS.

AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosophers, who reason about *general* and *abstract* Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of *Particulars*, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other* End. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing further than *general Ideas*?

To this it may be answered, that *Arts* surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are *general Terms* from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationally* explained. How

for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not the first through *general Terms* learnt those *general Theorems*, that respect the doctrine and practice of Mensuration?

BUT suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, *there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible*—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—*That the Objection was just ; that it was necessary to the Perfection and Completion of LANGUAGE, that it should be expressive of PARTICULARS, as well as of GENERALS.* We must, however, add, that its *general Terms* are by far its most *excellent and essential Part*, since from these it derives “that comprehensive  
“ *Universality*, that just proportion of



“ *Precision* and *Permanence*, without which  
“ it could not possibly be either learnt, or  
“ understood, or applied to the purposes  
“ of Reasoning and Science ;”—that *particular* Terms have their Utility and End,  
and that therefore care too has been taken  
for a supply of these.

ONE Method of expressing Particulars,  
is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the  
least artificial, because *proper Names* being  
in every district arbitrarily applied, may  
be unknown to those, who know the Lan-  
guage perfectly well, and can hardly there-  
fore with propriety be considered as parts  
of it. The other and more artificial Method  
is that of DEFINITIVES or ARTICLES,<sup>(a)</sup>  
whether we assume the *pronominal*, or those  
*more strictly* so called. And here we can-  
not enough admire the exquisite *Art* of

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<sup>(a)</sup> See before p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

Language, which, *without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite*; that is to say in other words, which, by the small Tribe of *Definitives properly applied to general Terms*, knows how to employ these last, tho' in number *finite*, to the accurate expression of *infinite Particulars*.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular, *as unknown*; I say, A *Man—known*; I say, THE *Man—indefinite*; ANY *Man—definite*; A CERTAIN *Man—present and near*; THIS *Man—present and distant*; THAT *Man—like to some other*; SUCH A *Man—an indefinite Multitude*; MANY *Men—a definite Multitude*; A THOUSAND *Men—the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout*; EVERY *Man—the same ones, taken with distinction*;

EACH *Man*—*taken in order* ; FIRST *Man*, SECOND *Man*, &c.—*the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively* ; ALL *Men*—*the Negation of this Multitude* ; NO *Man*. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR ; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY ; OF THE PARTICULAR, ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY, AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be asked, “why has Language this *double Capacity*?”—May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or *Intercourse of our Ideas* ? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express *the whole* of our Perception ? Now can we call that Perception *intire* and *whole*, which implies

either INTELLECTION without *Sensation*, or SENSATION without *Intellection*? If not, how should Language explain *the whole* of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?

To conclude—As in the preceding Chapter we considered Language with a view to its MATTER, so here we have considered it with a view to its FORM. Its MATTER is recognized, when it is considered *as a Voice*; its FORM, as it is *significant of our several Ideas*; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY WHICH ARE GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL.

## CHAP. IV.

*Concerning general or universal Ideas.*

MUCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, *by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are*; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged in Sense from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing to be *real*, but what may be *tasted*, or

*touched. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to these matters, being of much the same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no higher, than to experimental Amusements, deeming nothing Demonstration, if it be not made ocular. Thus instead of ascending from Sense to Intellect (the natural progress of all true Learning) he hurries, on the contrary, into the midst of Sense, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence then the reason why the sublimer parts of Science, the Studies of MIND, INTELLECTION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES, are in a manner neglected ; and, as if the Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by Experiment, is deemed no better than mere Hypothesis.*

AND yet it is somewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of such Notions, that there should still remain two Sciences in

fashion, and these having their Certainty of all the least controverted, *which are not in the minutest article depending upon Experiment.* By these I mean ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY.<sup>(a)</sup> But to come to our Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.

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<sup>(a)</sup> The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these two SCIENCES so eminently abound, arise originally from PRINCIPLES THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE; Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of EXPERIMENT, that they are *self-evident* to every one possessed of common sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue EXPERIMENT; whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther—I hold *all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject* to be founded in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than *the result of many repeated EXPERIMENTS.* But I must add withal, that the man who acts *from Experience alone*, tho' he act ever so well, is but an *Empiric* or *Quack*, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. It is then only that we recognize ART, and that the EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are those of the SENSES, in as much as they commence from his earliest Infancy. These Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least *indefinite*, and more *fleeting* and *transient* than the very Objects which they exhibit, because they not only depend upon the

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SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, WHAT *is to be done*, but WHY *it is to be done*; for ART is a composite of *Experience and Science*, Experience providing it *Materials*, and Science giving them A FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus necessary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with respect to PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have hinted already, it has not the least to do. For who ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geometry*, or *Arithmetic* being proved *experimentally*? It is indeed by the application of *these* that *Experiments* are rendered useful; that they are assumed into Philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the Chizze, and not the Chizze the Marble.



*existence* of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their *immediate Presence*. Hence therefore it is, that there can be *no Sensation of either Past or Future*, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties than the *Senses*, it never could acquire the least Idea of *TIME*.<sup>(u)</sup>

BUT happily for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called *IMAGINATION* or *FANCY*, which however as to its *energies* it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in *dignity* and *use*. *THIS* it is which *retains the fleeting Forms of things*, when Things themselves are gone, and *all Sensation* at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may

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<sup>(u)</sup> See before, p. 105. See also, p. 112. Note.<sup>(v)</sup>

be seen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *Sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *Sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves.<sup>(c)</sup>

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<sup>(c)</sup> Besides the distinguishing of SENSATION from IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are MNHMH, and ANAMNHΣIZ, MEMORY, and RECOLLECTION.

When we view some *relict* of sensation reposed within us, *without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object*, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION.

When we view some such *relict*, and *refer it withal to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original*, this is MEMORY.

As the Wax would not be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to *retain*, as well as to *receive*; the same holds of the SOUL, with respect to

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- Lastly, the Road, which leads to Memory through a series of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is RECOLLECTION. I have added *casually*, as well as *rationally*, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between *Memory* and *Phansy* be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, *without thinking of whom it is the Portrait*, such Contemplation is analogous to PHANSY. When we view it *with reference to the Original, whom it represents*, such Contemplation is analogous to MEMORY.

We may go farther. IMAGINATION or PHANSY may exhibit (after a manner) even *things that are to come*. It is here that *Hope* and *Fear* paint all their pleasant and all their painful Pictures of *Futurity*. But MEMORY is confined in the strictest manner to the *past*.

*Sense and Imagination.* SENSE is its *receptive Power*; IMAGINATION, its *retentive*. Had it Sense without Imagination, it would not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impressions' may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

THUS, then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call Sense (if we please) *a kind of transient Imagination*; and IMAGINATION on the contrary *a kind of permanent Sense.*<sup>(d)</sup>

What we have said may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more, may consult *Aristot. de Animâ*, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatise *de Mem. et Reminisc.*

(d) Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία ὥδε ἂν γνωρίσαιμεν· δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οἷον τύπον (*lege* τύπον) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμά τι τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ αἰσθητῷ γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τῷ αἰσθητῷ παρόντος,

Now as our feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the SOUL in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGINATION first fix the *fluency* of SENSE, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

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ἐπομένει τὲ ἐ σωζέται, ὃν ὥσπερ εἰκὼν τις αὐτῆς, δ' ἐ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῖν σωζόμενον αἴτιον γίνεταί· τὸ τοῖστον ἐγκατέλειμμα, ἐ τὸν τοῖστον ὥσπερ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλεῖσιν. *Now what PHANSY or IMAGINATION is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a relict of that motion caused within us by the external object; a relict, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of relict and (as it were) Impression they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION. Alex. Aphrod. de Animá, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.*

AFTER this manner, in the admirable Economy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there *no Things external*, the Senses could not operate; were there *no Sensations*, the Imagination could not operate; and were there *no Imagination*, there could be *neither Reasoning nor Intellection*, such at least as they are found in *Man*, where they have their Intensions and Remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than a mere CAPACITY or POWER. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature *more divine*, to which “Intension and Remission and mere Capacity are unknown.”<sup>(a)</sup> But not to digress.

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<sup>(a)</sup> See p. 162. The *Life, Energy*, or Manner of MAN's Existence is not a little different from that of the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Essence in MOTION. This

It is then on these *permanent* Phantasms that THE HUMAN MIND first works, and by an Energy as spontaneous and

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is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that *Life*, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without *first move* our faculties, and thence we move *of ourselves* either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

It is to this distinction that *Aristotle* alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσεως καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστίν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκὺ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμεταβολος ὁ πονηρὸς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· ὁ γὰρ ἀπλῆ, οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. For there is not only an Energy of MOTION, but of IMMOBILITY; and PLEASURE or FELICITY exists rather in REST than in MOTION; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For in the same

familiar to its Nature, as the seeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, it discerns

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*manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even.* Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. and Ethic. Eudem. VI. *sub. fin.*

It is to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that *Boethius* refers, when he say in those elegant verses,

—*Tempus ab Ævo*

*Ire jubes STABILISQUE MANENS das cuncta moveri.*

From this single principle of IMMOBILITY, may be derived some of the noblest of the *Divine Attributes*; such as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, INCORPOREAL, &c. Vide *Aristot.* Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. *Du Val.* See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of *Boethius* are quoted at length.

It must be remembered, however, that though we are not *Gods*, yet as rational Beings we have within us something *Divine*, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, permanent,



at once what in MANY is ONE; what in things DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR and the SAME.<sup>o</sup> By this it

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and rational, the higher we shall advance in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says) — Ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, *the becoming like to GOD, as far as in our power.* Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς πᾶς ὁ βίος μακάριος τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. *For to THE GODS (as says another antient) the whole of life is one continued happiness; but to MEN, it is so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy.* See *Plat. in Theætet.* *Arist. Eth. X. 8.*

<sup>o</sup> This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its most excellent part. It is this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders *Objects of Intelligence* invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the *sensible* World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but it is made up of all these, and other attributes UNITED; not an *unknown* Constitution of *insensible* Parts, but a *known* Constitution of *sensible* Parts, unless we chuse to extirpate the possibility of natural Knowledge.

comes to behold a kind of *superior* Objects;  
a new Race of Perceptions, more compre-

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What then perceives this CONSTITUTION or UNION?—  
Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of these, we know,  
can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell  
to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it  
would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. It  
is the same in other instances. We must necessarily  
therefore recur to some HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to  
give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her *subordi-  
nate Wholes*, much more in that *comprehensive Whole*,  
whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller  
Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be al-  
lowed the expression) this *unifying* Power more conspicu-  
ous, than in the subjects of PURE TRUTH. By virtue of  
this power the Mind views *One general Idea*, in *many  
Individuals*; *One Proposition*, in *many general Ideas*;  
*One Syllogism* in *many Propositions*; till at length, by  
properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Sylo-  
gism, it ascends into those bright and *steady regions of  
SCIENCE*.

*Quas neque concutiant venti, neque nubila nimbis  
Adpergunt, &c.*

Lucr.

hensive than those of Sense; a Race of Perceptions, *each one of which may be found*

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Even *negative* Truths and *negative* Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so necessary is this UNITING Power to every Species of KNOWLEDGE. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is *heard* by our Ears, and *understood* by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such as *hear* the sounds, without *knowing* the language. But to show their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both *hear* and *understand* the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles*. That this is ONE Truth, and not *two* or *many* Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION?—The Answer is obvious; it is by successive portions of little and little at a Time. When the first Word is *present*, all the subsequent are *absent*; when the last Word is *present*, all the previous are *absent*; when any of the middle Words are *present*, then are there some *absent*, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once

*intire and whole in the separate individuals of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, with-*

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than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much *is not* (to Sensation at least) as tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the perception of SENSE, than which we see nothing can be more *dissipated, fleeting, and detached*.—And is that of the Mind similar?—Admit it, and what follows?—it follows, that *one* Mind would no more recognize *one* Truth, by recognising its Terms *successively* and *apart*, than *many* distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every TRUTH is ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no respect true, *by parts at a time*, but it is true of necessity at *once*, and *in an instant*.—What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY?—Where even does it reside, or what makes it?—Shall we answer with the *Stagirite*, Τὸ δὲ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΙΟΥΝ ἴστω ὁ ΝΟΥΣ ἑκάστων—If this be allowed, it should seem, where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to concur, that Sensation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Sensation was *temporary, divisible, and successive*; Intellection, *instantaneous, indivisible, and at once*.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Centre that they are ONE. Let us then suppose SENSE and MIND to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them

*out departing from the unity and permanence of its own nature.*

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at the *Circumference*; Mind at the *Center*; and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but MANY IN ONE. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book; that Resolution or Analysis which enables us to *investigate the Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itself* the Subject of Philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exist; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as *Optics*, were we necessitated to contemplate *Colour concentered with Figure*, two Attributes which the Eye can never view, but associated? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any *coloured Body*.

AND thus we see the *Process by which we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS*; for the

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Those two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this *separative Power*. They are both conversant about QUANTITY; *Geometry* about CONTINUOUS Quantity, *Arithmetic*, about DISCRETE. EXTENSION is essential to *continuous* Quantity, MONADS, or UNITS, to *Discrete*. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite accidents, by which they are all *diversified*, we leave nothing but those SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHMETIC.—Again, by separating from *Body* every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its *triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness* (of which were it to be deprived, it would be *Body* no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of *Geometry*.

By the same *analytical or separate Power*, we investigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of which is a *developed Word*, as the same Word is an *enveloped Definition*.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SCIENCE: COMPOSITION MAKING

Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In these too we perceive the objects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE, which can by no means be, but *of that which is general, and definite, and fixt.*<sup>(\*)</sup> Here too even *Individuals*, how-

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AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARITIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NEGATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND DIVERSITIES.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.—If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Science as well to *compound* as to *separate*, may we not say that those Philosophers took *Half* of Wisdom for the *Whole*, who distinguished it from Wit, as if WISDOM only *separated*, and WIT only *brought together*?—Yet so held the Philosopher of *Malmesbury*, and the Author of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

<sup>(\*)</sup> The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING, may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ἐννόμασι, διὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ εἶ ὅρον τῶν πραγμάτων

ever of themselves unknowable, become objects of Knowledge, as far as their

ἀγειν ἡμᾶς τῆς ἀοριστίας ἐν μεταβολῇ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος ἀπάγασα· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐν ἀμετάπτωτα καταγίνεται· SCIENCE (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us (ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΙΝ) TO SOME STOP and BOUNDARY of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by *Blemmides*, and long before him adopted by the *Peripatetics*, came originally from *Plato*, as may be seen in the following account of it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue *Socrates*, having first (according to the *Heracleitan* Philosophy, which *Cratylus* favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that *Flow* and *unceasing Mutation*, supposed by *Heracitus* to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be *permanent* and *fixed*. On this principle he thus proceeds Σκοπῶμεν δὴ, ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τῆτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιβάλλον ἐστι, ἐν μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνόν τι ὅτι ΙΣΤΗ-ΣΙΝ ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἣ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται. Let us consider, then (says he) some of the very Words already examined; and in the first place, the Word



nature will permit. For then only may *any Particular* be said to be known, when by asserting it to be *a Mun*, or *an Animal*,

SCIENCE; *how disputable is this* (as to its former Etymology) *how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than that it is carried about with them.* Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the *flowing* System of *Heraclitus* there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἑπεσθαι and μένειν, as if it *kept along* with things, by perpetually *following* them in their motions. See *Plato* as before, p. 412.

As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to *Scaliger* for the following ingenious etymology. RATIOCINATIO motus quidam est: SCIENTIA, quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam nostrum. Παρὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Sistitur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum SCIENTIA, ὅτι γίνεται ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex ab usu abiecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis participiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens, ἀκούων ὢν. Sciens, σκῶν ὢν. Scal. in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17.

The *English* Word, UNDERSTANDING, means not at

or the like, we refer it to some such *comprehensive, or general Idea*.

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properly *Knowledge* as that *Faculty of the Soul*, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm *Basis*, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable Support.

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as *fleeting powers of Perception*, like *Sense*, but rather as *steady, permanent, and durable COMPREHENSIONS*.—But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain *steady, permanent, and durable OBJECTS*; since if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PERCEIVED (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a *Greek Platonic* (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—*Εἰ ἐπὶ γνῶσις ἀκριβετέρα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, εἴη ἂν καὶ γνῶσις ἀληθετέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν*. If there be A KNOWLEDGE more accurate than SENSATION there must be certain

Now it is of these COMPREHENSIVE and PERMANENT IDEAS, THE GENUINE PERCEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS of all Languages, however different, are the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that *as the PERCEPTIONS include, so do these their SYMBOLS express, not this or that set of Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur.* Were,

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OBJECTS of *such knowledge* MORE TRUE THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following, then, are Questions worth considering, — *What these Objects are?—Where they reside?—And how they are to be discovered?*—Not by *experimental Philosophy* it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of *Mathematics*; for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We can only add, that *if they reside in our own MINDS* (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not?) then will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

—NEC TE QUESIVERIS EXTRA.

*Pera.*

therefore, the Inhabitants of *Salisbury* to be transferred to *York*, tho' new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new Language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All, indeed, that they would want, would be the *local proper Names*; which Names, as we have said already,\* are hardly a part of Language, but must equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

It is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are *now* intelligible; and why the Language of *modern England* is able to describe *antient Rome*; and that of *antient Rome* to describe

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\* Sup. p. 345, 346.

*modern England.*<sup>(A)</sup> But of these matters we have spoken before.

§ 2. AND now having viewed *the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas*, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) *whence it is that these ideas originally come*. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

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<sup>(A)</sup> As far as *Human Nature*, and the *primary Genera* both of *Substance* and *Accident* are the same in all places, and have been so thro' all ages; so far all *Languages* share one common IDENTITY. As far as *peculiar species of Substance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as the *positive Institutions of religious and civil Politics* are every where different; so far each *Language* has its peculiar DIVERSITY. To the Causes of *Diversity* here mentioned, may be added the *distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

LET us suppose any man to look for the first time upon *some work of Art*, as for example upon a Clock; and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea of what he had seen?—And what is it, *to retain such Idea?*—*It is to have A FORM INTERNAL correspondent to THE EXTERNAL*; only with this difference, that the *Internal Form is devoid of the Matter*; the *External is united with it*; being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to view *many such Machines*, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one End, he might be then said to possess a kind of INTELLIGIBLE FORM, by which he would not only understand, and know the Clocks, which he had seen *already*, but every Work also of

like Sort, which he might see *hereafter*.—Should it be asked, “*which of these Forms is prior, the External and Sensible, or the Internal and Intelligible;*” the Answer is obvious, that *the prior is the Sensible*.

THUS then we see, THERE ARE INTEL-  
LIGIBLE FORMS WHICH TO THE SENSI-  
BLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.

BUT farther still—If these Machines be allowed the Work, *not of Chance*, but of *an Artist*, they must be the Work of one, who *knew what he was about*. And what is it, *to work and know what one is about?*—*It is to have an Idea of what one is doing; to possess a FORM INTERNAL, corresponding to the EXTERNAL, to which external it serves for an EXEMPLAR or ARCHETYPE.*

HERE then we have AN INTELLIGIBLE  
FORM, WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE SEN-

SIBLE FORM; *which, being truly prior as well in dignity as in time, can no more become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect.*

Thus then, with respect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS; *one Order, intelligible and previous to these Works; a second ORDER, sensible and concomitant; and a third, again, intelligible and subsequent.* After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to *work*; thro' the Second, the Works themselves *exist*, and are what they are; and in the third they become *recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation.* To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; *the first* may be called THE MAKER'S FORM; *the second*, that of THE SUBJECT; and the *third*, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us pass from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourselves view-



ing some diversified Prospect ; “ a Plain,  
 “ for example, spacious and fertile ; a  
 “ river winding thro’ it ; by the banks of  
 “ that river, men walking, and cattle  
 “ grazing ; the view terminated with dis-  
 “ tant hills, some craggy, and some  
 “ covered with wood.” Here it is plain  
 we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL. And  
 could any one quit so fair a Sight, and  
 retain no traces of what he had beheld?—  
 And what is it, *to retain traces of what one  
 has beheld?*—It is to have certain FORMS  
 INTERNAL correspondent to the EXTER-  
 NAL, and resembling them in every thing,  
*except the being merged in Matter.* And  
 thus, thro’ the same *retentive* and *collective*  
 Powers, the Mind becomes fraught with  
*Forms natural*, as before with *Forms arti-*  
*ficial.*—Should it be asked, “ *which of these*  
*“ natural Forms are prior, the External*  
*“ ones viewed by the Senses, or the Internal*  
*“ existing in the Mind?*” the Answer is  
 obvious, that *the prior are the External.*

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil est in INTELLECTU quod non prius fuit in SENSU*; an Axiom, which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the *Ideas of a mere Contemplator*.

BUT to proceed somewhat farther—Are *natural* Productions made BY CHANCE, or BY DESIGN?—Let us admit *by Design*, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly\* more exquisite than *any* Works of ART, and yet *these* we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by *Chance*.—Admit it, and what follows?—*We must of necessity admit a MIND also, because DESIGN implies MIND, wherever it is to be*

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\* *Arist. de Part. Animal. L. I. c. 1.*

*found.* Allowing therefore this, what do we mean by the Term, MIND?—We mean *something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned.*

THAT SUCH EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you please), must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be A MIND, as above mentioned. For take away these, and *what a Mind* do we leave without them! CHANCE surely is as knowing, as MIND WITHOUT IDEAS; or rather MIND WITHOUT IDEAS is no less blind than CHANCE.

THE Nature of these IDEAS is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely *beautiful, various, and orderly*, is evident from the exquisite

Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natural Substances, which are but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they are *mental* is plain, *as they are of the Essence of MIND*, and consequently no Objects to any of the *Senses*, nor therefore circumscribed either by *Time* or *Place*.

HERE, then, on this System, we have plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FORMS SENSIBLE. Here too we see that NATURE is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER, having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS, HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSEQUENT.<sup>(1)</sup>

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<sup>(1)</sup> *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the Predicaments, calls the *first* Order of these intelligible Forms, τὰ πρὸ τῆς μεθέξεως, *those previous to Participation*, and at other times, ἡ ἐξουσιμένη κοινότης, *the transcendent Universality or Sameness*; the *second* Order he calls τὰ ἐν μεθέξει, *those which exist in Participation*, that is, those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them

THAT *the previous* may be *justly* so called is plain, because they are *essentially*

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ἡ κατατεταγμένη κοινότης, *the subordinate Universality or Sameness*; lastly, of the *third Order* he says, that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—*ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑπεσῆσαμεν, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves.* *Simp. in Prædic. p. 17.* In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—*Μήποτε ὃν τριττὸν ληπτέον τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἐξηρημένον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ἢ αἴτιον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτῷ φύσιν, ὥσπερ ἢ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν πολυειδίαν πρόληψιν—δεύτερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆς αἰτίας τοῖς διαφόροις εἶδεσιν ἐνδιδόμενον, ἢ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίας ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὑστερογενὲς ὄν—Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multi-form pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists by abstraction in our own Understandings, being of subsequent origin to the other two.* *Ibid. p. 21.*

prior to all things else. The **WHOLE**  
**VISIBLE WORLD** exhibits nothing more,

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To *Simplicius* we shall add the two following Quotations from *Ammonius* and *Nicephorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these authors are not easy to be procured.

Ἐννοεῖσθω τοίνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκτύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ  
τύχοι, Ἀχιλλέως, ἢ κηρία πολλὰ παρακείμενα· ὁ δὲ δακ-  
τύλιος σφραγιζέτω τὰς κηρὰς πάντας· ὕπερον δέ τις εἰσελ-  
θὼν ἢ θρασυμένος τὰ κηρία, ἐπισήσας ὅτι πάντα ἐξ ἐνός  
εἰσιν ἐκτυπώματος, ἔχέτω παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκτύπωμα τῇ  
διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοίνυν σφραγίς ἢ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ λέγεται.  
ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἶναι· ἢ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ  
ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· ἢ δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῷ ἀπομαξαμένῳ,  
ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἢ ὑπερογενής. Τῷτο ὅν ἐννοεῖσθαι  
ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν ἢ εἰδῶν· ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργός, ποιῶν  
πάντα, ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα· οἷον,  
ποιῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος παρ' ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ,  
πρὸς ὃ ἀφορῶν, πάντας ποιεῖ. Εἰ δέ τις ἐνταῦθα λέγων,  
ὡς ἔκ εἰσι παρὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη, ἀκείτω ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ  
Δημιουργός δημιουργεῖ, ἢ εἰδὼς τὰ ὅτι δημιουργούμενα, ἢ  
ὁκ εἰδὼς. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, ἔκ ἂν δημιουργήσει. Τίς  
γὰρ, μὲλλον ποιήσειν τὸ, ἀγνοεῖ ὃ μέλλει ποιεῖν; ὁ γὰρ,

than so many passing Pictures of these immutable Archetypes. Nay thro' these

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ὥς ἡ φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμει ποιεῖ (ὅθεν καὶ ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, ἐκ ἐφιστάμενα γνωστικῶς τῷ γιγνομένῳ) Εἰ δέ τι καθ' ἑξὶν λογικὴν ποιεῖ, οἶδεπε πάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῆς. Εἰ τοίνυν μὴ χεῖρον, ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, οἶδε τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς γιγνόμενον· εἰ δὲ οἶδεν ὁ ποιεῖ αὐτόθι δῆλον, ὥς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ ὥς ὁ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ τύπος· καὶ λέγεται τῶτο τὸ εἶδος ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ καὶ χωριστὸν τῆς ὕλης. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστον ἀνθρώποις, ὥς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κηροῖς ἐκτυπώματα· καὶ λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ εἶναι, καὶ ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης. Θεασάμενοι δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων ὅτι πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔχουσιν (ὥς ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπερον ἐλθόντος, καὶ θεασαμένους τὰ κηρία) ἀνεμαζάμεθα αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ· καὶ λέγεται τῶτο ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἡγοῦν μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ ὑπερογενές. *Intelligatur annulus, qui alicujus, utpote Achilles, imaginem insculptam habeat: multæ insuper cerae sint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quispiam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione formatas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum annulo insculptum, ANTE MULTA dicitur: in cerulis impressum, in MULTIS: quod vero in illius, qui illo venerat, intelligentiâ remanserit, POST MULTA, et posterius genitum dicitur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo;*

it attains even a Semblance of Immor-

*etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum ceteros faciat omnes. At si quis restiterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nesciet, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quiddam rationis experte aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, etsi quæ faciat non advertat): Si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et IN MULTIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspiciamus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in mente nostrâ insidens POST MULTA, et posterius genita dicitur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conspexerat. Ammon. in Porphy. Introd. p. 29. b.*

Ἀφύονται δὲ τὰ γένη ἐν τῷ εἶδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ,



tality, and continues throughout ages to

ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οἷον  
 ἐννοεῖσθω τι σφραγιτήριον, ἔχον· κὴ ἐκτύπωμα τὸ τυχόν,  
 ἐξ ᾧ κηρία πολλά μεταλάβετω τῷ ἐκτυπώματος, καὶ τις  
 ὑπ' ὅψιν ἀγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ προκατιδὼν μηδ' ὅλως τὸ  
 σφραγιτήριον· ἑωρακῶς δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκτύπωμα, κὴ ἐπιστή-  
 σας ὅτι πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ μετέχουσιν ἐκτυπώματος, κὴ τὰ  
 δοκῆντα πολλά τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἓν ἐχέτω τῷτο  
 κατὰ διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν ὅν σφραγιτήριον τύπωμα λέγεται  
 ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ  
 ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καταληφθὲν, κὴ κατὰ διάνοιαν  
 αὐλῶς ὑποσᾶν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. Οὕτως ὅν κὴ τὰ  
 γένη κὴ τὰ εἶδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μὲν εἰσιν ἐν τῷ  
 Δημιουργῷ, κατὰ τὰς ποιητικὰς λόγους· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ οἱ  
 ὁσιοποιοὶ λόγοι τῶν ὄντων ἐνιαύως προῤφετήκασιν, καθ' ἧς  
 λόγους ὁ ὑπερέσιος τὰ ὄντα πάντα κὴ προώρισεν κὴ παρή-  
 γαγεν· ὑφήγηκέναι δὲ λέγονται τὰ γένη κὴ τὰ εἶδη ΕΝ  
 ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώποις τὸ  
 τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδος ἐστὶ, κὴ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἵπποις τὸ τῷ  
 ἵππῳ εἶδος· ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ, κὴ ἵπποις, κὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις  
 ζώοις τὸ γένος εὐρίσκεται τῶν τοιούτων εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ  
 ζῶον· κἄν τοῖς ζώοις ὁμῶς κὴ τοῖς ζωοφύτοις τὸ καθολι-  
 κώτερον γένος, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ἐξετάζεται· συναχθέντων δὲ  
 κὴ τῶν φυτῶν, θεωρεῖται τὸ ἐμψυχον· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἐμψύ-  
 χοις ἐθέλει τις ἐπισκοπεῖν κὴ τὰ ἄψυχα, τὸ σῶμα σύμπαν  
 κατόψεται· συνδραμεσῶν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένους τῶν ἀσωμάτων  
 δαιμόνων, τὸ πρῶτον γένος φαίνεται κὴ γενεκάστατον ᾧ ὅττω

he SPECIFICALLY ONE, amid those infi-

μὲν EN TOIS ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ὑφέστηκε τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη. Καταλαβὼν δὲ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων αὐτὴν τὴν ἱκνότητα, καὶ ἔτω τὸν καθόλου ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τὸν καθόλου ἵππου ἐπινοήσας· καὶ τὸ καθόλου ζῶον ἐκ τῶν καθέκατα τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγὼν· καὶ τὸ καθόλου αἰσθητικὸν, καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐμφρον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου σῶμα, καὶ τὴν καθολικωτάτην εἶσαν ἐξ ἀπάντων συλλογισάμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ διανοίᾳ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐλως ὑπέστησεν EPI TOIS ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, τετέστι, μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπερογενῶς. Genera verò et Species dicuntur esse ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum, quolibet figuram habens, ex quo multe cetera ejusdem figure sint participes, et in medium aliquis has proferat, nequaquam præviso sigillo. Cum autem vidisset eas ceras in quibus figura exprimitur, et animadvertisset omnes eandem figuram participare, et quæ videbantur multe, ratione in unum coegisset, hoc in mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse species ANTE MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quæ vero ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsistit, POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes. In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes una et simpliciter præ-existunt; secundum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in singulis hominibus hominis Species, et

nite particular changes, that befall it every moment.<sup>(k)</sup>

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*in singulis equis equi Species est. In hominibus æque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempe sensitivum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animatum. Si verò una cum animatis quisquam velit perscrutari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem IN MULTIS subsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam humanam, et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum, et universale animatum et universale corpus, et maxime universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in sua mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, hoc est, POST MULTA, et posterius genita. Niceph. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcim. in Platonic. Philosoph. Introdue. C. IX. X.*

<sup>(k)</sup> The following elegant lines of *Virgil* are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

*Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi  
Excipiat; (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)  
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET.—G. IV.*

MAY we be allowed then to credit those speculative Men, who tell us, "*it is in these permanent and comprehensive FORMS that THE DEITY views at once, without looking abroad, all possible productions,*

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The same *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind*, may be seen in all *perishable* substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' *individuals perish*, the *several kinds still remain*. And hence, if we take *TIME*, as denoting the *system of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the *Timæus*, where the philosopher describes *TIME* to be—*μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα*. *Æternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem*. *Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.*

We have subjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to serve as a commentary on this description of *TIME*.—*ÆTERNITAS igitur est, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clariùs liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPORE, id præsens à præteritis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatium pariter possit amplecti; sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit, hæternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vitâ non amplius vivitis, quam in illo nobili transitorioque momento.*

“ both present, past, and future—that this  
 “ great and stupendous View is but a View  
 “ of himself, where all things lie enveloped  
 “ in their Principles and Exemplars, as  
 “ being essential to the fulness of his univer-  
 “ sal Intellection ?”—If so, it will be  
 proper that we invert the Axiom before

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*Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec ceperit unquam esse, nec desinat, vitæque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est, ut æternum esse jure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinita licet vitæ spatium comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vitæ plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec præteriti fluxerit, id ÆTERNUM esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est, et sui compos præsens sibi semper assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præsentem. Unde quidam non rectè, qui cum audiunt visum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-æternum putant. Aliud est enim PER INTERMINABILEM DUCI VITAM, (quod Mundo Platon tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM, quod Divinæ Mentis proprium esse manifestum est.*

mentioned. We must now say—*Nil est in SENSU, quod non prius fuit in INTELLECTU.* For though the contrary may be true with respect to Knowledge merely human, yet never can it be true with respect to Knowledge universally, *unless we give Precedence to ATOMS and LIFE-*

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*Neque enim Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNC ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STATUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM MOTUS IMITATUR; cumque eum effingere, atque æquare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate præsentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam potius vitæ suæ plenitudinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso, quod aliquo modo nunquam esse desinit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans se ad quaecumque præsentiam hujus exigui voluerisque momenti: quæ, quoniam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRÆSENTIÆ QUANDAM GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibuscumque contigerit, id præstat, ut ESSE videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit; eoque modo factum est, ut CONTINUABET VITAM EUNDO, cujus plenitudinem complecti non valuit PERMANENDO. Itaque, &c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.*

LESS BODY, making MIND, *among other things, to be struck out by a lucky Concourse.*

§ 3. It is far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our latter Metaphysicians. But yet it is somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above *Precedence*.

FOR mark the Order of things, according to *their* account of them.—First comes that huge Body *the sensible World*. Then this and its Attributes beget *sensible Ideas*. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made *Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general*. Thus should they admit that MIND was coeval with BODY, yet *till BODY gave it Ideas*, and awakened its dormant Powers; it could at best have been nothing more,

than a sort of dead Capacity ; for INNATE IDEAS it could not possibly have any.

AT another time we hear of *Bodies* so exceedingly fine, that their very *Exility* makes them susceptible of *sensation* and *knowledge* ; as if they shrunk into *Intellect* by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as *subtle Æther*, *animal Spirits*, *nervous Ducts*, *Vibrations*, and the like ; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

BUT the *intellectual Scheme*, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing *corporeal* to the *primary mental Cause*. It is *here* it looks for the origin of *intelligible Ideas*, even of those, which exist in *human Capacities*. For tho' *sensible Objects* may



be the destined medium, *to awaken* the dormant Energies of *Man's* Understanding, yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in *Sense*, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the *Platonic Olympiodorus* (quoted before, p. 371), upon the *Phædo* of *Plato*; which, tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiscence*, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the *Senses* assist in the acquisition of *Science*, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.

Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χείρω ἐν δέυτερα ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτίαι εἰσὶ τῶν κρείττωνων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ ἐν ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰσθησιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσαν ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλου—κατὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐννοίαν εἴρηται καὶ τὸ ἐν Τιμαίῳ, ὅτι δι' ὀψέως καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορίσαμεθα γένος, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἀφικνύμεθα. *Those things, which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the Principles or Causes of the more excellent: and though we admit the common interpretations, and allow SENSE to be a Principle of SCIENCE, we must, however, call it a Principle, not as if it was the efficient Cause, but as it raises*

IN short, ALL MINDS, that are, are  
SIMILAR and CONGENIAL; and so too

*our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RECOLLECTION.*

And in another passage he observes—Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἀγαλμὰ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐριδιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμνησκαται ἐν ἑνδον ἔχει λόγων, ἐς τέρας προβάλλεται. *For in as much as the SOUL, by containing the Principles of all beings, is a sort of OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION or EXEMPLAR; when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.*

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ εἶδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσαν ἔσγε ἐπιστήμην τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτὰς ἔχοντας ἢ τελειότερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἴσχειν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ ἐν τελειότερον τῷτο ἢ ἀκριβέστερον ἀκ ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἴσχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δ' αὖ μῆδαμὲ ἀλλόθι ὅν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι· ὃ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μῆδαμὲ ὅν, τι διανοεῖσθαι τὰς γὰρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν ἐχὶ μὴ ὄντων ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἄλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων εἶναι συνθέσεις τῶν, ὃ κατὰ τὸ

are *their Ideas, or intelligible Forms.*  
Were it otherwise, there could be no in-

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ὁρθὸν γινομένης. Λείπεσθαι δὲ ἀφ' ἑτέρας τινὸς φύσεως πολλῶν ἐν κρείττονός τε καὶ τελειώτερας ἀφήκειν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελειώτερον τῶτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγων. *Those who suppose IDEAL FORMS, say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of Science, those proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior Perfection or Accuracy the soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence any where else. For the Soul is not formed so as to conceive that, which has existence no where, since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them compositions, irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but of various real beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this perfection, which is superior to the proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the Soul from SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH IS BY MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PERFECT. Pleth. de Aristotel. et Platonic. Philosoph. Diff. Edit. Paris 1541.*

*The ΛΟΓΟΙ or PROPORTIONS, of which Gemistius here speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions of Equality and Inequality, which exist in quantity (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they*

tercourse between Man and Man, or (what is more important) between Man and God.

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may be extended to mathematical *Lines, Angles, Figures*, &c. of all which Λόγοι or *Proportions*, tho' we possess in the *Mind* the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned whether any one of them ever existed in the *sensible* world.

To these two authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or INTELLECT, wholly distinct from *Sensation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

*Hæc est efficiens magis,  
Longè caussa potentior,  
Quam quæ materiæ modo  
Impressas patitur notas.  
Præcedit tamen excitans,  
Ac vires animi movens,  
Vivo in corpore passio.  
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,  
Vel vox auribus instrepit ;  
Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitus,  
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,  
Ad motus simileis vocans,  
Notis applicat exteris,  
INTROBSSUMQUE RECONDITIS  
FORMIS miscet imagines.*

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

FOR what is Conversation between Man and Man?—It is a mutual intercourse of *Speaking* and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker, it is *to teach* ; to the Hearer, it is *to learn*.—To the Speaker, it is *to descend* from *Ideas* to *Words* ; to the Hearer, it is *to ascend* from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at *no* Ideas, then is he said *not to understand* ; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said *to misunderstand*.—What then is requisite, that he may be said *to understand* ?—That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up *within himself*, correspondent and similar to those *within the Speaker*. The same may be said of a *Writer* and a *Reader* ; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid* wrote in *Greece* two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvellous, there should be *so exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they

were only generated from *sensible* Objects, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in Time, distant in Place, and no one Particular the same with any other?

AGAIN, do we allow it possible for God to signify his *will* to Men; or for Men to signify their *wants* to God?—In both these cases there must be an *Identity of Ideas*, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these COMMON IDENTIC IDEAS come?—Those of Men, it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And whence come God's *Ideas*?—Not surely from *Sensation* too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to *Body* that notable *Precedence of being prior to the Intellection of even God himself*.—Let them then be *original*; let them be *connate*, and *essential to the divine Mind*.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental (things derived from subjects so*

*totally distinct) should so happily coincide in the same wonderful Identity?*

HAD we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all MINDS have their Ideas *derived*, or all have them *original*; or *some have them original, and some derived*. If all Minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, *which is itself not Mind*, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. If all have them original, *then are all Minds divine*, an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must *one* Mind (at least) have *original* Ideas, and the rest have them *derived*. Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them?—From MIND, or from BODY?—From MIND, a thing *homogeneous*; or from BODY, a thing *heterogeneous*? From MIND, such as (from the Hypothesis) has *original Ideas*; or

from BODY, which we cannot discover to have any Ideas at all?<sup>(a)</sup>—An Examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of *the Epicurean Poet*,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum constare,*  
*animamque;*

or trust *the Mantuan Bard*, when he sings in divine numbers,

*Ignæus est ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO*  
*Seminibus.*——

BUT it is now time to quit these Specu-

<sup>(a)</sup> ΝΟΥΝ Δὲ εἶδεν ΣΩΜΑ γεννᾶ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ  
ΑΝΟΗΤΑ ΝΟΥΝ γεννησῶι; *No BODY produces MIND:*  
*for how should THINGS DEVOID OF MIND produce MIND?*  
*Sallust de Diis et Mundo, c. 8.*



lations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.

## CHAP. V.

*Subordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.*

ORIGINAL TRUTH,<sup>(a)</sup> having the most intimate connection with the *Supreme Intelligence*, may be said (as it were) to

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(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Sensation*, have a short method to explain the nature of TRUTH. It is a *factitious* thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance the last of any, being not only subsequent to *sensible* Objects, but even to our *Sensations* of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many TRUTHS, which have been, and are

shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence.—Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but itself neither admits *Diminution*, nor *Change*, because the Darkness respects

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no longer; others, that will be, and have not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those, I mean, who represent TRUTH not as the *last*, but the *first* of Beings; who call it *immutable, eternal, omnipresent*; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method *how they perceive* Truth, was to pass for an account of *Truth itself*; as if to describe the road to *London*, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are pro-

only particular Percipients. Among *these* therefore we must look for ignorance and error, and for that *Subordination of Intelligence*, which is their natural consequence.

WE have daily experience in the Works of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will suffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to

duced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of *natural materials*, but are as much *creatures of our own*, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If *Milton* by his *URANIA* intended to represent TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more antient, as well as a far more noble origin.

————— *Heav'nly born!*

*Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,*

*Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,*

*Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play*

*In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd*

*With thy celestial Song.*——

P. L. VII.

See *Proverbs* VIII. 22, &c. *Jeremiah* X. 10. *Marc. Antonin.* IX. 1.

NATURE; and well for mankind it is found to be true, else never could we attain any *natural* Knowledge at all. For if the *constitutive Proportions of a Clock* are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to *those seminal Proportions*, which make the essence and character of every *natural Subject*?—Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some *too general*, some *too partial*, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are *erroneous*, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνης' ἀπιστῶν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν.

AND thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of LETTERS,

and that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it being the business of both *to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth.*<sup>(b)</sup>

IN this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how these *peculiar* Ideas become THE GENIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, since the *Symbol* must of course correspond to its *Archetype*;<sup>(c)</sup>

<sup>(b)</sup> How useful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DISQUISITION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph. Mem.* IV. 5, 6. *Arrian. Epist.* I. 17. II. 10. *Marc. Anton.* III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

<sup>(c)</sup> ΗΘΟΥΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ἔστι τ' ἀνθρώπου ΛΟΓΟΣ. *Stob. Capiuntur Signa haud levia, sed observatu digna (quod fortasse quispiam non putavit) de ingentis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum.* *Bacon. de Augm. Scient.* VI. 1. Vid. etiam. *Quintil. L. XI. p. 675. Edit. Capperon. Diog. L. I. p. 58. et Menag. Com. Traz. Disp. V. 16.*

how the *wisest* Nations, having the *most* and *best Ideas*, will consequently have the *best* and *most copious Languages*; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices, discover by WORDS, to whom they are indebted for THINGS.

To illustrate what has been said by a few examples. WE BRITONS in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our *multiform* Language may sufficiently shew. Our terms in *polite Literature* prove, that this came from *Greece*; our terms in *Music* and *Painting*, that these came from *Italy*; our Phrases in *Cookery* and *War*, that we learnt these from the *French*; and our Phrases in *Navigation*, that we were taught by the *Flemings* and *Low Dutch*. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in *Regularity* and *Analogy*.

Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, we gain in *Copiousness*, in which last respect few Languages will be found superior to our own.

LET us pass from ourselves to the NATIONS OF THE EAST. The <sup>(a)</sup> Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about *the Form of their*

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<sup>(a)</sup> Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δαλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἥθη οἱ μὲν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ἔδεν δυσχεραίνοντες. *For the Barbarians, by being more slavish in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent.* Arist. Polit. III. 4.



*Government*; for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception); it was all from the poor motive of, *who should be their MASTER*, whether a *Cyrus* or an *Artaxerxes*, a *Mahomet*, or a *Mustapha*.

SUCH was their Condition, and what was the consequence?—Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction, for ever in their sight, was that of *Tyrant* and *Slave*; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into

*the Great and Magnificent*,<sup>(\*)</sup> they as frequently degenerated into the *Tumid* and *Bombast*. *The Greeks too of Asia* became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their masters; and hence that *Luxuriance of the Asiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the *Nature or Genius of the Romans*.

AND what sort of People may we pronounce the ROMANS?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts.

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(\*) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the dispensations of divine Providence, &c.

Hence therefore their LANGUAGE became, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms expressive of things *political*, and well adapted to the purposes both of *History* and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was their *Philosophy*?—As a Nation, it was none; if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language to this Subject; a defect, which even *Cicero* is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes *Philosophy* himself, from the number of terms, which he is obliged to invent.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> See *Cic. de Fin.* I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. I, 2, 4. &c. but in particular *Tusc. Disp.* I. 3. where he says, PHILOSOPHIA jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen LITEARUM LATINARUM; quæ illustranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c. See also *Tusc. Disp.* IV. 3. and *Acad.* I. 2. where it appears, that till CICEBO applied himself to the writing of *Philosophy*, the Romans had nothing of the kind in their Language, except some mean performances of *Amasanius* the *Epicurean*, and others of the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted to *Cicero* for *Philosophy*, and with what industry, as well as

*Virgil* seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when, admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

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eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of these Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The *Epicurean* Poet LUCRETIVS, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have overlooked the *Latin* writers of his own sect; deriving all his Philosophy, as well as *Cicero*, from *Grecian* Sources: and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in *Philosophy* in *Latin*, both from the *Poverty* of the Tongue, and from the *Novelty* of the Subject.

*Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM obscura reperta  
 Difficile inlustrare LATINIS versibus esse,  
 (Multa novis rebus præsertim quod sit agendum,)  
 Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ et RERUM NOVITATEM;  
 Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas  
 Suavis amicitia quemvis preferre laborem  
 Suadet——* Lucr. I. 137.

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of *Philosophy*; as did the Patriot BRUTUS, a Treatise concerning *Virtue*, much applauded by *Cicero*; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came HORACE,

*Tu* REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, *Romane,*  
*memento,*  
(*Hæ tibi erunt artes*) *pacisque imponere*  
*morem,*  
*Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.*

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some of whose satires and epistles may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of *Latin Philosophy*, whether we consider the purity of their Style, or the great Address with which they treat the Subject.

After *Horace*, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of *Augustus* to those of *Nero*, came the Satirist *PERSIUS*, the friend and disciple of the Stoic *Cornutus*; to whose precepts, as he did honour by his virtuous Life, so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single *difficult* writer among the *Latin Classics*, whose meaning has sufficient merit to make it worth while to Labour through his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period lived also *SENECA*; whose character both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble author of the *Characteristics*, to whom we refer.

Under a milder dominion, that of *Hadrian* and the *Antonines*, lived *AULUS GELLIUS*, or (as some call him) *AGELLIUS*, an entertaining writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who, tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a *Philosopher*, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

FROM considering *the Romans* let us pass to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN COMMONWEALTHS, while they maintained

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With *Aulus Gellius* we range MACROBIUS, not because a Contemporary (for he is supposed to have lived under *Honorius* and *Theodosius*), but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Somnium Scipionis* of *Cicero*, may be considered as wholly of the *philosophical* kind.

In the same age with *Aulus Gellius*, flourished APULEIUS of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a *Platonic* Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was MARTIANUS CAPELLA, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a *Philologist*, than of a *Philosopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank CHALCIDIUS the *Platonic*, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timæus* of *Plato*.

their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy that ever existed. They were

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The last *Latin* Philosopher was BOETHIUS, who was descended from some of the noblest of the *Roman* Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greatest part in the *Logical* way. But his *Ethic* piece, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, and which is partly prose and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbed *Africans* already mentioned. By command of *Theodoric*, king of the *Goths*, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the *Latin Tongue*, and the last remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other *Romans*, who left *Philosophical* Writings; such as MUSONIUS RUFUS, and the two Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS and JULIAN; but as these preferred the use of the *Greek Tongue* to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of *Latin* Writers.

And so much (by way of Sketch) for THE LATIN AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.

the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men. In the short space of little more than a Century, they became such Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers, that one can hardly help considering THAT GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to shew to what perfection the Species might ascend.<sup>(a)</sup>

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<sup>(a)</sup> If we except *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the *Lyric Poets*, we hear of few *Grecian Writers* before the expedition of *Xerxes*. After that monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the *Persian* power was at an end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that *Golden Period* spoken of above. I do not mean that *Greece* had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the *Great*, the *Striking*, the *Sublime* (call it as you please) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could ascend in any after age.



NOW THE LANGUAGE OF THESE GREEKS was truly like themselves, it was conformable to their transcendant and

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The same kind of fortune befel the people of *Rome*. When the *Punic* wars were ended, and *Carthage* their dreaded rival was no more, then (as *Horace* informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and *Rome*, like *Greece*, had her *Golden Period*, which lasted to the death of *Octavius Cæsar*.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one THE SOCRATIC PERIOD, the other the CICERONIAN.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals), so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then among the *Greeks* that fatal *Peloponnesian War*, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke

universal Genius. Where Matter so abounded, Words followed of course, and

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the confederacy of their Commonwealths ; wasted their strength ; made them jealous of each other ; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the *Romans* ; raised those unhappy contests between the *Senate* and the *Gracchi* ; between *Sylla* and *Marius* ; between *Pompey* and *Cæsar* ; till, at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Cassius* at *Philippi*, and the subsequent defeat of *Anthony* at *Actium*, the *Romans* became subject to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.

It must indeed be confessed, that after *Alexander* and *Octavius* had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. *Aristotle* maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the same monarch lived *Theophrastus*, and the Cynic *Diogenes*. Then also *Demosthenes* and *Æschines* spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of *Octavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Æneid*, and with *Horace*, *Varius*, and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it must be re-

those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in *Greek*.

HERE were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an *Aristophanes*; for the native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Menander*; for the amorous Strains of a

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membered, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. It was hence they derived that high and manly spirit which made them the admiration of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by *Alexander* and *Octavius*, soon stopt the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble saying of *Longinus*—Θρέψαι τε γὰρ ἱκανῇ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων ἢ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ, ἢ ἐπελπίσαι, ἢ ἅμα διωθεῖν τὸ πρόθυμον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἱριδος, ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμίας. It is LIBERTY that is formed to nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses; to inspire them with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one with another, and the generous emulation of being the first in rank. De Subl. Sect. 44.

*Mimnermus* or *Sappho*; for the rural lays of a *Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the sublime Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The same in Prose. Here *Isocrates* was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here *Demosthenes* found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withstood.

Who were more different in exhibiting their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and his disciple *Aristotle*? Different, I say, in their character of *Composition*; for as to their *Philosophy itself*, it was in reality *the same*. *Aristotle*, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such a pregnant

brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed in *Greek*? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves, either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either *Xenophon* or *Plato*, nothing of this *method* and strict *order* appears. The *Formal* and *didactic* is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, it is without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

AND yet though these differ in this manner from the *Stagirite*, how different are they likewise in character from each other?—*Plato*, copious, figurative, and

majestic ; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric ; enriching his Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect simplicity ; every where smooth, harmonious, and pure ; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the mystic ; ascending but rarely into the Sublime ; nor then so much trusting to the colours of stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment itself.

THE Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner.

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE,

*from its propriety and universality, made for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.*

*GRAIIS ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ore rotundo  
Musa loqui.*

IT were to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such as do either from views more sordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery), it were to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of *Grecian Literature*; that they would not waste those hours which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the *French* and *English* Press; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely

find any rational pleasure, and more rarely still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *it is Men, and not Books*, we must study, to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright



Examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the common helps, have been sufficient *of themselves* to great and important Ends. But alas!

*Decipit exemplar vitii imitabile—*

IN truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of *natural Capacity*, and of *superinduced Habit*. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess *the best Capacities*, cultivated with *the best Habits*. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of CULTURE and GOOD LEARNING, *they are able to render a Man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.*

AND so much at present as to GENERAL IDEAS; *how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their Nature; and what their connection with Language.* So much likewise as to the Subject of this Treatise, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

***THE*** following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.



## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

**PAGE 95.**—[TO STOP, &c.] The Quotation from *Proclus* in the Note may be thus rendered—**THAT THING IS AT REST, which FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE, both itself and its Parts.**

P. 105. In the Note, for *γινόμενον* read *γενόμενον*, and render the passage thus—*For by this faculty* (namely the faculty of Sense) *we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.*

P. 106. NOTE <sup>(d)</sup>.] The passage of *Philoponus*, here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings *corporeal* and *sensible*, which were said to be *nearly approaching to Non-Entities*. The Author explains this, among other reasons, by the following—  
Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔσι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῦθα τὸ παρελθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠφάνισται καὶ ἔκ ἐτι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ ἐτι· συμπαρατίθει δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολέθημά ἐστι ὁ χρόνος. *How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entities? In the first place, because HERE (where they exist) exists THE PAST and THE FUTURE, and these are NON-ENTITIES; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with TIME, or rather it is upon their Motion that TIME is an Attendant.*

P. 119.—in the Note here subjoined, mention is made of the REAL Now, or INSTANT, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a *necessary* Connection between *Existence* and the *Present Instant*, because *no other Point* of Time can properly be said to be, but also between *Existence* and *Life*, because whatever *lives*, by the same reason necessarily *Is*. Hence *Sophocles*, speaking of *Time present*, elegantly says of it—

—χρόνῳ τῷ ζώντι, ἢ παρόντι νῦν  
THE LIVING, and now present TIME.

*Trachin.* V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Passage in *Virgil* of which *Servius* here speaks, is a description of *Turnus's* killing two brothers, *Amycus* and *Dioreas*; after which the Poet says of him,

—curru abscissa DUORUM  
*Suspendit capita.*————

This, literally translated, is—he *hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off*, whereas the sense requires, of *THE Two persons*, that is to say, of *Amycus* and *Dioreas*. Now this by *Amborum* would have been exprest properly, as *Amborum* means *THE Two*; by *Duorum* is exprest improperly, as it means only *Two indefinitely*.

P. 259.—The Passage in Note <sup>(c)</sup> from *Themistius* may be thus rendered—*Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.*

P. 294.—Note <sup>(c)</sup>—*There are in the number of things many, which have a most known EXISTENCE, but a most unknown ESSENCE; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn.* Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.

P. 340—[LANGUAGE—INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING DEMONSTRATION.] See Three Treatises, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note to the Words, *The Source of infinite Truths, &c.*

P. 368—in the Note—*yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.*]

*Philoponus*, from the Philosophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, seems to have far excelled these *Moderns* in his account of WISDOM or PHILOSOPHY, and its *Attributes*, or *essential Characters*.—“Ἰδιον γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχσει διαφορὰν δεῖξαι τὴν κοινωσίαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχσει κοινωσίαν δεῖξαι τίνι διαφέρεισιν· ὁ γὰρ δυσχερὲς τὸ δεῖξαι φάττης (*lege* φάττης) καὶ περιτεροῦς κοινωσίαν (παντὶ γὰρ πρῶτον), ἀλλ’ ὁ (*lege* ὅπερ) τὸ διάφορον τῶν εἰπεῖν· ὁ δὲ κυνὸς καὶ ἵππου διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τί κοινὸν ἔχουσιν. IT IS THE PROPER BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; and IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHARACTER, THRO’ WHAT IT IS THEY DIFFER. *It is indeed*



*no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove (for this is evident to every one), but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common.* Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 379—THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN, &c.] The Words of *Aristotle*, here referred to, are these—*μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς.* THE PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN and BEAUTY are more in the Works of NATURE, than they are in those of ART.

P. 379—WE MUST OF NECESSITY ADMIT A MIND, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third Book of a manuscript Comment of Proclus on the *Parmenides* of Plato, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of IDEAS, as held by antient Philosophers.

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑποθέσεως, δι' ἣν ἐκείνοις ἤρρισε, ρητέον ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα, ὅσα ὄρατά, ἑράνια καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ἢ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης ἐστίν, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης ἀδύνατον· ἐπὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπέροις τὰ κρείττονα, νῆς, καὶ λόγος, καὶ αἰτία, καὶ τὰ αἰτίας, καὶ ἕξω τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείττω τῶν ἀρχῶν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ δ' φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· δεῖ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ, τέτων γὰρ ἐκβάσις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε τὸ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτης τὰ θεϊότατα ἦν τῶν φανερώων. If

*therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from CHANCE, or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the ENDINGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGINNINGS. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL, in as much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS A DEVIATION FROM THEM; so that whatever is the effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the effect of Chance, even though we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects [the heavens themselves].*

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite Cause of the World in opposition to Chance, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things, this Cause must be ONE. After which he goes on as follows.—

—Εἰ μὲν ὃν ἀλογον τῷτο, ἀποπον' ἔσαι γάρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑστέρων τῆς τέτων αἰτίας κρείττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἢ γνῶσιν ποιῶν, εἴσω τῷ Παντός ὃν, ἢ τῷ Ὅλῳ μέρος, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀλόγως τοῖστω. Εἰ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, ἢ αὐτὸ γινώσκον, οἶδεν ἑαυτὸ δῆπρ τῶν πάντων αἴτιον ὃν, ἢ τῷτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀγνοήσει τὴν ἑαυτῷ φύσιν. Εἰ δὲ οἶδεν, ὅτι κατ' ἑστίαν ἐστὶ τῷ παντός αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ὥρισμένως εἰδὼς θάτε-

ρον, ἢ θάτερον οἶδεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἶδεν ἄρα ἢ ὃ ἐστὶν αἰτιὸν ὠρισμένως· οἶδεν ἔν ἢ τὸ Πᾶν, ἢ πάντα ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, ὧν ἐστὶ ἢ αἰτιον. Καὶ εἰ τῷτο, ἦτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἄρα βλέπον, ἢ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκον, οἶδε τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ. Λόγοις ἄρα ἢ εἶδесιν ἀύλοις οἶδε τὰς Κοσμικὰς Λογας, ἢ τὰ εἶδη, ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, ἢ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ Πᾶν, ὡς ἐν αἰτίῳ, χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης.—

*Now IF THIS CAUSE BE VOID OF REASON, that indeed would be absurd ; for then again there would be something among those things, which came last in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cause. I mean by more excellent, something operating according to Reason and Knowledge, and yet within that Universe, and a Part of that Whole, which is, what it is, from a Cause devoid of Reason.*

*But if, on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON and knowing itself, it of course knows itself to be the Cause of all things ; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from ITS VERY ESSENCE IT IS THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the Cause. IT KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, and all things out of which the Universe is composed, of all which also it is the Cause. But if this be true, it is evident that BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER ITSELF, AND IS SUBSEQUENT. It is, therefore, through certain REASONS and FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER that it knows those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the*

*Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause, distinct from and without the Matter.*

P. 380—AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] It is upon these Principles that *Nicomachus*, in his *Arithmetic*, p. 7, calls the *Supreme Being an Artist*—ἐν τῇ τῆς τεχνίτης Θεῆς διανοίᾳ, in *Dei artificis mente*. Where *Philoponus*, in his *manuscript Comment*, observes as follows—τεχνίτην φησὶ τὸν Θεόν, ὡς πάντων τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας καὶ τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα. He calls GOD an ARTIST, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—ὥσπερ ἐν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, ποῖσμεν τόδε τι, ἔγω καὶ ὁ δημιουργός, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀποβλέπων, τὰ τῇδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν· ἀλλ' ἵπτον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῇδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ παντέλειοι εἰσιν. As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at those Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those REASONS or Proportions, which exist in GOD, are ARCHETYPAL and ALL-PERFECT.

It is according to this Philosophy, that *Milton* represents God, after he had created this visible World, contemplating

—how it shou'd

*In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair,*

ANSWERING HIS GREAT IDEA.—

P. Lost, VII. 556.

*Proclus* proves the Existence of these GENERAL IDEAS OF UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Arguments—  
 εἰ τοίνυν εἶναι αἰτία τῆ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖσα, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐαυτῆς ποιεῖ ἑσας τῆς εἰ πρώτως, ὅπερ τὸ ποιεῖμενον δευτέρως ἢ ὃ εἰ πρώτως, δίδωσι τῷ ποιεῖμεν δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἢ δίδωσι θερμότητα ἄλλω, ἢ εἰς θερμὸν, ἡ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωὴν, ἢ ἔχει ζωὴν, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντων ἴδοις ἂν ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσα αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ. ἢ τὸ αἷτιον ἐν τῆ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖν τῆς εἰ πρώτως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὴ ὁ κόσμος πλήρωμα εἰδῶν ἐπὶ παντοίων, εἴη ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ τῆς κόσμος ταῦτα πρώτως· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αἷτιον ἢ ἥλιον, ἢ σελήνην, ἢ ἀνθρωπον ὑπέστησε, ἢ ἵππον, ἢ ὅλως τὰ εἶδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί. ταῦτα ἄρα πρώτως εἶναι ἐν τῇ αἰτία τῆς παντὸς, ἄλλος ἥλιος παρὰ τὸν ἐμφανῆ, ἢ ἄλλος ἀνθρωπος, ἢ τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοίως ἕκαστον. εἶναι ἄρα τὰ εἶδη πρὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἢ αἰτία αὐτῶν τὰ δημιουργικὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μὲν τῆς κόσμος παντὸς αἰτία προϋπάρχοντα. *If therefore THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE be a cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing, operate from its own proper Essence, SUCH CAUSE IS PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARILY, and that which it is primarily, it giveth to its Effect secondarily. It is thus that Fire both giveth Warmth to something else, and is itself warm; that the*

*Soul giveth Life, and possesseth Life; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows, therefore, THAT THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, IS THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SECONDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the plenitude of FORMS of all Sorts, these FORMS MUST ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD, for it was the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The FORMS, therefore, PREVIOUS to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their ACTIVE and EFFICIENT CAUSES, are to be found PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE. Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.*

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this *antient* Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from *Plato* and *Socrates* to *Parmenides*, *Pythagoras*, and *Orpheus* himself.

If the Phrase, *to operate merely by existing*, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the *Supreme Being* no Attributes are *secondary*, *intermittent*, or *adventitious*, but all *original*, *ever perfect*, and *essential*. See p. 162, 359.

That we should not therefore think of a *blind unconscious* operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, *by uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy*, where he forms the Character of these *Divine and Creative Ideas*.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐθέλομεν τὴν ιδιότητα αὐτῶν (sc. ἰδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάβωμεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιητικόν, ὣν δὴ καὶ ποίησι· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωστικόν, ὣν ποίησιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποίησι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐνώσαντες φῶμεν αἰτίας εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας δημιουργικὰς ἅμα καὶ νοεράς πάντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελεσμένων. *But if we should chuse to define the peculiar character of IDEAS by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EFFECTING, MERELY BY EXISTING, all the things that they effect; and from ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF COMPREHENDING all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that IDEAS are at once the EFFICIENT and INTELLIGENT CAUSES of all things produced according to Nature.* From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, *Thomas Aquinas*, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. *Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificata ad Artem.*

The Verses of *Orpheus* on this subject may be found

in the tract *De Mundo*, ascribed to *Aristotle*, p. 23. Edit. *Sylburg*.

Ζεὺς ἄρσεν γενέτο, Ζεὺς κ. τ. λ.

P. 391.—WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED, &c.]

—ὅσα πέρ ἐστι ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δὴ τινα μερισμὸν, τοσαῦτα ἢ ΤΟ ΕΝ ἐκείνο πρὸ τῷ μερισμῷ κατὰ τὸ πάντῃ ἀμερές· ὃ γὰρ ἐν, ὡς ἐλάχιστον, καθάπερ ὁ Σπείσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν ἀλλ' ΕΝ ΩΣ ΠΑΝΤΑ. *As numerous as is the MULTITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS by Partition, so numerous also is that PRINCIPLE OF UNITY by universal Impartibility. For it is not ONE, as a MINIMUM is one (according to what Speucippus seemed to say), but it is ONE, as being ALL THINGS. Damascius, περὶ Ἀρχῶν, MS.*

P. 408—THE WISEST NATIONS—THE MOST COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] It is well observed by *Muretus*—*Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quæsierunt. Var. Lect. VI. 1.*

P. 411—BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSOPHY?] The same *Muretus* has the following passage upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.—*Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores ROMANI, in petendis honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Græculis esurientibus relinquebant. Ipsi, quod ab avaritia, quod ab am-*



*bitone, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus et partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Græcum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam victam a se et prostrigatam jacere Græciam somniabant. Var. Lect. VI. 1.*

# I N D E X.

## A.

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